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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Contextualizing Diaspora: Studies in Jewish Emplacement, 
Social Construction, Materiality, and Memory 
 
by 
 
Daniel P. Hotary 
 
 
 
 This dissertation explores the experience of diaspora and traces how it appears, 
changes, and operates within Judaism. I present case studies that question issues such as origins, 
reflections on travel, and intergenerational conflict. Each study exposes gaps found in previous 
studies of diaspora and posits how certain aspects of the phenomenon can be reexamined. I 
explore these gaps with theoretical models that one would not necessarily associate with 
diaspora in order to better understand how diaspora operates. I argue that diaspora exists due to 
its imagined quality and necessity of having to be remembered, through juxtaposition of early 
Israel’s archaeological and textual origins. From consideration of early Israel as partial 
indigenous peasantry to textual accounts locating Israel’s cultural memory as originating 
elsewhere, a new dimension of diaspora emerges. Emplacements, both spatial and temporal, 
obscure diaspora, which is an ever-present condition originating as an act/commemoration of 
remembrance. 
 Another portion of my work confronts how one writes about travel, home, and 
homeland, especially once one has in fact physically returned; and asks, “To what shall one 
commit?” To answer these questions I look at representative examples of Hebrew fiction and 
later extend the scope of the investigation to look at more social-scientific and journalistic 
reflections in Israel. Many scholars studying the Jewish diaspora continue the prevalent 
understanding of physical homecoming to the Land as a fait accompli, which, according to some 
	 ix 
interpretations, prohibits creativity and presupposes an already achieved redemption. This 
approach, however, misunderstands the calls for continued alienation and separation, regardless 
of location, thus denying access to more ways in which diaspora exists. By employing the 
theoretical frameworks of the chronotope (time-space literary analysis), as well as threshold and 
liminal moments, I delve into the possibilities for uncovering recollections and making present 
unanticipated memories as offered at such moments of confrontation (with the Land, with a 
sight, a smell, a sound, etc.). Such individual and collective confrontation destabilizes that which 
has become taken-for-granted and thus renews creativity. 
 When applied to Israeli reflections on intergenerational belonging and outlook, while 
acknowledging physical emplacement, a tension results from the inability of succeeding 
generations to identify with and recount the motivations and passions of previous generations. 
Through writing from the situation of emplacement, we see societal cleavages, continued 
alienation, and renewed separation. Through an exploration of these gaps we are left asking the 
same questions of living individuals as we did of literature: "To what shall one commit, and how 
shall one commit, if at all?" The resulting intentional separation of confrontation that we see in 
these works makes the quotidian extraordinary and the already achieved something to be 
anticipated. I argue that the Land remains contingent, never accomplished, and is always in a 
state of “permanent revolution,” thus placing into question notions as “post-Zionism.” Even 
while being emplaced, possibilities exist for re-diasporization – the need to feel distanced from 
the Land considered “home” in order to return to the condition prior to homecoming. This 
threshold that re-presents unforeseen memories is a call for ethical action now, and in the future, 
of the yet unredeemed, of being in imagined diaspora. 
 The fourth subset explores the ways in which Jewish genetic diseases are understood 
within Jewish communities and what genetics research offers in terms of complements to 
	 x 
foundational myths of Judaism. In both diaspora studies and genetics research the history of the 
phenomenon and an understanding of what constitutes it offer different, but necessarily 
concomitant, myths/authoritative narratives. Through the continuing use of Walter Benjamin’s 
call for contextualization across space and through time, I echo those who advocate for 
incorporating both the biological and socially constructed aspects of identity. This approach, 
rather than privileging one perspective, allows for a better understanding of migration, and 
acknowledges that genetic markers help place into question notions as kinship (to whom one 
feels connected), from what one feels displaced, etc., thus offering a more comprehensive view 
to constructed identity. We already always are displaced, have multiple homes, and struggle to 
articulate this complexity using only one paradigm. These concerns are reflected in the Jewish 
concept of brit (covenant), which includes both biology and social construction; only through 
the use of both aspects does a more comprehensive appreciation of “home,” “origins,” 
belonging, separation, and community/commitment emerge. 
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Chapter One 
Occupying the Diaspora: Places of Departure and Settlement 
 
Looking Back: Scholarly Confrontations with Diaspora 
Within the past two and a half decades studies of diaspora have become increasingly 
multidisciplinary. One outcome of this variegated approach to understanding this phenomenon 
is more specialized and narrowly defined studies that concentrate on certain constituent 
elements associated with the phenomenon itself (e.g., boundaries, space, and mobility). To date, 
the field of religious studies has not dealt significantly or explicitly with the experience as such,1 
and as a result, the discipline has yet to take up many issues that have emerged in diaspora 
studies. It thus lags behind in its theoretical engagement with this burgeoning field. This 
dissertation situates religious studies into a discourse on diaspora through an engagement with a 
subset of the category: Judaism, in both Israel and the United States. Within this subset we will 
juxtapose standard foci of diaspora studies, such as archaeology, literature, personal reflections, 
and even biology with theoretical concerns not usually associated with diaspora. The result will 
be to view diaspora as a commemorative performance and to include in any study of diaspora 
the process of collective memory, which acknowledges diaspora’s multivalence without offering 
attempts at reconciliation between individual memory and history. The resultant tension between 
these outlooks creates the ground for continued creativity and the potential for deeper 
contextualization. 
Academic studies of diaspora reflect a number of tensions, emanating from both the 
phenomenon itself and through scholarly analysis of the category. These tensions can be 
grouped along a general spectrum of concerns that includes: summary of the field/proposals for 
																																																								
1  Thomas Tweed’s Our Lady of the Exile is discussed here, and the only other exception is a doctoral 
dissertation. See Ellen Posman, “’There’s No Place Like Home’: An Analysis of Exile in Judaism and Tibetan 
Buddhism” (Ph. D. diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2004), although her study does not explicitly 
question the analytical category of “diaspora.” 
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defining the phenomenon; investigations into what constitutes the phenomenon, which provide 
nuance to the definition; and inevitably, reflection on the usefulness of the term “diaspora” 
itself. Contributing to the proliferation of constituent elements has been the need to respond to 
issues of globalization, postmodernism, and the inability of master frameworks to continue 
unquestioned. Throughout this array of self-fashioned identities and ways of belonging scholars 
have noted tensions between locality and mobility, often with the latter and more “routed” 
forms of belonging being privileged; between radical particularisms/individualized signifiers and 
the need for definitional anchoring to something specific (i.e., definitional parameters, thus 
constituting the phenomenon under study); and between individual memory and history. 
Underlying all of these concerns is a reluctant and concomitant warning of sinking into a 
situation of being unable to say anything cohesive about the very phenomenon under study: 
diaspora.2 
Early writings on diaspora concentrated on defining the term, deciding what constituted 
a diaspora, and detailing the histories of what became standard, paradigmatic cases, most notably 
the experiences of Jews and Armenians.3 In his own recent review of studies on diaspora, Steven 																																																								
2  Rogers Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (January 2005): 2-3. 
Brubaker states that the use of the term has proliferated to such an extent, cf. n. 3, and its meaning stretched to 
accommodate various applications and designations, that it is useless. With so many disparate groups, with varied 
histories, memories, consciousness, et cetera being referred to under the same rubric, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to identify phenomena and make distinctions. 
 
3  In what has become a standard reference in the field of diaspora studies, Robin Cohen’s Global Diasporas: 
An Introduction (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997) begins with an etymology of the word. He states that 
it is derived from the Greek verb “to sow” combined with the preposition “over,” thus corresponding to the 
ancient Greek conception of diaspora (especially of Greek expanded settlement of the Mediterranean world in the 
Archaic Period, 800-600 BCE, in which the empire expanded through plunder, conquest, colonization, and 
migration of citizens to populate the new strongholds), as migration and colonization (Ibid., ix, 2).  What all 
diasporas have in common, he asserts, is that their members form communities settled outside their natal or 
imagined-natal territories (Ibid.).  Cohen’s singular contribution to the study of diasporas is his generated typology: 
victim, labor, trade, imperial, and cultural diasporas. Some groups have multiple forms; their corresponding 
typologies change over time. Complicating these types are collective memories, reasons for dispersal (oftentimes 
voluntary, not forced), and reasons for not returning to the homeland once that option becomes available (Ibid., 
21).  These counter-narratives place into question the category of diaspora itself, as well as whether a group can 
continue its self-designation as such. Also, see William Safran, “Deconstructing and Comparing Diasporas,” in 
Diaspora, Identity, and Religion: New Directions in Theory and Research, eds. Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan, and 
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Vertovec explains that the term itself comes from the Greek diaspeirein, “to distribute.” This 
word is itself a compound of two components: speirein, “to sow, to scatter,” as one would 
disperse grain, and dia, “from one end to the other.” The Greek translation of the Hebrew 
scriptures, the Septuagint, used the term “diaspora” to refer to God scattering the Jews as 
punishment (e.g., Deut. 4:27 and Is. 36:19). Yet, as Vertovec explains, “[…] the Hebrew verb 
galah and noun galut – each expressing deportation and exile…designate…the period from the 
destruction of the second Temple in 70 AD until the creation of the state of Israel [in 1948]. 
Hence a distinction is made by a number of scholars between diaspora – implying free 
movement, especially pertaining to ancient Jews living among Greeks – and galut implying 
involuntary movement due to a conquest of territory that was/is considered home.”4 Based off 
of this biblical paradigm (albeit somewhat clumsily), scholars used the term to designate 
displacement from a “home” location and ensuing action based off of that focus. 
Later studies contributed to these checklists by expanding the definition. This move 
included more groups as being in diaspora and allowed more perspectives about the 
phenomenon to emerge.5 Yet, analyses of the causes of diaspora were limited, as was the amount 																																																																																																																																																																												
Carolin Alfonso (London: Routledge, 2004), 10. Safran concludes that diasporas are certain kinds of immigrations.  
They have retained a memory, some cultural connection to general orientation toward that home, have institutions 
reflecting that home, still harbor doubts about full acceptance in their current locations, are committed to survival 
as a distinct community, and to that end retain myths of return. 
 
4  Steven Vertovec, “Religion and Diaspora,” in New Approaches to the Study of Religion, vol. 2: Textual, 
Comparative, Sociological, and Cognitive Approaches, eds. Peter Antes, Armin W. Geertz, and Randi R. Warne (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 275-76. 
 
5  Any survey of the literature on diaspora includes in its bibliography the pioneering works of Khachig 
Tölölyan, who in 1991 started the academic journal Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, see Khachig Tölölyan, 
“The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 1, no. 1 (Spring 
1991): 4-5. In this introductory remark to the first issue, he already presented a rough overview of the field and the 
themes that subsequent scholars delved into more thoroughly in their respective, more narrowly focused studies. He 
states that the term “diaspora” originated with specific overtones to describe an experience of a particular people, in 
a specific time and place, and scholars increasingly have been applying the term to denote peoples, experiences, and 
causes for those experiences in ways that far exceed its limited, and more modest, origins. He claims that scholars 
have altered the semantic field to include as being “in diaspora” groups ranging from immigrants, expatriates, 
refugees, guest workers, overseas communities, to ethnic communities more generally. As Martin Baumann states in 
his article, “Genealogies of Semantics and Transcultural Comparison,” Numen 47, no. 3 (2000): 313, 322, since the 
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of attention given to the groups’ reception in the host societies.6 Groups were seen as operating 
within bounded environments, and the factors uniting the groups presupposed a high degree of 
homogeneity, specifically with factors as religion, culture, and language. Toward the late 1980s, 
scholars of diaspora became more attuned to the porousness of the boundaries of the nation-
state and to the disparateness of the actors who traversed the globe. From a narrowly conceived 
application to biblical Israelites, to more formalized categories that shared certain numbers of 
characteristics, to general applications of movement more broadly, diasporic groups were 
																																																																																																																																																																												
1960s the term’s semantic applicability has broadened and at that time was applied in African studies to the 
historical mass movements of people during the period of slavery, as well as to categorize the results of newer 
immigration laws and labor recruitment schemes of the decade. Since the 1970s, with John Armstrong’s definition 
of “diaspora” as any ethnic collectivity lacking a territorial base within a given polity, the term denotes almost any 
group living away from its ancestral or former homeland. In William Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths 
of Homeland and Return,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 1, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 83-84, Safran repeats 
Tölölyan’s acknowledgment that the term’s original usage designated a specific experience for a particular people. 
What he adds to this review of the use of the term is a list of six defining elements that in his view comprise the 
phenomenon: 1) dispersal from a specific, original center; 2) retention of a collective memory, vision, and myth of 
the homeland; 3) a belief that the dispersed group is not fully accepted by the host society; 4) an insistence that the 
ancestral homeland is the group’s true, ideal home and that ideally the group should return to it; 5) a belief that the 
group members collectively should be committed to the homeland’s maintenance and/or restoration; and 6) a 
continual personal and vicarious relation to the homeland.  In his study of diaspora, Steven Vertovec, “Three 
Meanings of ‘Diaspora’ Exemplified among South Asian Religions,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 6, no. 
3 (Winter 1997): 277, recognizes as well that the word describes practically any population that is deterritorialized or 
transnational, any group that originated in a place other than that in which it currently resides, as well as any group 
whose social, economic, and political networks cross borders of nation-states. 
 
6  The underlying condition, and sentiment, of diaspora is the sense of being in exile, of leaving one’s own 
culture and settling elsewhere, according to Ninian Smart, “The Importance of Diasporas,” in Gilgul: Essays on 
Transformation, Revolution, and Permanence in the History of Religions, eds. S. Shaked, D. Shulman, and G. G. Stroumsa 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), 289. Implicit in this definition is the possibility of having an exilic consciousness, of being 
out of context regardless of physical location. For Smart, diasporas are a microcosm of more general religious 
transformation.  Examining diasporas allows for the opportunity to understand how groups adapt to a new 
environment and undergo processes of self-identification.  Inevitable in every movement of people is the necessity 
of having to give an account of itself to others, of fitting itself into general principles; this often includes innovation 
within the tradition’s doctrine (Ibid., 108).  The aspect of a diasporic consciousness, which includes having specific 
relationships bound by history, geography, created by forced or voluntary migration, maintenance of identity tied to 
myths of common origin, ties to co-ethnic members, and the belief that group members (those with similar 
consciousness of being apart) are not fully accepted where they are is one adopted by Vertovec “Three Meanings of 
‘Diaspora’,” 277-78. As a type of consciousness, members of diaspora groups possess a particular awareness. They 
are both here and there. Especially true in the modern world, increased capacities for communication allow for 
greater interaction among members, and cultural artifacts can be shared, imagined, created, recreated together, and 
collective memory of another time and place expands the web of involvement. Yet, as Vertovec points out, these 
collective memories, however expanded and inclusive, do not always serve to consolidate identities (Ibid., 282).  The 
multiple realities of life within a location among various groups are contested, negotiated, and revised through 
engagement in the public sphere (Ibid., 284), and just as individuals can be bilingual, he states, so too can they be 
multicultural. 
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understood as a subset of characters epitomizing navigation among multiple-identities.7 In his 
attempt to reign in the various proposed definitions of the term, which are needed if the term is 
to continue signifying something, Vertovec states that “the topic can be distinguished in terms 
of underlying depictions…as a social form…as type of consciousness…or as mode of cultural 
production,”8 involving groups in relation to what they conceive of as “home” and their distance 
from it. 
Limited Roaming: Situating Diaspora’s Unboundedness 
The qualities of subjects being unbounded and settling in likewise unbounded locales, to 
which they either sojourned temporarily or eventually came to call “home,” highlight the 
problematics of locality, space, and performance. Diasporic groups congregate and 
commemorate together in order to foster identity as a group set apart, residing elsewhere. Often 
a tension develops between the group and the host society (due to the former’s attachment to an 
elsewhere while residing “here”), as well as between how scholars understand, often 
disparagingly, a group’s forming an attachment to any physical locale, given the scholars’ 
heralding and privileging of diaspora’s identification as a mobile entity. Spheres of action and in 
which meaning, identity, and cohesion occur are necessarily situated and located. Yet, any 
process of place making entails the possibility of potentially excluding others from that place. 
Nevertheless, in order for a group to maintain its distinctiveness, it must enact itself, and this 
requires locality (i.e., being located in a place). While groups can and do travel, oftentimes out of 																																																								
7  In approaching the recognition of groups maintaining multiple connections, Baumann stresses the 
significance of diasporic constellations, similar to a network or web, though which various gravitational centers 
emerge. This opens up the possibility of having numerous voices articulating what comprises these collective 
identities, and definition is not reduced to a single center, see Baumann “Genealogies,” 327, 331.  Others have 
proposed metaphors likewise focused on connection and recognition of the trans- aspect, cf. Khachig Tölölyan, 
“The Contemporary Discourse of Diaspora Studies,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 27, 
no. 3 (2007): 650, in which he likens diasporic activity to electricity. Just as electricity does not simply flow across 
space but rather between relatively fixed nodes or poles, so too does transnational, diasporic life necessitate 
sedentariness and differences produced there along with mobility. 
 
8  Vertovec “Religion and Diaspora,” 279.	
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necessity, and thus adapt themselves and their self-identifications accordingly, being sedentary is 
essential for many groups.9 
 The experiences of a group in a locale, often spent recounting and reliving life from 
elsewhere, highlight issues of individual memory, history, and collective memory. In fact, the 
debates regarding how one recreates, how one remembers, and how groups present to 
themselves narratives about themselves, is precisely what the term “tradition” includes, a central 
category in religious studies. While the group has an established connection to the events of the 
narrative and a connection to the place where the events occurred, the group members do not 
directly remember the events (of the origin of the group, of the origin of the dispersal, etc.), and 
thus the very real connection is imagined, as is the community formed around such connections. 
Yet, by commemorating these narratives the group reinvigorates itself and adds itself into the 
unfolding of the very narrative being told, recounted, and remembered.  It matters little if direct 
memory is involved, because the group itself is the narrative embodied. Diasporic groups 
establish locatedness even while maintaining a longing and attachment to another locale, either 
temporally or spatially. 
Competing claims are a result of locatedness, and attention to history and memory is 
important. Developed tradition and practice, as stated, become tied to place and anchor the 
community wherever it is and to other members expressing similar identifications. So often, 
though, groups are denied access, even in their newer host societies, to location, to place, and 
thus to avenues for commemoration. Partly as a result of this lack of access to place, and partly 
as a result of a general change in intellectual sensibilities, previously submerged and hidden 
voices break through into the discourse and reflection on a particular place. These relate 																																																								
9  See in particular Susanne Schwalgin, “Why Locality Matters: Diaspora Consciousness and Sedentariness 
in the Armenian Diaspora in Greece,” in Diaspora, Identity, and Religion: New Directions in Theory and Research, eds. 
Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan, and Carolin Alfonso (London: Routledge, 2004); Sean Carter, “The Geopolitics 
of Diasora,” Area 37, no. 1 (March 2005): 54-55. 
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experiences of exclusion from it, memory of it, and developed practices in relation to it.10 It is in 
this way that literature about diaspora, written both by diasporans themselves and by scholars, 
provides access to otherwise marginalized, if not erased, perspectives. Diaspora involves 
incorporation of counter-memories, other ways of being in the world; it necessitates 
contextualization. Experiences of estrangement, feeling not at home, and expressing desires to 
“return” are both individual and collective. Yet, studies on diaspora often lack that contextuality 
and instead focus on only the objective experience, or the historical condition of life being lived 
in an elsewhere, etc. without any attempt at recognizing that any narrative is only a partial 
version. 
Contributing to an articulation of this experience is the likewise tension-wrought process 
of collective memory, which oscillates among history, narrative, and individual memory.  
Collective memory also incorporates elements from both the recent past as well as what Fernand 
Braudel called the longue durée, a focus on long-term, historically persistent structures and ideas; 
Braudel’s method resonates with Walter Benjamin’s emphasis on recognizing the hidden, 
although persistent and continuous, memories and histories that operate as simply everyday 
occurrence. As well, studies of collective memory allow for an inclusion of Michael Taussig’s 
notion of the “optics of the nervous system.” This dissertation examines recent engagements 
within Jewish experiences of diaspora and shows that the category of diaspora, as explored 
through collective memory, is a condition that operates simultaneously on many levels. While 
the postmodern turn has done away with the top-down imposition of definitions of phenomena 
and opened up access to various groups and experiences, this does not do away with definitional 																																																								
10  The emergent literature focusing on these types of reflections is abundant. In particular see many of the 
contributions in Rites of Return: Diaspora Poetics and the Politics of Memory, eds. Marianne Hirsch and Nancy K. Miller 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Marlene Kadar, “Wounding Events and the Limits of 
Autobiography” and Anh Hua, “Diaspora and Cultural Memory,” both in Diaspora, Memory, and Identity: A Search for 
Home, ed. Vijay Agnew (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).  It should be noted that these attempts to 
redress oversights in previous representations of space, power, and history are critiqued later on in this study. 
	 8 
concerns. In some ways, the phenomenon, or rather the invocation of the category, insists on 
parameters. 
It is worth noting that the aforementioned developments in the field of diaspora studies 
likewise have their parallels in memory studies. Within the former, scholars have noted a shift 
from modernist concerns with systematic, stable definitions as the criteria through which to 
judge whether or not a group is “diasporic”  (and if so, into which type it can be placed) to 
contemporary, “postmodern” foci on individualistic senses of displacement and alienation more 
broadly. In the field of memory studies, scholars have noted the replacement of supposedly 
unified collective pasts that present one version of how things came to be (often legitimating the 
regime currently in power), to a decline in these utopian narratives. The result of this decline has 
been the proliferation of identity politics and inspiration for repressed, often individualized, 
identities to emerge on par with investigations into more stereotypical historical accounts of the 
past.11 Within studies of both diaspora and memory, the general trend follows the move from 
imposition of a definition to a phenomenon and projection of (forced) unitary pasts in order to 
legitimate the present (and thus future projects), to the dissolution of such endeavors in the face 
of competing claims and more individualized points of reference. 
From Here to There and Back Again: Category Formation in Religious Studies 
Previous studies on diaspora remained tied in some way to the earlier definitional 
proposals, even while entering domains that rendered the very phenomenon obsolete. Yet, 
studies on diaspora, including even recent forays, have not dealt adequately with religion, 
tradition, ritual, collective memory formation, and their implications for the category of diaspora. 
The field of religious studies investigates these very concepts and understands them as existing 
together, not as independent tools used at variance with one another. Regarding the interactions 																																																								
11  Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, “Introduction,” in The Collective Memory 
Reader, eds. Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3. 
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of bounded entities making sense of one another and thus of themselves is something that 
religious studies has encountered in the very subjects under its purview: religious traditions, 
communities, and the very understanding of the category “religion.”  Religious traditions have 
undergone the processes associated with modernity for millennia, and it is only recently that the 
field has brought the outlooks of others to these topics. Studies of diaspora need to pay 
attention to collective memory and commemorative performance as ways to approach the 
aforementioned elements. 
It is in this juxtaposition between attempts at forming restrictive definitions to being 
inundated with free-floating signifiers, and between attempts at developing systematic historical 
accounts to wading through the dross of sentimentalized personal reflections, that attention 
must be brought to the very enterprise of “history of religions.” As Jonathan Z. Smith points 
out, the field that has become religious studies has a long background in navigating these types 
of issues. Yet paradoxically, there are no critical investigations by scholars of religion into the 
category of diaspora utilizing these methodologies or insights. Smith details how Mircea Eliade 
reveled in the “labyrinthine complexity of elements which will yield to no formula or definition 
whatever.”12 The descriptions that Eliade provided in his studies of ritual, symbol, myth, and 
other categories offered no explanation or sense of causation; history and contextual 
development, to which Smith attests, are given up in favor of “descriptive, systemic 
complexity.”13   
As Smith relates in his critique of Eliade, the systems that these examples supposedly 
comprised were not defined, but rather were simply enumerated. How they all hung together, or 
																																																								
12  Jonathan Z. Smith, Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2004), 83. 
 
13  Ibid., 84. 
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changed over time, or could be seen through other perspectives, remained absent. Eliade 
presented a catalogue of the forms in a detailed manner, but did not account for historical, 
chronological, or causal transformation. 14  In this sense, the archetype located in the 
morphological system is static, resulting in what Smith describes as “an internal feedback 
mechanism, achieving equilibrium by reverting to type.”15 So while Eliade recognized alterations 
within the general form, the system eventually comes full circle, and the cause for the change is 
left unexplored; it remains external to, and unaccounted for within, the system. 
In his own work, Smith deals explicitly with issues of definition and comparison. He 
remains within the tradition of “history of religions,” but departs significantly from Eliade by 
presenting a veritable longue durée account of any respective phenomenon. He pays attention not 
only to changes within a system, but also to causes of and implications of such transformation. 
In his collection of studies on the imagined characteristics of “religion,” a move that 
foreshadowed Benedict Anderson’s understanding on nationalism, Smith explicitly explains his 
methodology. The phenomenon under study, the exemplum, has no ontological existence on its 
own, as it does in Eliade; it is the construct of the investigator, and the example must be 
thoroughly understood and contextualized. As well, the exemplum should be used to further a 
particular theory and to better explain a fundamental question for the investigator. Furthermore, 
there must be a way to evaluate and relate other components in the category to each other.16 In 
other words, Smith ties in together the field of “history of religions” with that of category 
creation. He also details how other fields deal with category creation and maintenance, what 
religious studies can take from them, and how further studies should proceed in this endeavor.  																																																								
14  Ibid., 89. 
 
15  Ibid., 90. 
 
16  Jonathan Z Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1982), xi-xii. 
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The Linnaean system in biology, for example, posits the existence of an object by means of 
reducing its characteristics to particular traits; taxonomy, then, is a monothetic practice that 
attributes to the constituent members of the taxon shared common features, and these members 
differ from other taxa by certain definitive features. Overtime, as Smith recounts, changes in 
time need to be accounted for in the classificatory system, and variability further complicated the 
endeavor of defining species and subspecies.17 
The result is a method that Smith adapts to religious studies. He rejects the imposed 
definitional reductionism of earlier biologists, paralleled by scholars of diaspora, for instance, 
and even the unwieldy morphological constructs of Eliade, in favor of a self-consciously 
polythetic mode of classification. No longer is there a goal of finding and preserving a unique, 
single taxonomy. Rather, a category necessitates a set of properties, and a constituent member 
possesses a large, albeit unspecified amount, of the properties associated with that phenomenon. 
As well, no one property is shared by every example, at all times.18 Finally, Smith proposes a 
methodology for how such a study will proceed. According to Smith, the first step is to select a 
“taxic indicator” that exists in a tradition as a way to set apart a phenomenon from others. In 
this case, the indicator is diaspora, movement across both space and time. The second step is to 
investigate this indicator as it appears, changes, and operates in various bodies of materials 
within that tradition.  For this study, I look at presentations/understandings of the category in 
archaeology, Modern Hebrew fiction, contemporary Israeli reflections, and genetic disease to 
explore how diaspora is understood in each as representative of the case of Judaism.19 
																																																								
17  Ibid., 3-4. 
 
18  Ibid., 4. 
 
19  Ibid., 9. 
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 In deciding how to approach an understanding of diaspora, I used a distinctively 
Smithian approach. The examples chosen for the four subsequent chapters contribute to a 
polythetic mode of classification. In order to help achieve this goal of polythetic analysis I 
pursue Benjamin’s call for contextualization (i.e., an awareness of time and what has been 
overlooked, forgotten, etc., in order to better understand one’s current condition), particularly as 
he presents them in his works “One-Way Street,” “A Berlin Chronicle,” and “On the Concept 
of History”; his considerations provide a way to better understand how diaspora functions 
through time and across space. Part of this endeavor entails addressing the mutually reinforcing 
realms of collective memory and commemoration. The result is to view diaspora as an 
experience in which diaspora itself is a commemoration that needs to be remembered and 
enacted. 
Chapter Two deals with a particular academic debate within Syro-Palestinian (i.e., 
biblical) archaeology regarding the reintroduction of materiality into the study of “origins,” while 
remaining cognizant of the impossibility of there ever having existed a perfect, unique, and 
essential characteristic that could expose the basis of a group’s beginnings. I juxtapose biblical 
archaeologist William Dever’s studies of early Israel as being a conglomeration of migratory 
peoples as well as “indigenous” peoples, including displaced Canaanites, with literary theorist Jan 
Assmann’s textual study of Deuteronomistic history. The places where textual accounts and 
material remains overlap in an effort to provide a broader understanding of what was occurring 
is what Dever calls “convergences,” and this more comprehensive view opens up our 
investigation into diaspora. This chapter emphasizes the notion that location matters, and that 
contrary to many detractors, archaeology does have something to contribute to representations 
of early Israel (ites), but which remains both overlooked and of little import to the construction 
of collective identity and memory. I argue that diaspora emerges not through physical departure, 
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especially in light of archaeological evidence, but rather due to its imagined quality and necessity 
of having to be remembered. From consideration of early Israel as partial indigenous peasantry 
to textual accounts locating Israel’s cultural memory as originating elsewhere, a new dimension 
of diaspora emerges. 
 Chapters Three and Four ground the theoretical debate in an engagement with Hebrew 
writings, most notably in three texts by S. Y. Agnon, two ethnographic works, and reflections by 
Israeli journalists and scholars. These mixtures of fiction and autobiography highlight ways in 
which people have imagined, recollected, remembered, and conceived of home, travel, and 
return. In these subsets I ask a straightforward question: “Once one has physically returned, how 
does one write about travel, home, and homeland?” Many scholars studying the Jewish diaspora 
continue the prevalent understanding of physical homecoming to the Land as a fait accompli, 
which, according to some interpretations, prohibits creativity and presupposes redemption. This 
approach, however, misunderstands the calls for continued alienation and separation, regardless 
of location, thus denying access to more ways in which diaspora exists. The texts in these two 
chapters place into question concepts such as group formation, location, bounded communities, 
tradition, generational divides, and the implications of representation. They highlight ways of 
including different and conflicting voices and incorporating self-reflective change. 
To better grasp the importance and ways in which space exists alongside of and often in 
tension with memory (i.e., time), I explore the insights of Benjamin, Thomas Tweed, Mikhail 
Bakhtin, and Abraham Joshua Heschel. These scholars elucidate the interplay one has on the 
other and what the resulting contextualization means for ethics. By employing the theoretical 
frameworks of the chronotope (time-space literary analysis), as well as threshold and liminal 
moments, I delve into the possibilities for uncovering recollections and making present 
unanticipated memories as offered at such moments of confrontation (with the Land, with a 
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sight, a smell, a sound, etc.). Such individual and collective confrontation destabilizes that which 
has become taken-for-granted and thus renews creativity. 
In Chapter Four I examine some works by Israeli intellectuals who offered reflections on 
Israeli society. Through the writings the writings of Eliezer Schweid, Amos Elon, Amos Oz, 
David Grossman, and Ari Shavit we gain an appreciation for the tensions that develop between 
generations in how each views the land and understands peoplehood. Through utilizing the 
aforementioned theoretical perspectives that advocate for confrontation, we see societal 
cleavages, continued alienation, and renewed separation. A tension results from the inability of 
succeeding generations to identify with and recount the motivations and passions of previous 
generations. 
Through an exploration of these gaps we are left asking the same questions of living 
individuals as we did of literature: “To what shall one commit, and how shall one commit, if at 
all?” The resulting intentional separation of confrontation that we see in these works makes the 
quotidian extraordinary and the already achieved something to be anticipated. I argue that the 
Land remains contingent, never accomplished, and is always in a state of “permanent 
revolution,” thus placing into question notions as “post-Zionism.” Even while being emplaced, 
possibilities exist for re-diasporization – the need to feel distanced from the Land considered 
“home” in order to return to the condition prior to homecoming. This threshold that re-
presents unforeseen memories is a call for ethical action now, and in the future, of the yet 
unredeemed, of being in imagined diaspora. 
Finally, in Chapter Five, the last subset, I delve into the operation of myths and 
narratives that people tell themselves about themselves. We find, through an examination of 
genetic disease, that even contemporary humanity maintains its reliance on myths. Despite, or 
perhaps because of, impressive technological advances, we still remain partial and incomplete in 
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our self-understanding. Through an examination of ways in which people imagined Jews and 
Judaism over time using biological insights as they became available, we can trace how people 
developed two general myths about identity, although some scholars note that the language to 
describe identity often compounds one view with notions from the other. People tend to rely on 
either socially constructed aspects of identity or impose a biological determinism to their 
concepts of kinship, the body, etc. A result of focusing on one perspective to the exclusion of 
the other is to present a view of history and memory that is partial in scope. Through the use of 
historical studies about Judaism and race, to more biologically explicit accounts of disease and 
what genes can help elucidate about migration and human connectivity, I explore how in both 
diaspora studies and genetics research the history of the phenomenon and an understanding of 
what constitutes it offer different, but necessarily concomitant, myths/authoritative narratives. 
Through the continuing use of Benjamin’s call for contextualization across space and through 
time, I echo those who advocate for incorporating both the biological and socially constructed 
aspects of identity and argue that we already always are displaced, have multiple homes, and 
struggle to articulate this complexity using only one paradigm. These concerns are reflected in 
the Jewish concept of brit (covenant), which includes both biology and social construction. 
Following Jonathan Z. Smith, the aim of incorporating issues such as archaeology, 
fiction, personal reflection, and biology in a work on diaspora is to more fully explore the 
phenomenon in its many valences as a way to responsibly provide the characteristics of a feature 
of Judaism. This endeavor allows for the discussion to be bounded by reference to its properties 
and to map its appearance and operation through a variety of materials. This will provide a 
multi-perspectival approach to its character, in order to “gain appreciation of the range of its 
application.”20 																																																								
20  Ibid. 
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Persistently Lurking: Diaspora’s Hidden Stories 
Amidst the proliferation of studies in both diaspora and memory studies is a tension 
among historical accounts, personal accounts, collective reflection, 
remembrance/commemoration, and questions about the categories themselves. Each 
component claims validity and truth in some regard. Often it is difficult to know where, and 
how, to get an “accurate” view of “what happened,” of how a state of affairs came to be, or if 
such an endeavor is even worthwhile/possible. To help reconcile these tensions in memory and 
diaspora, between experience and alienation, and between history and memory, it is useful to 
turn to Walter Benjamin. His aphorisms, and even his longer writings, capture the inherent 
problems of modernity (i.e., trauma more generally, the shattered projects of the past), presented 
in an almost postmodern method. Yet, any attempt to apply his theories, as they develop out of 
his disparate writings and snapshots of life, reveals a view of humanity and human identity that is 
in fact tied to overarching concerns with redemption and wholeness (perhaps a longed-for 
return to unity?); in a way this denies him a postmodern appraisal, but provides him entrée into, 
and proposals for dealing with, a distinctively Jewish worldview of alienation, memory, history, 
and longing (i.e., of being in diaspora). 
Benjamin ties together the fate of the individual with that of humanity, and he places 
into question the stability of the past. Benjamin shows us in “One-Way Street” a journey that is 
not a linear street in the least, but in a more general way a path that implicates the individual and 
the group with one another and also exposes the dangers of not cultivating a “presence of mind” 
in the present. This latter endeavor is what necessitates being cognizant not only of individual 
memory, but also of the effects of the continuous presence, albeit hidden, of persistent currents 
from the past accumulated in disguised form – la longue durée. Not to recognize these other 
dimensions/registers of reality is to revel in the idiosyncratic, the individual, and the apparent. 
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Remaining one-dimensional denies the cultivation of a presence of mind and thus disallows the 
liberation and redemption of the individual and society, of memory, and of history. As opposed 
to developing context as a way to explore meaning and contribute depth to a created identity, all 
is left to mire in never-ending spirals of (individual) signification. 
Benjamin begins “One-Way Street” with the “Filling Station,” a place that bespeaks 
individualism, “convictions,” and “facts.” He warns of the needed recognition of a scenario’s 
multivalent characteristics; accounts need both the universal and individual, the quantifiable and 
documented as well as the recollected and uncovered. Yet, opinions aid in this pursuit only if 
used sparingly and at the appropriate times.21 The end of the path is the Planetarium, a place that 
reveals experience and knowledge of history and humanity, of the universal and of individual 
identity. Yet, given modernity’s entrenchment within the individualized convictions of “poetics” 
(i.e., individual, subjective prisms of interpretation), we lose sight of the fact that “man [sic] can 
be in ecstatic contact with the cosmos only communally. It is the dangerous error of modern 
man to regard this experience as unimportant…and to consign it to the individual as the poetic 
rapture of starry nights.”22 In other words, humanity exists in a predicament; it has forgotten and 
glossed over the ways that allowed for its current rendition to occur, and instead it mistakenly 
assumes that the individual interpretation of truth will suffice. 
The decisive moment in many of Benjamin’s writings was the First World War, although 
this is understood more broadly as terror, alienation, and rupture. Humanity endured a shock, 
and this put into relief many of the previously held notions that constituted the supposed 
stability of life at the time. Warfare changed the world economy; unprecedented monetary 
collapse ensued, empires likewise collapsed, world systems were overturned in revolution, and 																																																								
21  Walter Benjamin, “One-Way Street,” in Selected Writings: Volume 1: 1913-1926, eds. Marcus Bullock and 
Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1996), 444. 
 
22  Ibid., 486. 
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social orders and the role of the individual were being torn apart and examined. Benjamin noted, 
however, that the prewar years, in which many people believed that they had prospered, were in 
fact not always pleasant. For many people, the years consisted of “stabilized wretchedness.”23 In 
other words, what once were thought to be stable and encompassing narratives of imagined 
previous wholeness unraveled upon closer examination. Entire worldviews and perspectives 
changed in a matter of a few years. 
As Michael Taussig relates, it is not only the First World War that exposed aporia where 
once there was presumed stability and coherence. Scholars may argue about when the “process” 
began, but what Taussig points out, using Benjamin’s notion of history being a state of siege, is 
that contemporaneity is conditioned by anxiety and nervousness. What is thought to be 
controlled, ordered, and systematic (e.g., world systems, states, the military, etc.), in fact is fragile 
and riddled with instability and incongruence.24 In such a world, linearity erodes, as does the 
assumed singular connection between cause and effect, as well as how knowledge is 
disseminated. For Benjamin, in the state of siege (now characteristic of contemporaneity) order 
is frozen, and disorder and tension mount beneath the surface; this state of affairs becomes 
normality. Therefore, if this is the case, humanity needs to rethink categories. Center, location, 
and certainty become de-centered, unstable, and uncertain. Calls for certainty equate to “dream-
images” and hopeful illusions for peace in circumstances that do not allow for stability; 
nervousness and precariousness predominate.25 
Benjamin states that since the First World War, storytelling (i.e., the ability to provide 
personal narrative, relate experiences, and equally the ability of others to empathize – to place 																																																								
23  Ibid., 450-51. 
 
24  Michael Taussig, The Nervous System (New York: Routledge, 1992), 2. 
 
25  Ibid., 10. 
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themselves into another’s perspective) has declined, if not become impossible to perform. 
Individuals have experienced such horror, contradiction, and despair that they are unable to 
communicate effectively,26 and all individuals likewise are mired in their own isolation, distanced 
in many ways from other connections. As well, the traditional modes of communication in 
which information is passed from mouth to mouth is less frequent, and people are less able to 
imagine experiences and to place themselves in the role of the narrator.  With the decline of this 
mode of communication, people do not incorporate these experiences of others into their lives. 
The type of information that is received, however, is that which is already colored by explanation 
from others; it is mediated and thus indirect. Consequently, the lessons it can convey are 
tainted.27 
The implications of such a reality, in which modernity is de-stabilized and grand 
narratives are dethroned and made subject to suspicion, entail not only the questioning of such 
narratives and of state-sponsored pronouncements, but also the upending of the security with 
which people engage in everyday interactions.28 Because people are torn and unable to navigate 
quotidian activities with any certainty, and in which everybody becomes a representative of a sort 
of individualized ultimate truth, everything is believed, and yet, nothing is believed. Related to 
this unmooring in our everyday lives, Taussig states that people must turn a reflexive, and 
reflective, gaze onto their own involvement in this state of affairs. Individuals oscillate between 
revelation and concealment, and often people conceal the terror in their own lives, histories, and 
memories,29 thus forestalling further revelations. 																																																								
26  Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov,” in Illuminations, trans. 
Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 83-84. 
 
27  Ibid., 88-89. 
 
28  Taussig Nervous System, 1. 
 
29  Ibid., 12. 
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Concomitant with Taussig’s indictment of contemporaneity is Benjamin’s awareness that 
latent and hidden histories of terror exist wherever one superficially sees victory and validation 
(i.e., reality, as in the phenomenon of diaspora, contains disparate registers, operating 
simultaneously). Benjamin’s concept of history includes what Taussig dubs the “optics of the 
nervous system,”30 which is the ability to understand what is actually occurring and to recognize 
the double-ness is inherent in life. This recognition allows one to see both ways at once – the 
surface superficialities included in the terror and the underlying, hidden histories, which also 
include terror. As Benjamin describes it, the usual perception of victory is that the mighty won 
and took with them cultural booty of the vanquished, of the now dispossessed. Yet, even these 
cultural treasures have a history. The history is not about solely the people who created the 
artifacts, but also includes an associated terror; Benjamin notes, “they [i.e., the cultural treasures] 
owe their existence not only to the efforts of great geniuses who created them, but also to 
anonymous toil of others who lived in the same period.”31 In other words, those who are now 
vanquished were themselves once victorious and acted with similar disdain to those they 
vanquished, and that past will never escape those treasures.  The stable past, then, was for many 
people stable wretchedness, albeit hidden in the possessions of the then victorious. 
As Taussig closes, he states that what are important are not the “facts” (for there are so 
many, often undisclosed or unrecognized), so much as it is acknowledging the shift in location in 
which facts are now placed. Different memories and histories emerge when locations change.32 
While it may seem that Benjamin offers a rather predictable trajectory of thought, a trenchant 
critique of modernity that can easily be translated and transposed onto contemporaneity, his 																																																																																																																																																																												
 
30  Ibid., 17. 
 
31  Benjamin Illuminations, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 391-92. 
 
32  Taussig, 27.	
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presentation of memory, history, and identity is much more nuanced than simple historical 
materialist interpretations proffer. 
As Benjamin pointed out, grand narratives are suspect, there exist hidden memories and 
histories, one’s experiences are unable to be expressed, and what information is received is 
already altered and explained. For all intents and purposes, grand narratives are seemingly 
dismissed. Yet, Benjamin’s view of humanity is not quite the postmodern cornucopia in which 
an individual’s own self-explication is left unexamined, in which people are left to revel in their 
own created truths as though they were ultimate truths. Humanity has accumulated dross of 
these particularisms, and Benjamin points us in the direction to something larger – the notions 
of redemption and the messianic. His vision of humanity transcends any political program and 
involves a connection that unites generations, although this has become tenuous, and as a result 
prohibits the fulfillment of humanity in the time of now. 
Working with the notion that interpretation and explanation are impediments to human 
fulfillment and redemption, Benjamin states that people must avoid interpreting their actions for 
potential future rewards, but rather must live accordingly to their inner intimations of coming 
events. According to Benjamin, each day people have the opportunity to grasp direct experience 
anew and have the ability to be aware of the present. Inevitably people squander that 
opportunity by turning to others’ interpretations and explanations of those experiences and signs 
that constantly confront people; individuals turn to others for help in understanding how things 
fit together, rather than using their own awareness of the present to do so. As he states, 
“Awareness of the present is more decisive than knowing beforehand of distant events.” People 
must recognize the signs around them, and use them, rather allow others to interpret them. 
People need to act decisively and directly. Only if humanity can do this can it connect with its 
past and break away from the terror of the state of siege in which it lives and can re-establish the 
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connection to memory. This connection shows people life, how it has been lived before, and 
what to look out for.33 In other words, having a presence of mind in the time of now parallels in 
many ways Taussig’s optics of the nervous system. 
Benjamin’s relation to Judaism exists in such a way as to point out the various conditions 
of alienation, displacement, and estrangement that are exhibited in writings on Jewish history, 
which have been encapsulated in Jewish writing over the years, and reflected in scriptures. But 
he also points out the underlying narrative that is contained in the shifting parameters of 
tradition: the narrative of generational connection and methods of attaining a presence of mind. 
Yet, inevitably, as he relates, there are hidden and latent memories and histories, and in this way 
people remain alienated from their own narratives and memories. The further the tradition 
accumulates the dross of individualized, unnarratable, inexpressible, and intransmissible 
experiences, the more its members become alienated and entrenched in diaspora; people, and 
the tradition, remain unredeemed and disconnected from themselves. People have numerous 
origins, numerous sources from which they are displaced, and numerous ways through which 
they can return; the difficulty rests in recognizing the signs and acting on inner intimations 
without recourse to external interpretation and explanation. What this entails for Judaism 
remains obscure, for few examples of its application exist, but it is something with which any 
study on diaspora must grapple. 
Rinse and Repeat: Diaspora’s Scholarly Standstill 
Two recently published books on the category of diaspora grapple with oftentimes-
complex theoretical perspectives on issues of history, memory, representation, identity, and 
space. Yet, both books, Irving M. Zeitlin’s Jews: The Making of a Diaspora People (2012) and 
Marianne Hirsch’s and Nancy K. Miller’s edited volume Rites of Return: Diaspora Poetics and the 																																																								
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Politics of Memory (2011), fail to address, let alone integrate, the double-ness of which Taussig 
wrote and to which Benjamin alluded. Thus, their contributions toward a better understanding 
of the category remain locked within the dichotomy of the general/“fact” and the 
individual/opinion that Benjamin describes as constitutive of the path. Zeitlin relies on Max 
Weber’s construct of the ideal-type as a tool to “make clear and explicit the unique individual 
character of a social phenomenon.”34 Rejecting previous attempts at using and imposing a 
prototype or archetype as the defining example of a phenomenon to which all other cases are to 
be judged, which follow a checklist of characteristics that supposedly comprise the category, 
Zeitlin proposes studying a historically specific phenomenon, for example of a group outside of 
its presumed/assumed original place and its point of departure, and then analyzing its 
circumstance, and only later attributing a name to it.35 As Stéphane Dufoix notes, in the past 
scholars identified groups based on similarities to pre-existing terms, to an archetype, and this 
practice resulted in reifying the category, in presenting the dominating exemplar as the only 
ontologically “real” member of the category, and in having at times to qualify the checklist of 
qualities necessary for membership in the group. Paradoxically, this latter result oftentimes 
placed into question even the prototype itself.36 
After having rejected the methodology of the prototype, as presented for example in 
Robin Cohen’s Global Diasporas: An Introduction (1997),37 in favor of that of the ideal-type, Zeitlin 
proceeds to state that Jews, owing to their distinctive historical experiences, are the ideal-typical 
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diaspora people.38 While this approach at first seems to be precisely what Smith calls for in a 
study of a category in religious studies, Zeitlin’s project stops before it even commences. He 
does not explain any further about the category of diaspora. Before he explains the outline of his 
proposal of the ideal type, he engages in a review of Jonathan and Daniel Boyarin, Paul Gilroy, 
and James Clifford. 
Zeitlin focuses his review on the Boyarins’ understanding of the cultural power of Jewish 
diasporic existence. Briefly summarized, the Jewish experience, according to the Boyarins, is 
typified by historical statelessness. Any power that Jewish communities acquired was founded 
not on force, but rather operated in the cultural sphere. Diaspora power, then, is the attainment, 
preservation, and development of cultural goods.39 Due to their vulnerability and political 
weakness, Jews’ only option for action was spiritual revolt. In this way, oppression and 
persecution of Jews resulted in an inversion of the values of the politically victorious. In other 
words, if the “noble-warrior” values could not be adopted in particular circumstances, Jews 
adopted “slave morality.”40 In this understanding, the Boyarins stress the significance of the 
bottom layers of society, where the Jews operated, which are gendered feminine, in contrast to 
the politically and militarily dominant male roles. Later Zionist undertakings, then, were 
uncharacteristically forceful and male Jewish pursuits and alternatives, in their reading. 
The Boyarins’ reading, which could be seen as a foray into the double-ness as part of the 
attainment of the presence of mind in the now, however, is based on texts, rabbinic and other, 
not on actual historical experiences of Jews in diaspora, according to Zeitlin.41 Thus, even this 																																																								
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attempt is a perpetuation of the entrapment in delusion characteristic of modernity. He proceeds 
to point out that Gilroy’s example presents both males and females subverting the dominant 
power structures; this tactic was not limited to the Jewish experience, and the characteristically 
“Jewish” narratives of return, forced separation, suffering, and redemption through these 
experiences resonated as well with North American black communities, and there is no evidence 
that in descriptions of their struggles and cultural tactics black men were portrayed as feminine, 
as the Boyarins propose with Jews.42  What is curious, though, is that in his discussion of Gilroy, 
Zeitlin does not touch on notions of space that characterize much of the reviews of Gilroy’s 
work, such as hybridization, but rather focuses on a Boyarin gloss of power as presented in 
Gilroy’s examples. Yet, Zeitlin does not explicitly relate power to performance or representation. 
It is only with Clifford that Zeitlin engages explicitly with the theme of space. He notes 
Clifford’s unease with the notion of return that predominates in many black and Jewish 
experiences and literature, for this notion presupposes a center, an actual territory that is not a 
book, a tradition, or any other portable means for unity.43 This implies a future exclusion of 
others, a surrendering to nationalistic and potentially authoritarian impulses. Zeitlin ends his 
discussion of the theorists by stating that he appreciates their focus on the historically creative 
aspects of Jewish diaspora cultures, and he agrees with their admonitions against ascribing 
eternal, immutable traits to groups. But he insists that Jews, as do all groups, possess a 
uniqueness that is graspable; it has a set of unifying principles.44 
These principles usually are overlooked in studies on Jewish communities and histories, 
he asserts. Studies on Jewish history tend to downplay and overlook the interconnected nature 																																																								
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of Jewish life, which rests on the unifying principles that he lays out, and which have been 
commented on by others throughout history. For example, ancient historians noted Jews’ lack of 
idols, of resting one day a week, and of teaching their children the Law (comprised of the 
Pentateuch, Prophets, Psalms, Samuel, and other “books”). Out of a desire to remain pure, both 
ritually and to guard against polytheistic influences (i.e., culturally), Jews designed distinct 
religious communal organizations and new institutions. Original Jewish ritual segregation to 
avoid pollution developed into a sort of antipathy toward many practices of the host society, and 
over time, as he relates, this antipathy was reciprocated. When Jews returned to Judea, they 
continued the practices and organization developed elsewhere, and then when they were re-
exiled, they continued the self-segregation that translated into later distinct economic and 
political positions elsewhere.45 Zeitlin’s project of the ideal-type entails a detailing of Jewish 
history that relies on underlying principles as guiding forms for culture, operating trans-
geographically, wherever Jews happened to be, through time, as a diasporic people.46 
Yet, for all of his detailed descriptions of and denouncements of previous theories of 
diaspora and of understandings of Jewish existence, he provides little in the way of integration, 
analysis of the category of diaspora itself, and he simply extends Weber’s understanding of the 
conditions that led Jews to being a “pariah people” (due to the experiences listed above) into the 
modern period. This recent approach to diaspora targets the communal aspect that Benjamin 
presents as necessary for redemption of memory, experience, and identity, but falls short on 
developing a cognizance of double-ness. 
At the other end of the spectrum on approaches to history, memory, and identity, is 
Hirsch’s and Miller’s Rites of Return. This collection pays particular attention to the poetics of 																																																								
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memory at the expense of the histories of those spaces; sentimentality is privileged over an 
investigation into how sites came to possess contested histories and memories. The point of 
departure for the project is laid out in their preface, a step in the direction of double-ness. They 
invoke the “legacy of violence” that precipitates the development of a set of rites – both 
individual and collective – that aims to reconstruct past histories, retrieve lost memories, activate 
historical sites, and quest for origins.47 The result, however, is a very presentist activity, grounded 
only in emotional attachment. 
Hirsch and Miller quote Simone Weil in that “every human being needs multiple 
roots.”48  They proceed to regale readers with the example of Alex Haley’s set of rites (e.g., the 
journey that resulted in his book) through which he performed the reconstruction of past 
histories, retrieval of lost memories, activation of historical sites, and quest for origins. This 
exemplary experience “gave name and shape to the longing for verifiable identification of 
personal and cultural beginnings.”49  They invoked Haley’s search for roots as a way to target 
both action and writing, of the personal within the general,50 and rites as a performance of roots 
seeking. Yet, they also caution against quests for rootedness, for they echo the fear of the 
Boyarins and Clifford, among others, who state that it leads to territorialism, cultural 
chauvinism, and “triumphant ideology.”51 Following so many others, they herald marginality, the 
embrace of the border, and of diaspora existence as a “corrective” to essentialist identity politics. 
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The chapters in the collection emphasize (self-) construction as a performative process 
and a reinterpretation of attachments and dwelling. The result is that attempts to uncover the 
hidden or glossed over dimension of injustice, for example, so often presented in popular and 
scholarly representations of events lose their specificity and impact because they are not 
grounded in “history” or in any investigation, archival or otherwise. In presenting memories 
based on reflection and philosophical speculation (i.e., “poetics), they allow for one narrative to 
be transposed onto another, often unintentionally, which would stand at-odds with the intended 
purpose of the author, if such a re-re-interpretation were to be offered in its stead. The overall 
effect of the chapters is a diluted, free-floating impression, rather than the counter- or revisionist 
history hoped for by the authors and editors. History becomes autobiographical, and thus its 
presentation lacks confirmed, external evidence. In this way, the marginal and marginalized 
voices included in Rites of Return likewise fall victim to entrenchment in perspectives that lack 
contextualization. In other words, the accounts in the collection are already mediated snapshots 
of and reflections of vague meaning, with transposable and interchangeable/malleable 
components, albeit based on personal sentiments, which do need expression. 
What is more, the notion of rites of return proves even more unpersuasive when its very 
premise, of “verifiable identification of personal and cultural beginnings,” spurred on by Haley’s 
Roots, was exposed as un-verifiable and fabricated, a combination of both fact and fiction. As 
attested to in Hauke Dorsch’s chapter “Griots, Roots, and Identity in the African Diaspora,”52 
the griot, bard/official storyteller, whom Haley used for information regarding the clan of his 
African ancestor, Kunta Kinte, was not a “properly” trained bard; his expertise regarding the 
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Kinte clan was suspected of being fabricated.53 Yet, this is precisely Taussig’s point when he says 
that based on the overwhelming amount of stories, experiences, and circumstances of these 
injustices suffered and inflicted, he believed them all, but believed none of them. So while 
Haley’s intended goal was shown to be corrupted, the overall effect remained an example of a 
diasporic existence. It even highlights the notion that “return” itself must be questioned. 
The enterprise of Rites of Return exists on the opposite end of the spectrum as Jews. The 
former presents interchangeable snapshots based on memories guided by sentimentality. It is 
thus representative of individual and personal reflection on forms of alienation and 
displacement. The latter is grounded too heavily on common, recycled, uncritical historical 
narrative. Both are mediated, explained, and interpreted, and in fact fail to do justice to the 
“optics of the nervous system.” Each is enmeshed, blindly so, in a program, which thus 
prohibits its being cognizant of the double-ness necessary for a better understanding of what 
constitutes a diasporic existence. As well, Benjamin already provided testament to the storyteller 
being unable to communicate (in this case falsely communicating, perhaps knowingly) and 
people being unable to relate to what is being attempted. Zeitlin, and Hirsch and Miller are 
worlds apart from one another, as well as from the audiences approaching these texts, to 
effectively communicate directly. In a sense, they both represent examples of reflections on 
diaspora in a state of diaspora. They are removed from the very condition they attempt to 
explain and offer no insight into the category itself; they present mirrors to their respective 
surfaces and theoretical perspectives, the ideal-type and poetics, respectively. 
The result is a replacement of the hegemony of history written by elites by the hegemony 
of the individual. As Benjamin, Taussig, and others attest, uncovering hidden, repressed, and 
suppressed experience and memories is a necessary endeavor. Nevertheless, the reliance on 																																																								
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“poetics” and positional accounts, to the exclusion of qualitative history, does not clarify a 
category, experience, or offer redemption and liberation to memory and identity. Rather, it mires 
the study in the new status quo in which one account is no more “complete” than any other. 
The author is not beholden to context and gains no access to the longue durée, in which case 
history, experience, and memories are accepted at face value. Double-ness remains elusive, and 
understanding of transformation within the system is unfulfilled because focus remains on the 
replacement, on the change, not on the system itself. These recent examples of studies in 
diaspora are symptoms of the problem rather than new directions toward a better understanding 
of the category. 
Spaces of Diaspora: Articulating Movement 
 As the scholar within religious studies proper who has explicitly contributed to the 
literature on diaspora, Thomas Tweed incorporates into his theory of “diasporic religion” not 
only the elements and their concomitant critiques from the aforementioned theorists, but also 
the perspectival concerns of Benjamin and Taussig. Tweed maintains that diaspora is a condition 
of dispersal from a center, but he resists the metaphors of state and territory because his 
emphasis is on movement, although its (re) presentation is located in time and place. 54  
According to Tweed, the dispersed members of a group share a common culture that includes 
language and symbols, which bridge “homeland and new land.”55  For Tweed the significance of 
the location in which diaspora communities find themselves rests in it being a symbolic space 
that offers opportunity to target practices and beliefs that “overcome opposition between here 
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and there, us and them.” In this way, diasporic religion, and the locations in which these 
religions operate, is a tirtha, a crossing place that highlights difference but also unites.56 
 The process of migration affords opportunities for the group to make sense of itself as a 
displaced group. Through the experience of departure, arrival, and settlement the group needs to 
imaginatively (re) construct its symbols and their meanings.57  These spaces of dispersal are sites 
in which confrontation and negotiation over symbolic practices, images, and relations occur not 
only among different groups, but also within the group itself.58  Exiles, diasporans, and other 
members of the dispersed groups more generally struggle over the meaning of the symbols used 
in the settled locations, and the symbolic forms used in these practices often share in the 
creolized ethnic and cultural mixture.59 It is these symbols that help the group members make 
sense of exile, identify with the homeland from which they, and the images, came, and serve to 
connect the otherwise disparate group members into a coherent diaspora group making sense of 
itself in a new home as a group displaced.60 
 Despite intragroup differences, its members nevertheless are bound together by sadness 
and longing, disorientation of exile, among other sentiments and responses to this process. The 																																																								
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new locations, then, become sites for the enactment of peoplehood.61  Diasporic religion, which 
can be generalized to include the multiple ways that dispersed groups make sense of themselves 
as being dispersed and of their dispersal, is an ongoing cultural process through which people 
constantly map their “symbolic landscapes” and construct their “symbolic dwellings.”62 In this 
way, religion is a spatialized and spatializing cultural form incorporating symbols that are both 
transtemporal and translocative. Group members operate simultaneously on multiple registers; 
they move across space (translocative) and also across time and history (transtemporal). 
Tweed recounts how in rituals performed in diasporic communities, for instance, time is 
fluid and easily fluctuates from a constructed past, to imagined future, all while being performed, 
recollected, and represented in the present, which is itself displaced and dispersed and in a state 
of longing. All registers inform the experience and the symbolization of the present.63  Rituals 
symbolically move members between the homelands, and festivals/holidays and other 
occurrences of collective remembering position members in fluid time, connecting the present 
to times that were important to those community members of the past. They also are 
prospective in that they position the members in an imagined future.64 
 In this way, Tweed articulates a distinctively Durkheimian understanding of religion and 
community, albeit accounting for mobility and historical perspective. The meanings that the 
group attributed to shared symbols and practices varied over time and thus are dynamic and in 																																																								
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flux. The group, now deterritorialized, is supralocal and transregional, and in recreating its home 
and concomitant practices elsewhere is likewise a moral community mapped onto a new location 
but tied in many ways to the former.65 Tweed’s pairing of the simultaneously operative registers 
of the translocative and transtemporal highlights the double-ness, presence of mind, and “optics 
of the nervous system” to which Benjamin and Taussig presciently called for in any study of 
contemporaneity, lest it becomes just another symptom of the time rather than an analysis. 
Tweed’s insistence on accommodating the aspect of movement while acknowledging location 
allows for a more responsible accounting of the construction, maintenance, and propagation of 
identity in relation to history and memory. 
Betwixt and Between: Refining Diaspora’s Lexicon 
 Tweed’s vocabulary of the translocative and transtemporal provides a framework 
through which the element of movement can be accounted for, while not overlooking the 
situatedness out of which such movement emerged and from which it reflects. In one of his later 
writings, Tweed acknowledges his indebtedness for the metaphor of travel to better understand 
diasporic religion to James Clifford.66  For Clifford, travel implies a two-way process, and he 
juxtaposes his suggestion to investigate movement from previous, more localized studies, which 
shied away from the blurred boundary areas and historical realities that exist outside the 
respective ethnographic frame.67 As will be noted, it is precisely in these blurred boundary areas 
that other significant diaspora theorists revel, such as Paul Gilroy and Homi Bhabha. 
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 Once one recognizes the interplay of the local and/with the global (the aptly-named 
“glocal”),68 then one more easily can recognize and appreciate issues of domination, resistance, 
historical encounters, and the resultant co-productions of such encounters and modes of 
thinking/consciousness among interacting groups. 69  Clifford’s suggested “program” entails 
studying the “native,” the traveler, the exile, the migrant, as well as the route, and the specific 
histories of those movements undertaken. Such a comparative study of histories, tactics, and 
everyday practices of both dwelling and travelling allow one to appreciate the “traveling-in-
dwelling” and the “dwelling-in-travelling.”70 It must not be overlooked, however, that in calling 
for such an expansive scope in future proposed studies, Clifford was one of the first scholars 
advocating for, albeit implicitly, an approximation of Benjamin’s and Taussig’s presence of mind 
and “optics of the nervous system.” 
 Clifford’s advocation of shifting emphases from studies detailing defining characteristics 
(of a particular people, location, diasporic group, et cetera) to the diaspora’s borders, against 
which the group defines itself (i.e., for an incorporation of movement encompassing the 
translocative) also allows for inclusion of the element of time. The populations under study 
come from elsewhere, maintain allegiance and practical connections to that elsewhere, and in a 
sense exist within a lived tension between their currently lived, performed, and imagined identity 
here and their previously held conceptions of themselves as a group,71 which resided “there.” In 
other words, they live “here” and remember, desire, and long for “there,” another place. They 
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are separated but simultaneously entangled.72  Clifford’s recognition of diasporic groups being 
both routed and rooted broadens the conversation to include a questioning of space more 
generally, while also highlighting the tensions created in consciousness, remembrance, history, 
and identity construction regarding those concepts. 
 During the period in which Clifford was advocating a break with previous 
anthropological ethnographic methods, and thus proposing new avenues for humanistic 
scholarship that included studying groups traversing borders (i.e., diasporic populations), Paul 
Gilroy engaged in a revision of cultural historical methods by examining previous conceptions of 
culture. He placed into question that which people had understood (i.e., national, cultural, and 
ethnic identity) to be immutable, with notions of creolization and hybridity. As a result of 
interaction, exchange, and contact the once-thought immutable concepts of culture and identity 
are reworked and rearticulated, and something new emerges.73  The developed cultures, however, 
which were neither “purely” any one form, worked to maintain their new community, preserved 
and recovered selective traditions, and customized them in hybrid, often antagonistic ways. 
 Overtime the telling of stories about how the hybrid groups came into being, in which 
people would detail the community’s origins and development of its identity, was part of the 
process of slaves becoming citizens, for example. Storytelling organized the group’s 
consciousness, and through the processes of storytelling and music making, among other 
practices, alternative public spheres are created that aid in the negotiation of and navigation 
among these groups and the larger locale. Through the intermixture of various components, 
histories, and identities, notions of purity and stability (of a posited African past, for example) 
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broke down, and the interstitial spaces became ex-centric, unstable, non-traditional cultures that 
eventually formed their own traditions. In these new developments, people are less concerned 
with “what really happened,” than with the self-construction of forms that eventually became 
integral parts of their “counter” cultures.74 Pasts, and previous locations, lose their status as 
revered entities. Attention shifts to idolizing a culture into which one hopes to return and 
instead turns to the newly created identity. 
 Through the processes of movement, interaction, and contact along with its concomitant 
result of new hybrid formations, Gilroy exposes the conception of identity as an on-going 
process of self-making and social interaction. As Gilroy states, identity is not an object to be 
possessed; it is not reified into a thing.75  In this way, Gilroy’s understanding of “identity,” 
broadly conceived, parallels Tweed’s understanding of “religion” as an on-going cultural process 
that is never completed and entails contestation of symbols and their meanings. Diaspora, for 
Gilroy, is a relational network involving mobility, selection, and creation; it thus challenges the 
anchored and moored notions of land, territory, soil, and rootedness. Gilroy’s seeming dismissal 
of investigating “what really happened” is tempered somewhat by Bhabha’s explication of the 
“third space” (i.e., the in-between and the counter-narrative, which is co-implicated with the 
traditional history). 
 Like Clifford and Gilroy, Bhabha understands the “subject” (e.g., the individual, the 
diasporic group) to be articulated, created, and imagined only in the passage between here and 
there, the interstitial space in-between more stable points. 76  For Bhabha, the monolithic 																																																								
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structures of “nation” and “tradition,” among others, are eroded by the production of 
amalgamated counter-narratives that develop in the emergent voices speaking in the interstices 
between time and place.77 As with Clifford and Gilroy, Bhabha advocates the study of being 
neither inside nor outside but rather in some combination between them, and this instability of 
previously stable categories is found on the boundaries, a hybrid realm. In this way, Bhabha 
approximates Tweed’s understanding the diaspora as a tirtha, a crossing place that highlights 
difference while also serves to unite into something new but that retains elements of the old. 
The nation, for instance, contains thresholds of meaning; in other words, categories 
contain boundaries, conceptions of what is in and what is out. As a result of this recognition, 
modes of identification and identity-construction are never complete.78  One is never outside or 
beyond “us,” but rather emerges within the discourse itself. As with Gilroy, the process of 
hybridity gives rise to new areas of negotiation and meaning. When applied to history and not 
particular, more localized, and more narrowly conceived communities (when taking the 
approach of la longue durée as opposed to the conjecture or the event, to use Annales’ parlance), 
the history of colonialism has yet to be written alongside the history of the West’s democracy, he 
states. In this way, Bhabha can be seen as identifying a call to include Benjamin’s and Taussig’s 
double-ness on a large scale.  Colonialism, for example, is a counter-history/-narrative to the 
traditional history of the West, 79  and through its inclusion in presenting a history and 
understanding of the West, one can gain an appreciation of the co-implication of one in the 
other, of the West in the identity of the colonized and vice versa. Often, group narratives and 
myths rely on and involve the Other in depicting itself, but these necessarily are only one side of 																																																								
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the Janus-faced in-between.  The story is never complete, is always evolving, and entails 
reflexivity regarding one’s production as well.80 
The Diaspora (Re) membered: Inscribing and Incorporating the Past 
 The previous section dealt with space, a here and a there, but more importantly with the 
creative processes undertaken/emergent within the location in-between more rooted locales; 
mobility, movement, and routes enable translocality and new forms of identity that are neither 
tethered here nor moored to a there, but which were created out of the journey itself. This 
section deals with the various ways in which individuals and groups are constructed and 
“informed” socially and often unconsciously through time, and how societies and individuals 
contain implicit, but pervasive, memories. Theorists have posited that both the group and the 
individual contain existences/realities that transcend the mere sum of their parts. In other 
words, operative at “hidden” levels are forces that shape and guide social and personal life; they 
do so over long periods of time and serve to connect the present to the past and the represented 
past to the future. In order to uncover these powerful forces it is necessary to investigate their 
duration and transformations over the course of many years. The effect of studying effects both 
																																																								
80  See Anthony D. Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” in Becoming National: A Reader, eds. Geoff Eley and 
Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). He reiterates scholars who note the on-going 
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community that manifests the characteristics of a common set of myths of common origin, common historical 
memories, common history, territory, language, customs, religion, and sense of solidarity (p. 108). Ethnies are either 
lateral or vertical. The former are communities that originated aristocratically, cover a wide territorial base, but do 
not possess deep social entrenchment. The sentiments, myths, language, and other shared features are the purview 
of a select, elite cadre of individuals. Vertical ethnies are demotic, may be geographically dispersed, but possess deep 
entrenchment within all strata of the community. Modern nations, regardless its type of ethnie, have roots in 
premodern eras and cultures, and it is those ties that must be traced (p. 124), thus situating Smith among those 
calling for inclusion of the longue durée. Regarding the various contents of these “ties,” see Prasenjit Duara, 
“Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When,” in Becoming National: A Reader, eds. Geoff Eley 
and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). National identification is a form of 
consciousness that is constructed out of fluid relationships, which necessarily involve contestations and negotiations 
(p. 152); thus, there always exists the possibility of potential disunion and new formations. Scholars must 
acknowledge and incorporate into their studies of nationalism these contingencies, as well as the mechanisms that 
present this construction as unitary and cohesive (p. 164); cf. Balibar, n. 95. 
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translocatively and transtemporally is a recognition that what meets the eye is rarely to be trusted 
as constituting all that needs to be known about any particular phenomenon. 
 Émile Durkheim noted that, “religion is an eminently social thing.”81  It is through 
experiencing life in a group that an individual learns how to conceive of space, comes to 
understand the “group,” and recollects memories.82 He posited that located within an individual 
are both the singular, biological entity (the individual being) and also the social being, a 
representative of collective morals, values, and behavior.83  These observations set in motion the 
ability of later theorists to establish not only the social basis of memory, but also the embodied 
aspect of reality; as well, through Durkheim’s theory of the interconnected aspects of the social 
foundation of mental categories, group cohesion, and the ability of an individual to 
unconsciously encapsulate the norms and mores of particular groups we are able to connect the 
category of “diaspora” with the study of memory. Because one can overcome neither 
individuality nor the social, it is necessary to engage with Durkheim. His work emphasized 
context, both the subjective and the collective, co-implicated elements that later both Benjamin 
and Taussig claimed have become overlooked. They added the recognition of the dimension of 
time, an element with which Durkheim’s study did not deal. 
 It is to this other aspect of double-ness (i.e., of the body incorporating both the singular 
biological entity along with its inculcated sociality) that Marcel Mauss developed what was left 
unexplored in Durkheim. Habits and ways in which an individual knows how to move, gesture, 
and behave have their basis in a socially informed existence. As Mauss states, it is due to society 
that there is an intervention in consciousness; an individual immersed and raised in a society is 																																																								
81  Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life [1912], trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: The 
Free Press, 1995), 9. 
 
82  Ibid., 11. 
 
83  Ibid., 15. 
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endowed with knowledge about how to utilize that body without having explicitly studied what 
societal traditions have prescribed regarding behavior or what society expects that body to do.84 
Categories of existence (i.e., what is prohibited, allowed, and the methods used to bring about 
those distinctions) are reinforced, and common sentiments are made manifest and strengthened, 
in groups and common action.85 
 As a younger colleague and later collaborator with Durkheim, Maurice Halbwachs 
preserved Durkheim’s emphasis on the social and collective frameworks through which 
individuals and groups create images of themselves, and with this consideration he directed his 
focus explicitly to memory creation. For Halbwachs it is through the group that an individual 
preserves, reproduces, and perpetuates memories. One’s imagination and reproduction of the 
past occurs within and through the collective in which one lives.86  The sentiments, thoughts, 
and interests common to a group orient its members, help to articulate what is important, what 
is remembered and the way it is envisioned, and generally serve to distinguish what is included or 
not in the group’s image of itself, its past, and therefore what is passed on in future 
recollections. 87  As well, as Halbwachs notices, individuals usually are unaware that their 
convictions and feelings come not from themselves so much as from the group in which one 
currently is located. In other words, social influences that people respond to and obey pass 
unnoticed and are unperceived.88 																																																								
84  Marcel Mauss, “Techniques of the Body” [1934], in Incorporations, eds. Jonathan Crary and Sanford 
Kwinter (New York: Zone, 1992), 475. 
 
85  Durkheim Elementary Forms, 421. 
 
86  Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory [1952], trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 43, 47. 
 
87  Ibid., 52, 73. 
 
88  Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, trans. Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1980), 45. 
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 While Durkheim’s focus remained on the collective and the result of gatherings in terms 
of collective solidarity, reinforcement and perpetuation of boundaries, and the image that the 
group has of itself as seeming to exist outside of and beyond the respective group members 
themselves, Halbwachs recognized that memory is mediated by the individual, although the 
individual’s viewpoint and memory changes as do his/her positions and relationships, respective 
to various social milieus.89 In fact, Halbwachs provides nuance to Durkheim’s insistent focus on 
society writ large by acknowledging that an individual is part of as many collective memories as 
the number of subgroups within society, or elsewhere, to which that individual belongs.90 
 In this way, Halbwach’s understanding of collective memory differs from “history” in 
that while the academic discipline of writing history, at least in the earlier part of the twentieth 
century, was to periodize and divide the course of time into sequences of centuries and periods, 
collective memory presents continuity and unity. As opposed to operating under the impression 
that there exists a universal account of time through which changes are recorded, groups 
conceive of and present themselves as unchanging through time. Such a view necessitates having 
a group continue a memory of it as existing as such without that image fading away. These 
groups, moreover, do not take into their consideration of themselves the details that erode as 
members die or leave. There is seldom explicit reflection on how the group itself transforms, for 
the group retains an unbroken connection to that past through its periodic gatherings and 
retellings of its story;91 this is similar to Durkheim’s collective effervescence, albeit in diminutive 
form. 
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90  Ibid., 83. 
91  Ibid., 82. 
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 In order to carry this analysis of memory further to account more for change and 
transformation through time, regardless its recognition by the respective group under study, it is 
helpful to turn to the Annales School of the 1920s, which understood human experience as 
comprised not only of individual events, but as a composite result of the interaction of many 
phenomena.92 Following Durkheim, the Annales School adopted the view that an individual can 
be comprehended meaningfully only in a social context, and its scholars extended their study to 
include analyses of enduring structures, both mental and physical, which contributed to 
individual and collective behavior. To understand those structures, the scholar must open the 
study to the continuities and discontinuities over long durations, otherwise known as the longue 
durée.93  History, thus comprehended, is the composite result of bundles of systems/structures, 
each of which has its own coherence. The longue durée is juxtaposed to and differentiated from 
the medium-term study, called conjecture, which deals with modifications in the structure, and 
from the short-term focus, which confines itself to individual events. 
 Another component of the Annales School dealing with enduring structures, and which 
Mauss picked up on later in his career and theorized somewhat differently, is the notion of 
mentality. It is this element that makes the Annales School a logical connection between the 
social foundation of memory and the popular conception of embodiment, or how individual 
beings become repositories of society’s mores, norms, and expectations, which structure their 
lives and in turn are structured by continued accretions of human behavior and action; the result 
is a self-perpetuating, unconscious, cycle that persists over generations. In the Annales’ usage of 
“mentality,” as Jacques Le Goff explains, the term signifies a collective psychology, a way of 
thinking and feeling particular to a group (similar to the German notion of Weltanschauung, 																																																								
92  Colin Lucas, “Introduction,” in Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology [1974], eds. Jacques Le 
Goff and Pierre Nora (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 4. 
 
93  Ibid., 5. 
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worldview).94 The history of mentalities operates on the level of everyday “automatisms of 
behavior” (i.e., the history of bodily techniques), which normally would not be included in 
historical studies because they reveal impersonal content of an individual’s thoughts and 
actions.95 The Annales School opened up for study the gestures, spontaneous words, and 
behavior that seemingly have no origin and which appear to be reduced to (cultural) 
improvisation, but which in fact carry deep roots in systems/structures of thought. 
 In an effort to make the connection among the individual, the collective, and both the 
explicitly and implicitly inculcated feelings, behaviors, and actions more apparent, Paul 
Connerton relates that if one posits the existence of such a social memory, then one 
presupposes that it would be found in commemorative ceremonies (thus recognizing 
Durkheim), and ceremonies are commemorative so long as they entail performance. That which 
is performative and social, and most likely recurrent, entails aspects of habit (thus recognizing 
Mauss).  Habit, then, necessitates bodily automatisms, and all modes of existence are based on 
the premise that the body already possesses “predisposed frameworks” that were not 
consciously learned or studied but rather incorporated into one’s habit through repeated bodily 
movements so that one simply “knows” how to behave in a given situation.96 
 Important for our purposes is Connerton’s differentiation between the sociological level 
of analysis, which confines itself to recorded history, and the habituated bodily substrate of the 
																																																								
94  Jacques Le Goff, “Mentalities: A History of Ambiguities,” trans. David Denby, in Constructing the Past: 
Essays in Historical Methodology [1974], eds. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 171. 
 
95  Ibid., 169. 
96  Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 5-6.  Cf. Pierre 
Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice [1972], trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), in 
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performance, which operates below the level of explicit discourse; in other words, he juxtaposes 
overt “inscription” of bodily action with implicit “incorporation,” in which a being 
unconsciously takes in teachings that become part of the body’s habits and mode of thinking.97 
In this way Connerton engages in analysis closely related to the principles presented by the 
Annales School. For Connerton, ritual, for example, should not be looked upon as exemplifying 
simply a type of cultural value expressed in myth (i.e., that which is inscribed and consciously 
taught/learned), but also should highlight the performative aspect encoded in gestures, postures, 
and movements.98 Memory, for Connerton, can be preserved not only through inscribing a 
narrative in text, myth, and images, but also can be incorporated into the body itself so that 
one’s habits, one’s behavior, and the ways in which one moves hold and convey information, 
and this is learned through unconscious repetition.99 
Of course, it must be noted that Connerton’s study, while providing a much needed 
investigation into the functioning of instruction and inculcation, which operate simultaneously 
on many levels, is limited in scope in that its perspective is presented as a monologue, not the 
dialogue or multivocal component needed in cultivating a presence of mind or a better 																																																								
97  Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” trans. Chris Turner, in Race, Nation, Class: 
Ambiguous Identities, eds. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991).  Balibar states that the 
nation is presented as an already established narrative, and it appears to its members that the current form of the 
nation is the only way that things could have been (p. 86). From birth individuals are already situated into the nation 
form; they are socialized into becoming national, and through daily apparatuses and practices people are constituted 
as homo nationalis, while also being homo economicus, religiosus, politicus, et cetera (p. 93). In this way, the nation, as does 
every other social community, functions through imagination, the projection of individuals into the form of a 
narrative (Ibid.). Also, on the notion of imagination in nation formation, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991). He defines the nation as 
an imagined political community. Because its members will never meet and thus never know all of their co-
members, the nation is imagined. Communion resides in the mind of each individual (p. 6). Because the notion of 
togetherness, community, and comradeship exists in group life, the nation is a community (p. 7).  What permits this 
mental development to form is what Anderson describes as “homogeneous empty time,” which incorporates 
temporal simultaneity that is imaginatively experienced translocatively (p. 24-25). Individuals, now constituted as co-
nationals, gain reassurance that the imagined world of the nation writ large is rooted in quotidian practices (p 35-36), 
cf. Kertzer, n. 111, and Confino, n. 109. 
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appreciation of the “optics of the nervous system.” His analysis, and others like his, paves the 
way to a deeper understanding of the necessarily multivalent quality of any study that purports to 
study things social, but still falls short of any recognition of the diversity of meanings of symbols 
and their associated communities of action and memory. 
Resituating the Diaspora: Symbolically Constructing the Whole 
Such multivocality in the various ways that groups come to imagine, reflect upon, 
remember, and commemorate themselves finds expression in the works of Pierre Nora, Jan 
Assmann, and Alon Confino. Nora, emerging from the Annales School, is interested in 
dismantling chronological and teleological continuity and thus focuses his attention on the 
symbolic fragments that combine into and relate to the symbolized whole. In other words, Nora 
situates the scholar’s attention on the scrutiny of the “building blocks” that form otherwise 
traditional representations of what people consider to be stable entities, such as the group and 
nation.100 
According to his understanding, people operate today under the 
assumption/consciousness that traditions have ended, that globalization, democratization, and 
the proliferation of mass culture/media have upset societies.101 Institutions that once transmitted 
values inter-generationally no longer operate as they did in the past, and one’s perception of the 
past is now supplanted by current events.102  “Sites of memory,” such as museums, as well as the 
ways in which traditions are passed on, safeguard what little is left of memory. In this current 
environment, he asserts, old symbols no longer evoke in group members the same sort of 
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response as they might have in previous generations, but their energy and potential still 
remain.103 
Jan Assmann, writing out of a Halbwachian tradition, notes that Halbwachs was 
influential in shifting attention away from biological frameworks of memory to cultural ones.104  
Assmann furthers the social embeddedness of memory by differentiating between 
communicative and cultural memory. The former is what is gained through everyday 
communication, which is limited in the degree of that interaction and information gained to the 
extent of basic temporal considerations, such as human longevity, while cultural memory is 
grounded in fateful events. The memory of such events is maintained through developed 
institutional structures.105  Repeating a refrain familiar to those in religious studies, Assmann 
states that everyday, communicative time is interrupted by rites, festivals, images, et cetera that 
relate to and reflect different temporal dimensions. As people experience those collective 
“interruptions,” meaning crystallizes and is accessible to any given present across time that 
continues to encounter those phenomena.106 
																																																								
103  Ibid., 7.  This acknowledgment is common in religious studies literature. Cf. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, 
Religion as a Chain of Memory [1993], trans. Simon Lee (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2000), in 
which she posits that religion is a particular mode of believing, and an adherent is a member of a chain of 
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justifies its relationship to the present, suffers attenuation in modernity (p. 125). Social change alters the ability of 
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Flight of the Wild Gander: Explorations in the Mythical Dimension (New York: Viking Press, 1969), where he claims that 
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Through development of practices, in relation to those transtemporal phenomena, the 
group utilizes a body of reusable texts, images, and rituals that aid in the stabilization of the 
group’s self-image, and the group becomes aware of itself and thus becomes visible to others as 
possessing a cultural heritage. 107 Assmann stresses the fact that the cultural dimension of 
memory is communicative, not just embodied and lived. More importantly, memory’s cultural 
dimension operates in different temporal structures from other dimensions of memory. While it 
is true that within a group people live among markers that allow for one to observe a tradition, 
contexts do change and may change to such a degree that individuals are not reminded, in the 
new environment, of commitments made previously and the situations leading to having made 
such commitments. In this way, Assmann notes memory’s relativity, similarly to Nora’s 
assessment of society’s changing responses to symbols over time. 
Certain elements of cultural life, like religion, operate in ways that support the 
maintenance of memories, despite the change in circumstance.108  These rituals, according to 
Assmann, exhibit counterfactual elements. They introduce into new situations, environments, 
and periods of time components that are both distant and alien (e.g., previously made 
commitments, recollections and accompanying practices from elsewhere). In this way, the 
concept of ritual (cultural) memory serves as bonding memory; it brings meaning, significance, 
and memories from the past to the present and works to stabilize those components and the life 
of the group in the present, new situation.109 Cultural memory “disseminates and reproduces a 
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consciousness of unity” and does so through texts, which answer questions that are both 
normative (“What should we do?”) and formative (“Who are we?”).110 
In his analysis of national identity more specifically, Confino provides solid examples of 
how individuals, often from disparate circumstances, turn national, and demonstrates how a 
common denominator arises linking their particular local place to the abstract, national world.111 
In a move reminiscent of Nora, Confino posits the idea that it was through the emergence of 
small-scale, local, and village (heimat, homeland) museums in Germany that regional, political, 
and religious differences were overcome and the notion of a German nation developed. The idea 
of heimat was so vague so as to allow adherents of those differences to remain loyal to their own 
causes and aims while at the same time informing a transcendent national community.112 The 
local museum, as site of memory, bonded identification of its inhabitants to a national sentiment 
of belonging, and this developed emotive understanding transcended time and space. 
The heimat, he asserts, was not a system of articulated concepts (akin to Connerton’s 
understanding of “inscription”); rather, it was a system of sentiments that united locals to their 
particular places of residence, reminded them of home (their villages, their parishes, their 
families), which when reflected upon while away from those locations, at war for instance, 
attached the “coziness” of the hometown to the larger region and eventually to the nation as a 																																																								
110  Ibid., 38.  Cf. Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?” [1882], in Becoming National: A Reader, eds. Geoff Eley 
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and projects its hopes for continuation into the future (p. 52). 
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whole.113 Confino presents Nora’s program of studying the symbolic components that tie in to 
the larger symbolized whole. The conglomeration of often contradictory and opposing 
memories and sentiments added up to something more than the sum of its parts (as depicted 
and located in local museums). Local uniqueness was preserved in the museum, and the heimat 
became the denominator uniting the various locales into the abstract whole. In this way, Confino 
highlights how this novel form of consciousness (i.e., nation- and peoplehood) can be 
understood as comprised of memories and recollections of the specific location that is enlarged 
through later manipulation by various means to form attachment to a larger (imagined) entity. 
The locales imagined together, identified with each other, and belonged to a united idea. 
 
Judaism, the Exemplum: Approaches to Emic Contextualization 
 As Arnold Eisen notes in his study of the concept of galut, the Hebrew term used to 
denote historical exile and dispersion of Jews from Judea and later emigration from the land of 
Israel, both political and metaphysical dimensions are implicated; 114  and in this way, he 
acknowledges that the term carries a multiplicity of ways in which people use it, identify with it, 
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and enact it.115 The biblical texts, for example, depict a world in which all people are displaced 
and not at home. Humanity became estranged from its originary center, its Paradise (and later 
utopia), and as Eisen notes, this inherent state of dispersion, of already having come from 
elsewhere, is later rearticulated in the founding narratives of Judaism itself.116 
 Throughout his treatment of the biblical texts, Eisen focuses on three specific narratives 
of exile/dispersion: Adam and Eve heeding the serpent’s suggestion, not God’s, thus disrupting 
humans’ relation to the earth, which resulted in banishment and ceaseless wandering; Abraham’s 
sojourn to Canaan; and Jacob’s later descent into Egypt. It is in Egypt that the Hebrews 
encountered the combination of both political and metaphysical exile.117  Eisen notes that from 
Abraham onward, the pattern of relations between what became the people Israel and the rest of 
humanity becomes fixed (i.e., a paradigm and heuristic tool are created).118  What God gives can 
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be taken away, and how those physical possessions are handled depends on what Israel does 
with them and how it lives.119  For example, while in Egypt Moses persuades the people of the 
possibility of living a life they have never before known, of living according to a defined way. 
Through their wandering the people continually are re-directed to the memory of God’s words 
at Sinai and are reminded along the way that they (i.e., the people) consented to those dictates. 
Set in motion, then, was a state of being, and consciousness, in which every object and event 
(retroactively for the past, present, and into the projected future) are endowed with ultimate 
meaning.120 
 Throughout his text Eisen points out that Israel conceived of itself as the midpoint 
between origin and destination, and in order to enact the dictates to which it consented, it 
needed space. Because Israel had been politically exiled and lacked access to that designated 
land, its leaders continued to distinguish sacred/holy from the profane, as dictated by God, but 
had to do so in a “small sanctuary” (i.e., the developed Torah), which served as a portable 
homeland that would safeguard the community in its wanderings.121 For Jewish communities, 
each dimension of exile was intimately connected to and (co-) implicated in the others; political 
homelessness was a cause of anxiety because it exposed Jews to the metaphysical exile that was 
lessened in its (i.e., in God’s) own land.122 
 The metaphysical dimension eventually gained ascendency over the political in the 
development of the sixteenth-century Lurianic Kabbalah, in the wake of the political expulsion 																																																																																																																																																																												
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from Spain in 1492. In this system, God was understood to have contracted Itself, to make 
room for creation. This meant that even before the onset of Creation there existed divine 
exile.123  As part of the process of creation, the light of the primal energy burst its container 
(another exile), and thus the task bequeathed to humans, especially to Jews, according to the 
kabbalists, was to gather the sparks to aid in the re-creation of a unified God. In effect, humans 
aid in the redemption not only of humanity, but of the world, and of the divine. 
 Throughout their wanderings, which eventuated into prolonged settlements elsewhere, 
Jews learned to maintain certain mental reservations about their continued exile (metaphysical, 
political, etc.), to which their religious laws were adapted and accounted for, while maintaining 
an inner acknowledgement that this condition was temporary and conditional; that is, they still 
had (religious, communal, humanitarian, etc.) tasks to perform.124 With political emancipation in 
Europe in the late eighteenth century, Jews were promised the possibility of being at home, 
politically, in that elsewhere. Zionist thinkers noted that (the people) Israel had to become less 
Jewish in order to become like, and accepted by, other nations.125 
 With the later creation of the political State of Israel, tensions oscillate between the 
metaphysical and political dimensions of exile. Different registers are emphasized at different 
times, for different purposes, and for different communities. Possession of land served a 
political purpose, but as Eisen makes clear, exile is more than physical dispersion. Wherever 
there is a sense of “spiritual obtuseness,” galut exists.126  As Eisen notes, “The Jewish people has 
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come home. It has not come Home.”127  Already it is becoming clear that to be in diaspora 
entails being 1) a human with a history of migration from Africa, or any other primordial site of 
origination, 2) possibly a human who adheres to biblical texts for meaning, thus seeing oneself as 
constituting humanity as having been exiled from Eden, 3) possibly a Jewish human who 
understands Judaism as “originating” through wandering to a (promised) elsewhere, 4) possibly a 
Jewish kabbalist who understands that all of Creation and God Itself is exiled and concomitantly 
in the process of restoration of lost unity, 5) someone who either voluntarily or through 
coercion was politically forced to leave and (re)settle elsewhere, and 6) someone who feels out of 
place and feels as though one’s identity has been created through experiencing various periods of 
respite and continued wandering, searching, and travel.  For many people, these registers come 
to the fore at different times. 
 
 
While Standing on…Both Feet?:  Judaism’s Ambiguous Territorial Positionality 
 William Safran’s investigations into the concept of “diaspora” are situated within the 
discourse on space and groups’ receptions by the hostland, and responses to the hostland, within 
that space. He notes that traditionally understood, the concept of “diaspora,” or of being in 
diaspora, for Jews has taken on connotations of deracination, legal disabilities, oppression, and 
adjustment to a hostland whose conditions may be unreliable.  The host population may wish 
that the incoming population’s presence will be temporary.  As is often depicted in standard 
histories of Jewish communities over time, though, the incoming population (in this instance 
Jewish groups) has developed institutions, social patterns, and symbols that unite it and cohere 
																																																								
127  Eisen Galut, 178. 
	 54 
its disparate elements, while retaining an idea of “return,” which is often left undefined.128 As is 
readily noted in contemporary studies on Jewish life outside the reestablished land of Israel, 
socio-political, and economic, conditions have witnessed fewer and less severe instances of 
oppression toward Jewish communities and in fact have exhibited an openness that makes it 
easier for people to “opt out” of particularistic communities, if many elements of identity are 
assumed by the larger, host society.129 
 In fact, it is this very situation of Jewish prosperity, in the face of a tradition and 
developed paradigms that posit states of precariousness and misery while in dispersion, that 
some scholars use in their development of a new critique and understanding of contemporary 
Jewish life worldwide. For example, Caryn Aviv and David Shneer posit a new category, “new 
Jews,” and they see an end to the Jewish diaspora. They claim that a majority of Jews worldwide 
no longer possess a self-understanding of being in diaspora; rather, they conceive of their 
current locations as home and do not pine for a “Promised Land.”130 “Home” may continue to 
be mythic, but the reality of Jews’ situation is rootedness on earth in a respective dispersed 
community. They claim that this tension between the spiritual and the physical, between rooted 
life and spiritual rootlessness, is exemplified scripturally in Jeremiah’s call on Jews to oscillate 
between being at home (in the world, wherever they are) and recalling the mythic homeland.131 
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 While Aviv’s and Shneer’s counter-narrative to more traditional understandings of 
Jewish existence is necessary and may more adequately reflect current thinking, it nonetheless is 
still a rather staid monologue. In other words, there is no incorporation of history, methods of 
transformation, and “religion” in their presentation of Jewish life around the world. They 
recognize that Jews always had multiple diasporas and homelands, that Jews have understood 
themselves as rooted in various, respective places of residence, and have exercised various 
methods of identifying and marking locations as “Jewish.”132 Yet, what is absent from their 
analysis, similar to the marked absences in Hirsch and Miller, is any explicit grappling with how 
Jews connect with other Jews beyond using the nominal designation “Jew.”133 There is no sense 
of how this rootedness and connection to Judaism is created, maintained, envisioned, enacted, 
recollected, and perpetuated, let alone the many other registers in which Jews, and others, exist 
diasporically. 
 As one who does target aspects of sedentary and rooted life that in fact help to foster 
connections across boundaries, thus effecting a diasporic consciousness on many levels, Safran 																																																								
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invokes religion explicitly. He notes that for Jews religion has been an important element of 
diaspora reality. This element is reflected in the idea of the “homeland” being the locus of holy 
sites, the location where the national religious identity developed, and where the sacred writing 
originated.134  While located abroad, which as stated, in locations that became quite settled and 
conducive to merging in many regards into the surrounding environs, Jewish communities 
maintained connection with that homeland, however it was imagined. For example, Jews 
provided financial support to issues related to there, adopted its language and culture, and simply 
participated in rituals dictated in religious texts themselves that were directed to that place.135 As 
Confino demonstrated, it is these quotidian actions and investments in daily life that people 
make with regard to “home” that helps break down the center/periphery model. 
 In writing specifically about Jewish relationships to particular places, Barbara Mann 
investigates various elements implicit in any understanding of place, ties together many of the 
themes Eisen invoked, and relates them to contemporary concerns about the (political) results of 
identification with particular places (and enactments of possessing those places). In alluding to 
Jewish religious conceptions of space, and time, she claims that one cannot think about 
wholeness (redemption, unity) without thinking of and remembering its loss.136  The Garden 
(Eden), then, is a symbol of an irretrievable past, of stability, and of sovereignty. Taken along 
with Jerusalem, they constitute Judaism’s main symbols of lost centers.137 
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 She also notes that throughout Jewish history there have been experiences of 
communities understanding themselves to be ideologically in exile while being existentially at 
home.138  Repeating a refrain that Eisen already established, she notes that scriptural descriptions 
of the land (of Israel) depict it as a site of contestation, as being filled with others, and as never 
totally belonging to anyone. Israel’s possession of it is conditional.139  Its loss is recognized by 
and in prayer, which replaced the sacrificial offerings in the Temple. Mann reiterates that 
diaspora connotes being uprooted, displaced, but also as entailing processes of (re-) rooting. 
Space, as she makes clear, is determined by geography, but also by activities performed 
in it. An example of Jewish grappling with the conundrum of maintaining “Jewish place” in an 
otherwise non-Jewish space is the rabbinic development of the eruv, a physically enclosed area 
(usually demarcated by a wire boundary) that symbolically extends the private domain of a 
household, thus permitting activities allowed in the home but normally forbidden in public on 
the Sabbath, such as carrying objects.140 This construction is a ritual related to space, that of the 
neighborhood conceived of as a home, which transforms space into a particular place,141 without 
it being dependent on a group’s claiming sovereignty over that area. 
Texts, Social Imaginaries, and Exigencies: Quandaries over Levels of Reality 
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 As exemplified in the discussion on ways in which scholars of Judaism have dealt with 
Jewish views toward, and enactments within, particular space, even more levels/registers of 
diasporicity exist than simply being geographically separated from somewhere. Even the rabbinic 
allowance for a bounded, imagined construct demonstrates that the rabbis invested energy in 
detailing symbolic dimensions necessary for “inscribing communal identity onto a lived 
environment,”142 while never abandoning the recognition that the necessity of such a construct 
was due to being dispersed in many ways. The very development of a religiously sanctified 
“home,” as resulting from the guidelines for an eruv, for instance, places into question the very 
category of “diaspora,” if control of space is one of the underlying factors of being in diaspora. 
 It is to this tension, between the imagined and the lived, which encapsulates subsequent 
research on (Jewish) diaspora studies. The need for context, which necessitates focus on time, 
space, history and autobiography, memory and collective belonging, displacement, and 
settlement, highlight the fact that Benjamin’s and Taussig’s cautions are all the more prescient 
and in need of address. Representing the major streams within this genre are Sidra DeKoven 
Ezrahi and George Steiner. Ezrahi delves into an analysis of the worlds of Jewish fiction as a 
way to critique the current political situation. Her underlying question rests on asking what it is 
that the authors she analyses actually remember in their writing about home, travel, and return. 
Throughout her analysis of various authors’ styles and literary characters, she juxtaposes the 
portable, open, and malleable creation of rabbinic culture and of Jewish life structured by it to 
the (re-) territorialized, closed (re-) creation of a Jewish state.143 
 For many of the authors that she discusses, their point of departure is reference to 
sacred memory, to sacred place/space, and to the ensuing pilgrimage of return. They present 																																																								
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voyages that are linear, although the path is quite circular. In these depictions of Jewish travels, 
the wanderers are not possessors; speech is privileged, and the actual destination is absent and 
remains vague.144  After the Shoah (i.e., the Holocaust of the Second World War), though, she 
notes that many authors questioned space more generally because survivors could not find 
“home” anywhere. Because there once was a home, many authors demanded reconcretization 
(i.e., particular places).145  For other authors, existence itself was questioned, not just place and 
home.  If at least physical remains of previous lives were not totally effaced, then “return” to 
even dilapidated homes would be bearable, but to be confronted with having left no trace, to 
being erased, leaves survivors outside historical time and memory.146 
 Throughout her discussion of these authors’ imagined worlds, albeit worlds often 
reflecting lived exigencies, Ezrahi presents her analysis. If visions remain unrealized (i.e., if 
possession of that goal, concrete place, utopia, which would mean physical place located 
somewhere and inhabited by others – as presented in the biblical texts, for example – is 
unfulfilled), then an “infinite elasticity” connects dreamers and the object of their faith (i.e., 
physical return and solidification of imagination).147 In this way, Ezrahi presents the Jewish 
teleology, as is commonly understood. She states that what is remembered (by the authors, by 
Jewish communities, for example) is also imagined.  Banishment from the Garden is the 
moment when myth becomes history. From that moment on, history becomes a narrative with a 
posited utopian goal: projected repatriation and alternative sovereignty. 148   To finish the 
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narrative, then, is to provide closure, and this threatens imagination and creativity in the now. In 
her view, exile (and being in diaspora) enables the storyteller and scholar to produce, to imagine, 
to create, and not to (dis) possess.149 
 While Ezrahi presented an analysis of Jewish fiction and the supposed (religious, 
political, and artistic) implications of actually succeeding in working to enact a dream of 
“return,” George Steiner presents a view of diaspora as understood by G. W. F. Hegel, but 
cautions against a total privileging of texts and social imaginaries over physical concerns and 
acknowledgment of history. Steiner states that Hegel’s understanding of Judaism was one in 
which Judaism broke the bonds of human unity. According to Hegel, Abraham’s leaving Ur 
destroyed the bonds that connect a group to its ancestors; Abraham dismissed his childhood, 
and this repudiation of the past produced estrangement from the rest of humanity, the result of 
which was Judaism’s eternal longing for and incapability of achieving self-integration.150 
 In this way, Hegel continues, the Jewish claim to nearness to God, accessed and 
approached through the text, came at a cost of self-ostracism from earth and relations among 
humans. Foreignness, of being in diaspora, gains an ontological status in Judaism. What is tragic 
to Hegel, however, is for others the secret to Jewish survival: locating home in the text, which 
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forever will be with each community. Each commentary, then, is a homecoming.151  He proceeds 
to relate how the development of Christianity contributed to another sense of Jewish diaspora. 
Christianity’s development, in particular Pauline universalism, could have diffused Judaism’s 
identity into Christianity itself, he asserts, had the early Church not become a political-territorial 
structure, later following and serving the militancy of secular states.152 Underlying all of these 
examples of being in diaspora (philosophically, religiously, and thus socially wherever Judaism 
was a minority presence), Jews were in precarious positions. For Jewish “survivors” of the 
concrete politico-historical realities, such as the Dreyfus Affair, the Shoah, among others, 
homeland needed to be re-found. Mere textual homecoming was no match for (potential, and 
actual) physical persecution.153 
 
 
Looking Forward to the Past 
In his discussion of the origins of Israelite religion P. Kyle McCarter, Jr. explains how 
Israel went through a process of ethnic self-identification in Canaan; it drew boundaries between 
itself and other peoples.154 In coming to this conclusion, he discusses the various avenues and 
perspectives he had to consider. In other words, he adopted, from the Annales School, a view of 
the longue durée, which included an examination of texts (of archaic poetry, specifically), 
archaeology, weather patterns, economic and militaristic history, and considerations of social 
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scientific investigations into ethnicity, all in light of, and juxtaposed to, various proposed 
theories of the emergence of early Israel. 
After a consideration of the available data, he states that from disparate groups a single 
people developed by drawing ethnic boundaries and developing a genealogy.155  An important 
part of this boundary was religion; Israel comprised those who worshipped Yahweh, God of 
Israel. This factor was not unique in Iron Age religions, in which devotion to a chief national 
god was characteristic. Included in this discussion, which he expands upon later, are issues of 
boundaries (territorial, spatial, ideological), narrative, and genealogy/kinship (ethnicity). The 
setting of this prehistory of the Israelite community is the central hill country, the highlands, in 
which settlements and villages developed during the Early Iron Age.156 
Israel became an ethnic group united by kinship. While often defined by biology and 
expressed by genealogy, kinship also may have non-biological ways of manifesting itself. 
Boundary markers, such as language, religion, dress, and diet, as well as various combinations of 
such elements, help to create a sense of being apart, and a part.157  The result, as McCarter 
highlights, is that by the time of the Iron Age the communities in the central highlands 
demonstrated ideas and customs that were no longer Canaanite and in fact were actively 
distancing themselves from the surrounding cultures. 
As mentioned, underlying McCarter’s presentation are the three pillars of space, 
narrative, and genealogy. It is through an examination of each element that we can glimpse 
experiential precursors to Bhabha, Gilroy, Halbwachs, Confino, and others. Without taking into 
consideration McCarter’s view of the longue durée, we could not see how Israelite ethnogenesis 
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occurred in the space in between Egyptian control, Canaanite culture, and various movements of 
peoples during the general malaise at the end of the Late Bronze Age. We also could not 
appreciate the development by later redactors of Israelite texts and narratives, which present a 
particular description of events that do not correspond to events “on the ground,” but which do 
incorporate, interspersed throughout the writings, fragments of historical realia from earlier 
centuries that aid in creating and complementing the formation of rituals and ethos that 
continue the ethnic markers of the group. 
Each of the considerations regarding boundaries, narrative, and genealogy contribute to 
an understanding of the category of diaspora. Various scholars have attempted to deal with 
components of those elements, but instead of clarifying categories and understandings, they 
rather have produced chaos and indiscriminate musings (poetics) that resonate little with others 
in the same predicament. The result, as Brubaker observed, is a “diaspora” diaspora, but more 
importantly, a lack of presence of mind in the time of now. People are distanced from their own 
pasts, which entails alienation from a true understanding of their current actions and 
considerations, as Benjamin cautioned. 
McCarter’s engagement with archaic poetics, for example, demonstrated that while 
cultural borrowings and mixture occurred over time,158 with for example the Canaanite god El 
becoming one of the designations for the divine in early Israel (and throughout the rest of 
Jewish tradition), there developed coherence in the service of an overarching goal. It is through 
investigating how these various strands (movements of people, space, narrative and texts, 
genealogy and ethnic markers) emerged, came together, and developed that McCarter’s poetics 																																																								
158  He presents an example of archaic poetry found in the biblical texts, which, while produced in the 
ninth century BCE, can be dated, due to form and content, to Iron I composition (1200-1000 BCE) (Ibid., 123).  
The use of the designation El, one of the names of the God of Israel, but also the king of gods in the Canaanite 
pantheon (Ibid.,125) reflects a divinity that is a warrior and as coming from the southeast of Judah and Israel, from 
Teman, or Edom, or from Sinai.  Jewish tradition attests this much by portraying the first encounter between 
Yahweh and Israel in Midian, which suggests that Yahwism originated in the south and east of Judah (Ibid.,128-29). 
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distinguishes itself from Hirsch’s and Miller’s, for instance; whereas for Hirsch and Miller 
poetics are ends in themselves, for McCarter (archaic) poetics represent a contributing strand to 
an interweaving of components that persist under an overarching, developed people. With this 
in mind, it is to debates within Syro-Palestinian (biblical) archaeology of Israel’s “origins” that 
we now turn, for it is in this period that the three pillars emerge, which continue to today.
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Chapter Two 
Digging the Diaspora: Convergence and 
the Elusive Quest for Reconciliation 
 
Archaeology and the Materiality of Early Israel 
 
 In attempting to gain a better understanding of the origins of early Israel, some scholars 
focus primarily on texts and textual analysis. For example, P. Kyle McCarter, Jr. uses linguistic, 
grammatical, and other literary techniques to help date biblical texts to an approximate period. 
Others, like biblical archaeologist William Dever, utilize approaches that are grounded, quite 
literally, in material remains in order to reconstruct the beginnings of early Israel. Dever has 
spent his professional career as an active archaeologist and also has been thoroughly involved in 
debates about how to incorporate both biblical texts and material remains in a better 
appreciation of often competing forces that shaped what we think of today as the biblical world 
and the peoples who inhabited it. In an attempt to gain a more well-rounded view of “Israel’s” 
supposed beginnings, Dever advocates for what he dubs “convergences,” instances where 
textual and archaeological finds overlap, before making any “truth” claims about the humanly 
distant past.1 Such an endeavor stands as a response to scholars who claim that the relatively late 
composition of the Hebrew biblical texts in the Hellenistic period, ca. third-second centuries 
BCE, implies that they are entirely fictitious and thus that ancient/early Israel never existed.2 
Yet, late editing, Dever claims, does not equate to late composition. Remains from the past 
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persisted in the developed cultural memory of the group, and hits to that past are scattered 
throughout the texts. 
This chapter uses the archaeological sources that Dever presents in his studies and 
juxtaposes them with the theoretical analysis of cultural historian and Egyptologist Jan Assmann, 
who likewise deals with Israel’s origins, albeit in texts that reflect the period out of which 
Dever’s material remains originate. When biblical archaeology and cultural memory studies are 
used alongside one another, we are able to construct not only a more viable understanding of the 
emergence of a people, but also a much broader appreciation of the many levels in which the 
category of diaspora operates, in which it can be constituted, and the means through which it is 
conveyed. To aid in this endeavor I look to Benjamin again, but this time as Tomoko Masuzawa 
uses him in her understanding of origins and reproductions of things considered to be originary. 
Our context is provided by the literary and material, the socially constructed and the physical 
remnants of people from then. Through Benjamin’s concept of the grid and reproducibility, we 
gain further insight into how diaspora operates and how it is always already a condition within 
which we exist. 
When considering the archaeology of early Israel alongside the formation of its cultural 
memory, especially as depicted in the biblical books of Deuteronomy, Joshua, and Judges, one 
can understand how diaspora “originates” through remembrance of an imagined past, which is 
continually commemorated. 3  Viewing diaspora as an experience, which is itself a 
commemoration, complicates the broader orientations toward which historians, political 
scientists, and even some literary theorists gravitate. In these understandings, something external 																																																								
3  These biblical books comprise part of the Deuteronomistic History. Throughout his later books, and 
thus forming the core of his argument against “revisionist” historians and literary theorists, Dever hones in on the 
convergences between material remains from the Bronze and Iron Ages and the textual accounts of this History, 
which, as he describes, comprises the books of Deuteronomy plus Joshua through Kings. See Dever The Lives of 
Ordinary People, 1-2. 
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precipitates a group into a diasporic existence. Yet, when incorporating points of convergence 
among multiple elements, across both time and space, into the discussion (i.e., including 
archaeology as a supplement to textual sources in order to provide better contextualization), 
more levels of diaspora emerge that further forestall attempts at reconciliation. The “emergence” 
of a diasporic existence becomes much more complex and intangible, thus frustrating easy 
identification with an experience and “people.” 
 Using both archaeological material of the biblical world and cultural analytical 
approaches to the book of Deuteronomy (and the Deuteronomistic History more generally) is 
not intended as a pretext to engage in Pentateuchal or biblical criticism, certainly not as an 
exercise in philological study of the biblical texts, or an examination of debates in biblical 
archaeology regarding “origins” of the patriarchs, of Israelite settlement, etc. Rather, this chapter 
will explore a broader issue: How ancient Israel imagined itself and how that imagination was 
realized or not in the archaeological record. This is a study of a way to target how the category of 
diaspora functions in delimited situations and debates. Throughout the discussion of Dever’s 
explanation of archaeological excavations of what archaeologists understand to be the purported 
origins of Israel, it is clear that biblical archaeology has many interlocutors, including collective 
and cultural memory studies, and nationalism more broadly. Guiding questions underlying an 
investigation into how scholars approach material remains of a people and literary theoretical 
reflections on a text, which happen to retrojectively describe the period of the physical remains 
themselves, include “When does diaspora begin?” and “How is it remembered?” 
Poetics and the Betrayal of History 
 As attested, the earliest portion of the biblical texts, at least chronologically in terms of 
composition, is archaic poetry. These excerpts, notably the Song of Deborah (Judges 5, thus part 
of the Deuteronomistic history) are dated to the Early Iron Age (1200-1000 BCE). The texts 
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present the God of Israel as a warrior coming from the south and east of historical Israel and 
Judah.4  Dever states that most scholars regard this material, which includes the experience of 
later, monarchical Israel as well as its preceding formative period, as a composite work that 
incorporates older sources woven together into a national epic. Included in these early texts 
purportedly are Israel’s history from its emergence in Canaan in the twelfth century BCE to the 
fall of Jerusalem and the beginning (Babylonian) exile in the sixth century BCE.5 According to 
Dever, the later compilers of this material put the narration of this history in the mouth of 
Moses and claimed that the material was found, recovered. That the compilers “recovered” 
material that supposedly came from Moses served to legitimate both the reformers themselves 
and their goals under Josiah (ca. 650-609 BCE); the reformers used this “recovered” law to urge 
their co-religionists/-ethnics (i.e., the people Israel) to repent and spiritually re-coalesce in the 
face of neo-Babylonian advance. This resuscitated law thus represented a “pure” past from 
which later generations, including the one about to be exiled, deviated, and a past to which they 
needed to return.6 
 Scholars date the writing of this material to the seventh century BCE and its final 
redaction to the exilic period of the sixth century BCE, or even later. While the authorship of 
the texts is unclear, its intention, according to Dever, is to present a grand sweep of history 
about a people united in faith, living a covenanted life; it is didactic literature that describes the 
past in order to impart moral lessons.7 This literature about the emergence of the people of 
Israel, then, was written hundreds of years after the events it purports to describe occurred. Yet, 																																																								
4  McCarter “The Origins of Israelite Religion,” 125-28. 
 
5  Dever What Did the Biblical Writers Know, 100. 
 
6  Ibid.; William G. Dever, Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From? (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2003), 236. 
 
7  Dever The Lives of Ordinary People in Ancient Israel, 3-4. 
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as Dever attests, the sources of this material rest on traditions and knowledge of earlier times, as 
reflected in fragments such as oral traditions and earlier documentary sources like the Song of 
Deborah, combined with events contemporaneous to the later time of authorship and 
compilation.8 Continuities, as well as deviations, can likewise be found in pottery styles, housing 
and agricultural developments, and in cultivated religious outlook between Late Bronze Age 
Canaanite culture and that of Early Iron Age Israelites. 
 Throughout these texts glimpses of earlier legacies occur, which date back to the Middle 
Bronze Age, ca. 1880s-1500s BCE, a period corresponding to the Joseph story in the Israelite 
perspective and to the period of the Hyksos in ancient Egypt.9 An example of convergences 
between literary and archaeological remains exists in the form of scarabs with the name of Jacob 
on them, as one of the Hyksos kings, thus attesting to the plausibility of earlier ancestral lore in 
Israelite collective memory with roots attested to externally. The Hyksos are described as foreign 
rulers, “interlopers” from Canaan, who were one of the many groups arriving and leaving from 
Egypt between the 1600s-1400s BCE.10  What are now considered the Jewish scriptures reflect 
back on Egypt and Canaan of the Bronze Age from the perspective of the Babylonian exile, with 
some interspersed writings from the Iron Age located throughout those materials. Earlier in the 
book of Genesis, we are told that Israel (Jacob) sojourned to Egypt due to famine in Canaan; 
while there he found Joseph who earlier had been sold into slavery.  This period is attested to in 
the Amarna letters, Egyptian documents describing drought and famine in Canaan, the sale by 																																																								
8  Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 8; Nadav Na’aman, “The ‘Conquest of Canaan’ in the Book of Joshua 
and in History,” in From Nomadism to Monarchy: Archaeological and Historical Aspects of Early Israel, eds. Israel Finkelstein 
and Nadav Na’aman (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1994), 222. 
 
9  Baruch Halpern, “The Exodus from Egypt: Myth or Reality?” in The Rise of Ancient Israel, ed. Hershel 
Shanks (Washington, D.C.: Biblical Archaeological Society, 1992), 98-99. 
 
10  Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 11; Na’aman “The ‘Conquest of Canaan’,” 245; Hershel Shanks, 
“Defining the Problems: Where We Are in the Debate,” in The Rise of Ancient Israel, ed. Hershel Shanks 
(Washington, D.C.: Biblical Archaeological Society, 1992), 22. 
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Canaanite families of individuals to Egypt in exchange for grain, and of Semitic “invaders” who 
later controlled Egypt, but who were later expelled back to Canaan in the mid-sixteenth century 
BCE.11 
 Baruch Halpern understands these external writings, events, and their later 
implementation by the authors of the Jewish texts as ways that Egyptian memory and experience 
influenced Israelite tradition. The author(s) of these particular excerpts from the Bible 
demonstrate literacy and familiarity with knowledge of the history of this earlier time, of a 
particular historical milieu, and identification with the traditions of the Hyksos, in this case.12 In 
this way, much of the Exodus story correlates with realities on the ground during the Middle 
Bronze Age. Many elements of the story are topologically true, such as the fact that Moses’s 
name is Egyptian. Yet, many scriptural descriptions seem unlikely, given scholars’ understanding 
of demographics of the time as well as from details gained from external texts of the time. It is 
unlikely that three million people left Egypt, for instance.13  Nevertheless, a people identified 
with the experiences of the Hyksos, albeit unnamed in the texts, escaped into the desert, 
migrated through the land of the Shasu, of other pastoralists, of Yhwh, came into contact with 
peoples migrating down the King’s highway in Transjordan, and found compatibility with one 
																																																								
11  Halpern “The Exodus from Egypt,” 92.  See Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 172-73, in which Dever 
provides information about the content of the letters. They provide valuable information regarding conditions in 
Canaan during the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE. Much of the material in the letters details complaints 
and appeals by Canaanite chiefs to Akhenaten (Amenophis IV, ca. 1370-1353 BCE) about the ‘Apiru being a 
disruptive element, about local competition among chiefs, tribute chiefs paid to the Egyptians in an attempt to buy 
them off of one another, revenue extracted from the populace, etc. Also see William G. Dever, “How to Tell a 
Canaanite from an Israelite,” in The Rise of Ancient Israel, ed. Hershel Shanks (Washington, D.C.: Biblical 
Archaeological Society, 1992), 58, in which he tells us that based off of reading the Amarna letters, archaeologists 
know that the Canaanite city-state system was collapsing by the 1400s BCE, that there was a mass exodus from the 
Canaanite cities, and that the rural population was in flux. The hill lands offered ample opportunities for retreat. 
 
12  Halpern “The Exodus from Egypt,” 94. 
 
13  Ibid., 106. 
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another.14 Overtime, as Halpern describes, these peoples coalesced around/subscribed to a 
national myth of escape from Egypt, mediated by a god residing in the south, and established a 
nation in Canaan. The narrative that developed was a “call to arms,” a call to xenophobia against 
Canaanites elsewhere in the land (i.e., in lowland areas, not those in the central hills) whose 
ancestors did not participate in the exodus and who did not identify with those who experienced 
such an event, imagined or not.15 
 Those peoples who did identify with the established cult, including those whose stories 
constituted the kernel(s) out of which the narrative developed, understood themselves as being 
guided by liberation from slavery and national enfranchisement.  This was the developed 
paradigm, which excluded those who did not adhere to such a self-understanding. The narrative 
encodes certain symbolic structures (e.g., social and territorial boundaries, and genealogy) and 
common values into the culture, regardless of one’s biological ancestry. To be Israelite meant 
that ancestors, spiritual or emotive or collective, had “risen from Egypt to conquer Canaan.”16 
Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again 
 As soon as one takes issue with the description from the biblical tradition and attempts 
to dismantle the narrative to find convergences with the archaeological record, one interjects 
into the story/narrative pieces that do not cohere, however accurate and necessary they are to 
the narrative itself. To date, there are four models through which scholars have understood the 
“historical” and archaeological emergence of Israel; often these models accord well with the 
																																																								
14  Ibid.  See also Ann E. Killebrew, Biblical Peoples and Ethnicity: An Archaeological Study of Egyptians, 
Canaanites, Philistines, and Early Israel, 1300-1100 B.C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 152, in which she posits that the story 
of the exodus does not represent a single, specific, historical moment, but rather a merging together of numerous 
exoduses of many runaway Asiatic slaves, such as the Hyksos, which have been “telescoped” into a single event. 
 
15  Halpern “The Exodus from Egypt,” 107. 
 
16  Ibid., 88. 
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developed tradition, but usually their findings serve to complicate the ways in which people 
identify, with what it is they identify, and expand the ways in which “diaspora” originates. 
William Dever, paraphrasing the conquest model as presented in the book of Joshua, 
states that according to biblical tradition the people who later formed Israel entered the land 
from the east, via Jericho, fanned out northward, then southward, and later overran the entirety 
of the area, annihilating its native population and apportioning territories amongst the tribes.17 In 
fact, located in the Bible are two versions of how people took possession of the land. The first, 
from the book of Joshua, exemplifies the idea that Israelites invaded the land and possessed it. 
The other occurs in the book of Judges, which essentially is a reversal of the description in 
Joshua. Judges presents territorial allotment before possession.18  The understanding of Israelites 
conquering the land and its inhabitants, often quite violently, is quite prevalent, even in 
contemporary scholarly interpretations of Jewish identity.19  Yet, as Dever points out, not a 
single destruction layer around 1200 BCE can be ascribed to the Israelites. Many sites mentioned 
in our biblical texts were not even occupied at that time, let alone destroyed or annihilated at the 
purported time of “conquest.”20 
 Archaeological evidence in the land of Israel until the 1960s corroborated some sort of 
military campaigns by foreign peoples in Canaan of the late thirteenth, early twelfth centuries 
BCE, but by the late 1960s, the conquest model as depicted in the Bible (i.e., a large-scale, 
concerted military invasion) was dismissed by serious archaeologists due to a lack of external 
																																																								
17  Dever “How to Tell,” 31. 
 
18  Shanks “Defining the Problems,” 3. 
 
19  See, for instance, Jonathan and Daniel Boyarin’s assertion that the biblical story is one not of 
autochthony but always already coming from somewhere else, in Daniel Boyarin and Jonathan Boyarin, “Diaspora: 
Generation and the Ground of Jewish Identity,” Critical Inquiry 19, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 715. 
 
20  Dever “How to Tell,” 32. 
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material evidence supporting such a claim. Of the more than forty sites that biblical texts claim 
were conquered, only about two or three of them would fit the descriptions of Israelites from 
1250-1150 BCE, the period in which it is believed that Israel became a significant presence in 
the region.21 
 During the 1920s-1930s some archaeologists, most notably Albrecht Alt, proposed a 
new model. Looking instead to biblical depictions of Israel’s ancestors as mobile, tent-dwelling 
shepherds, scholars posited a peaceful infiltration model, in which they attest that the central hill 
region was almost empty and offered nomadic tribespeople from the semi-arid regions of 
Transjordan respite and allowed their transformation into a small-scale and rural agricultural 
society with egalitarian ideals. In other, more populated areas of Canaan, such as the plains and 
fertile valleys, military clashes ensued with the infiltration of these outsiders.22  Yet, as Dever 
adds, this model of small-scale, peaceful sedentarization of nomads does conflict with other 
strands of the biblical tradition, presents a romanticized ideal of the Bedouin life, and even fails 
to appreciate the real dynamics of sedentarization. According to some literature in anthropology, 
urban authorities forcefully settle nomads because the nomads are considered a nuisance.23 
 During the early 1960s a third model appeared, which was supported by scholars such as 
George Mendenhall and Norman Gottwald.  The peasant revolt model posited the notion that 
the Israelites were indigenous peasants to Canaan, revolted and left the coastal urban centers at 
the end of the late Bronze Age, went to the hill country out of economic, not theological, 
reasons, and only later developed a religion based on worship of Yhwh, thus evolving into the 
																																																								
21  Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 45, 71. 
 
22  Ibid., 51; Shanks “Defining the Problems,” 6. 
 
23  Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 52. 
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people of Israel.24 In other words, this model understands the Israelites as part of an indigenous, 
internal revolution, which might have had religious motivation. There was no overnight military 
conquest by foreigners, but rather a drawn out sociocultural and religious revolt, undertaken by 
local Canaanites acting out against their overlords; these “rebels” formed a new ethnic entity and 
society. Yet, as Dever is quick to point out, this model relies too heavily on Marxist thought and 
reads back onto the peoples of the Late Bronze Age motivations and consciousness that would 
be anachronistic, but more importantly, lacks archaeological support.25 
 Finally, the fourth model, loosely dubbed the symbiosis model, and which is attributed 
to Volkmar Fritz, understands the Israelites, or the proto-Israelites, as a people living alongside 
the Canaanites and who emerged out of the Late Bronze Age Canaanite culture and society.26 
This model also states that about 300 small agricultural villages were founded de novo in the late 
thirteenth, early twelfth centuries BCE, often on hilltops adjacent to arable land and good 
springs, and they usually were defenseless, unwalled villages. These villages were scattered in the 
central hills from the lower Galilee in the north to around Beersheba in the south. None of the 
villages was founded on the ruins of destroyed Late Bronze Age sites, and they all are in areas 
conspicuously devoid of Canaanite urban centers.27 
 Adding to the debates about the origins of the Israelites and their emergence in the 
central hills of what became known as Israel and Judah, Israel Finkelstein argues that the long-
term settlement history and demography of the land is in fact characterized by oscillations 
between nomadization and sedentarization. The Early Iron Age represents only the third wave 																																																								
24  Shanks “Defining the Problems,” 9, 13-14. 
 
25  Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 53-54. 
 
26  Dever “How to Tell,” 30. 
 
27  Dever What Did the Biblical Writers Know, 110. 
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of this cyclic process. According to Finkelstein, nomads who had been displaced by the 
upheavals of the Middle Bronze Age, and who remained nomadic throughout the Late Bronze 
Age, gradually resedentarized. The Middle Bronze Age origins of the Iron Age settlers can be 
attested to by their lack of fortifications, domestic architecture, and pottery, among other 
elements. There is no evidence for a direct shift from the lowlands to the highlands in the Late 
Bronze Age-Early Iron Age transition, thus adding further nuance to the symbiosis model.28 
 As Dever concludes his assessment of the older models, he reiterates that it is important 
to note that the conquest, peaceful infiltration, and peasant revolt models are obsolete. Many 
sites that ostensibly were conquered by the Israelites, such as Heshbon, Aran, ‘Ai, and Hebron, 
were not occupied in the Late Bronze Age; as well, through various means, most notably pottery 
style, archaeologists see that Late Bronze Age culture was gradually destroyed over many years, 
thus contradicting the rapid conquest tradition in the Bible. Furthermore, the establishment of 
Transjordanian kingdoms of Ammon and Moab, according to the conquest tradition, antedates 
the penetration of Israel into Canaan. In actuality they were contemporaneous with the rise of 
the later Israelite monarchy, ca. late eleventh century BCE. Edom emerged even later. This 
provides further evidence that the conquest tradition was written at a time when the rise of 
Transjordanian states was forgotten.29 
																																																								
28  Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 155-56. 
  
29 Na’aman “The ‘Conquest of Canaan’,” 223.  As Dever attests, the authors/redactors of the biblical texts 
under discussion, with the notable exception of fragments of archaic poetry, were retrojections from the context of 
the Babylonian exile of the seventh century BCE. These authors demonstrated little familiarity with Iron Age 
topographical and settlement patterns. See Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 31. Na’aman furthers this critique by 
noting that the depiction of the five Amorite kings in Joshua in fact reflects the later five Philistine kings whom 
King David defeated. As well, many of the Judean cities mentioned in Joshua as being conquered by the Israelites 
parallel the number and name of cities of later battles among the Israelites and Assyrians and have nothing to do 
with Iron Age I. In other words, Na’aman states that the authors took later military events as a model for their 
depiction of early Israel’s ordeal, of David’s fight against the later Philistines and Sennacherib’s (Assyrian) campaign 
to Judah. See Na’aman “The ‘Conquest of Canaan’,” 254-60. 
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While the older models are obsolete, given recent archaeological excavations and debate, 
Dever does acknowledge that Gottwald et al. were correct in claiming that the early Israelites 
were displaced Canaanites, displaced both geographically and ideologically.30 There did occur a 
demographic upsurge in the Early Iron Age (1200-1000 BCE) in the hill country; those settlers 
were not foreign invaders, as attested to by their unwalled villages; their overall settlement 
process was gradual, perhaps reflecting cyclical patterns in the region; and there are significant 
continuities with Late Bronze Age material culture, in pottery, for example. The culture that 
emerges in the highlands during the Early Iron Age is heterogeneous and reflects an ethnic 
mix.31 
 Dever maintains that the Bible is not history, and it does not pretend to be. Rather, he 
states that it is literature, and a peculiar brand of theological literature at that. It is a 
reconstruction of the past after the past was over. It was written, edited, and put together in its 
present form long after even the collapse of both the northern and southern kingdoms, ca. 
seventh century BCE; in other words, it refracts and reflects the past, much as how Halbwachs 
described collective memory.32 In this way, Dever understands the Bible as a kind of revisionist 
history, and I might add, one of the first diaspora polemics. 
Location, Location, Location: Context in Service of Theory 
In order to better appreciate how biblical material culture can factor in to a discussion of 
diaspora, it is helpful to gain some context of the region at the time of the assumed “origin” of 
Israel. During the final centuries of the Late Bronze Age, around 1400-1200 BCE, the southern 
Levant was characterized by well-developed commercial and political contacts, rise of empires, 																																																								
30 Dever “Ethnicity,” 210. 
 
31  Na’aman “The ‘Conquest of Canaan’,” 154. 
 
32  Dever “How to Tell,” 28. 
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and regional imperialism. Objects, as well as people, as we have seen in the case of the groups 
migrating in and out of Egypt, were exchanged. Results of these exchanges include cross-
fertilization of knowledge, technology, concepts, ideologies, political systems, and cultural 
practices. During this period, Egypt was the major political force in Canaan, with the Hittites, 
Assyrians, and Greeks the major powers to the north. By the late thirteenth and early twelfth 
centuries BCE, the Hittite empire was destroyed, the centralized palace system of the Mycenaean 
world was beginning to disintegrate, and Egypt suffered economic and political deterioration. As 
well, the Canaanite urban centers were destroyed or in decline. Many of the areas in the lowlands 
were taken over by the incoming Sea Peoples. In addition to this systemic collapse, natural 
disasters, such as severe seismic activity and earthquakes in the region, ca. 1225-1175 BCE, 
contributed to the destruction of Hittite sites and palaces in mainland Greece. Climactic change 
also brought extended drought.33 
Another consequence of this fragmentation and destruction was that Egypt gradually 
withdrew from Canaan, leaving a vacuum in its wake. Appearing out of this chaos were 
uprooted peoples and nomads who joined the already mobile Hyksos and ‘Apiru, a group 
known as renegades and “social dropouts” who lived on the margins of Canaanite society. 
Control was left to the local chiefs as detailed in the Amarna letters, and the major lines of 
communication and trade were replaced by local contacts and regional workshops.34 
As well, this large-scale disruption caused upheaval in the Canaanite urban areas of the 
lowland coastal plains, causing the nomadization of a portion of its population into the 																																																								
33  Killebrew Biblical Peoples, 34-35. 
 
34  Ibid., 12, 26-28; Israel Finkelstein and Nadav Na’aman, “Introduction: From Nomadism to Monarchy – 
The State of Research in 1992,” in From Nomadism to Monarchy: Archaeological and Historical Aspects of Early Israel, eds. 
Israel Finkelstein and Nadav Na’aman (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1994), 12, 16; Itamar Singer, 
“Egyptians, Canaanites, and Philistines in the Period of the Emergence of Israel,” in From Nomadism to Monarchy: 
Archaeological and Historical Aspects of Early Israel, eds. Israel Finkelstein and Nadav Na’aman (Jerusalem: Israel 
Exploration Society, 1994), 295. 
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highlands frontier; it forced pastoralists to settle elsewhere, where they mixed with other 
migrants from the Aegean-Anatolian-Syro-Palestinian region.35 Until just after the death of 
Rameses III in 1153 BCE Egypt had maintained control over parts of Canaan, albeit in 
progressively diminishing extent. During the first half of the twelfth century BCE, Canaan was a 
mosaic of cultures, including Canaanites (themselves an assortment of disparate city-states), 
Egyptians, Israelites, and various Sea Peoples (including, but not limited to, the Philistines). A 
century or two before the Sea Peoples arrived the settlement process in the central highlands 
began in Canaan.36  Toward the end of this period, new power centers emerged, such as the 
empires of Moab and Ammon along the Jordan River, and the southern coastal plains were 
colonized by the Aegean Sea Peoples (i.e., groups including the Philistines).37 
External artifacts attest to the existence of a group known as Israel around 1200 BCE. 
The stele of the nineteenth-dynasty Pharaoh Merneptah, which was erected at Thebes during the 
second year of his reign (ca. 1210 BCE), celebrates the Egyptian victory over a number of 
enemies in Canaan. The mention of Israel in this list is followed by the Egyptian plural gentilic, 
or determinative sign, which signifies a people, rather than kingdom or city-state, like the other 
names on the stele: Ashkelon, Gezer, and Yeno’am, city-states that are recorded as surrendering 
to the Egyptians.38 In other words, it designates an ethnicity. Israel is identified as a tribally 
																																																								
35  Dever “How to Tell,” 68; Na’aman “The ‘Conquest of Canaan’,” 237. 
 
36  Lawrence E. Stager, “Forging an Identity: The Emergence of Ancient Israel,” in The Oxford History of the 
Biblical World, ed. Michael D. Coogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 123. 
 
37  Killebrew Biblical Peoples, 12; Finkelstein and Na’aman “Introduction,” 12; William G. Dever, “Ethnicity, 
and the Question of Israel’s Origins,” The Biblical Archaeologist 58, no. 4 (December 1995): 206; Singer “Egyptians, 
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organized pastoralist or agriculturalist group, with or without territorial boundaries, and it was 
one group, settled or not, which threatened Egyptian control and order in central Canaan.39 
 Another text that Dever uses to attest to the characteristic of Israel as a loose 
confederation of peoples is the Song of Deborah in Judges 5, which Dever dates to the twelfth 
century BCE. In returning to this excerpt, Dever explains that the poem portrays a theopolity 
known as the people of Yhwh that exists in niches on both sides of the Jordan River. The 
groups were committed kindred of Yhwh, and they did not always act in concert. An 
understanding of themselves as kindred to a deity accords well with the Egyptian designation of 
Israel as a people,40 although that is a claim to which archaeology remains silent. Increased 
settlement in the central highlands at this time also attests to a confluence of peoples and ideas, 
which persisted and continued into the time of the united monarchy. 
 During the Late Bronze Age the Canaanite urban areas along the coastal plains 
experienced a shortage of labor as the Canaanite city-state system declined, along with the 
decline of other major empires during this period. Archaeologists believe that these forces 
caused peasant farmers to settle beyond the urban areas, on the frontiers of state control. The 
pastoralists found opportunities in the hills and even shifted toward different means of 
																																																								
39  Stager “Forging an Identity,” 124-25.  This example of external evidence is cited in all major reference 
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subsistence.41  The overall trend was toward decentralization and ruralization, in essence a type 
of diasporic existence. 
The new settlements in the highlands appear to be deliberately isolated. 42   Their 
dispersed pattern of settlement and small stature suggest a nonurban society and economy. If 
one looks at the settlement type, there is a marked shift from a few large urban centers to 
numerous small villages in the hill country. The settlements are characterized by a lack of 
monumental architecture, the appearance of pillared houses, and various installations such as 
silos and cisterns, which were rare in Late Bronze Age sites. These features, particularly the 
terraces, silos, and cisterns, were introduced gradually in the twelfth-eleventh centuries BCE, and 
were not common before the tenth century BCE.43  In fact, the hallmark of the highland 
settlements was the four room pillared house, later dubbed the “Israelite house.”44  Many 
archaeologists consider house plans and village layout to be reliable ethnic indicators, and these 
types of houses have no substantial predecessors in the history of Canaan; they appear only in 
the thirteenth/twelfth century BCE and sporadically in Transjordan. They reflect a preference 
for a rural society, given the cisterns and silos, as well as a close-knit grouping that is self-
sufficient.45 
There is no extensive agriculture, but rather small-scale horticulture, cultivation of olives 
and grapes, dry farming of cereals, stockbreeding, and herding.46  At the end of the Late Bronze 
																																																								
41  Ibid., 141. 
 
42  Killebrew Biblical Peoples, 14. 
 
43  Ibid., 171; Dever What Did the Biblical Writers Know, 110; Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 117. 
 
44  Killebrew Biblical Peoples, 175. 
 
45  Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 105. 
 
46  Dever “Ethnicity,” 208. Also see Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 107, 178, where Dever explains that 
the inhabitants of these settlements produced grains: wheat, barley, cereals, and legumes. They were farmers and 
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Age, ca. thirteenth century BCE, the population of the hill country was about twelve thousand, 
which grew to fifty five thousand by the late twelfth century BCE, and then to seventy five 
thousand by the eleventh century BCE. The dramatic increase in population cannot be attributed 
to natural increase alone, or even to natural increase combined with settled nomads. Therefore, 
archaeologists posit that it is due in part to in-migration.47 
 The absence of defensive walls suggests that the newcomers were not invaders, but 
rather political refugees, revolutionaries, social bandits, or simply immigrants from elsewhere in 
Canaan.48  Of the 687 twelfth-eleventh century BCE sites, 633 of them are new foundations, and 
they are small and unwalled villages.49  The technological changes suggest some continuity with 
earlier Late Bronze Canaanite culture, but some additions to suit the needs of the highlands. 
Some archaeologists even point out that references in Judges, Samuel, and Kings to ways in 
which people identify themselves, as belonging to the House of the Father, the bet av, accord 
well with the evidence of the housing units of the immediate and extended family.50 The classic 
patriarchal family, bayit (house), was the focus of village life, and one’s identification extended 
outward in concentric circles. From bayit, one would belong to the bet av, to the shevet (tribe), to 
the am (people), to the shivte-israel (tribes of Israel), and bene-israel (sons of Israel).51  In other 
words, in addition to archaic poetry, there are other scattered references throughout the biblical 
																																																																																																																																																																												
stockbreeders who demonstrated previous experience with local agriculture, something that nomads would not have 
been able to acquire so easily. As well, see Dever What Did the Biblical Writers Know, 113, in which he notes that the 
absence of pig bones in the excavated remains may suggest the traces of an ethnic marker. 
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texts comprising the Deuteronomistic History that betray knowledge of and familiarity with 
earlier periods, thus demonstrating strands of continuity from the Iron Age into the later period 
of biblical redaction and developed Jewish tradition and ways of belonging. 
 Another good indicator of the relative isolation and perhaps ethnic distinctiveness of 
these highland enclaves is pottery. 52   At the lowland sites, now occupied by the Sea 
Peoples/Philistines, ceramic wares and other containers, such as collared rim jars, large pithoi, 
and storage jars, are not locally manufactured, rather transported overland from neighboring 
areas, including Cyprus and the Greek mainland. In contrast, the pottery in the highland sites 
provides signs that they are locally produced, thus indicating a social boundary.53  The local 
pottery shows an absence of decoration and imitation of imports, including the popular 
Philistine bichrome of the period, as well as an absence of luxury wares.54  There are no cult 
vessels, which may suggest that the economy is rural and agricultural-pastoral, and self-
sustaining, rather than focused on an elaborate cult and organized religious personnel.55  The 
continuation of Late Bronze Age pottery types in the highland sites suggests that these settlers 
emerged from within Canaanite society itself; they were not intruders, at least wholly.56  In fact, 
the only new Israelite pottery is that of large jars, which are not found in Canaanite city-states of 
the period; these jars are ideal for the storage of agricultural surplus needed to survive in 
isolation.57 																																																								
52  Dever What Did the Biblical Writers Know, 117. Dever is quick to assert that no single list of traits can be 
created about what constitutes ethnicity, and material culture alone provides nothing definitive. Additionally, 
nothing definitive can be said about ethnicity in premonarchic Israel at all. 
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 The fact that pottery provides rather accurate information on chronology, settlement 
shifts, local culture, degree of isolation or contact within cultures, level of technology, social 
structure, stratification, subsistence, adaptation to environment, trade, and aesthetic traditions 
makes its analysis invaluable to the study of the emergence of early Israel. The pottery remains in 
the central highlands of the Early Iron Age indicate that there were many scattered villages in 
marginal zones, rather than a few concentrated urban areas; there occurred a shift from the 
urban areas to rural settlement; and there is strong continuity in these isolated enclaves with Late 
Bronze Age Canaanite repertoire, while the lowlands developed more sophisticated styles and 
even imported objects from elsewhere.58   
These settlement patterns are not new, however. Israel Finkelstein notices that there 
existed earlier waves of migration in the region dating even to the Middle Bronze Age, in the 
nineteenth-eighteenth centuries BCE. Yet, what sets this Early Iron Age movement off from 
earlier periods of transition are the dramatic increase in number of sites and that sedentary 
activity in the central hills continued to large-scale development, thus bringing about a territorial 
state in the area. The process of unification and consolidation of these inhabitants ended with 
the establishment of the monarchy, which resulted in fixed boundaries; this made it easier to 
identify and define Israelites from Canaanites.59 The process of shifting from urban civilization 
to a mixed rural pastoral society and back to urban system was fixed for the time being. 
 The point that Dever makes is that the Israelites were a composite culture, including 
both old and new features. Many elements of household architecture were new, as were some 																																																																																																																																																																												
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social and economic structures (e.g., more egalitarian villages, no evidence of elite monumental 
structures), but many aspects of technology were continuous with previous Canaanite Late 
Bronze culture.60 As stated, he argues that it is helpful to think of a significant portion of the 
highland settlers as displaced Canaanites, displaced both geographically and ideologically. This 
group also included the urban refugees, social dropouts, and other immigrants from places 
affected by socioeconomic upheaval of the thirteenth century BCE. These proto-Israelites had 
sufficient solidarity to constitute an ethnic group.61  Through Dever’s explication of the material 
record, we see diaspora existing on multiple levels. The highland settlers were spatially displaced 
from the urban coastal cities and elsewhere, these disparate groups bonded together through 
ideology and developed consciousness (accessed through differences in housing and pottery 
styles). Later generations of the same community, however, did not take into account this history 
in their recollection of their own foundation, an alienation that persisted in the writing of 
Deuteronomistic History and even in many of today’s understandings of the Jewish past. 
As Dever asserts, the main editors of the biblical tradition were people from the House 
of Joseph, parts of Benjamin, Judah, and Manasseh, and it is possible that parts of their families 																																																								
60  Dever “Ethnicity,” 52. 
 
61  Ibid., 210.  For Dever’s understanding of ethnicity, see Dever Who Were the Early Israelites, 192-93. He 
uses Fredrik Barth’s five elements that constitute ethnicity to claim that the (proto-) Israelites were a people who: 1) 
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membership defined by others, as a category distinct from others of the same order; and 5) perpetuated self-identity 
by developing and maintaining boundaries but also participated in interethnic social encounters.  As noted earlier, 
McCarter understood early Israelites as engaging in a process of ethnic self-identification through which they 
created a genealogy linking these disparate groups to each other; part of this genealogy came to include religion (p. 
129). Finally, Killebrew interprets this process as ethnogenesis, in which out of the mixed multitude in the central 
highlands, many of whose origins were largely indigenous, emerged a group identity comprising: 1) stories of 
primordial deeds (e.g., revelation, exodus, covenant, etc.); 2) undergoing a change as a result of the primordial deed 
(i.e., becoming a people identified with those deeds); and 3) the existence of ancestral enemies that serve to cement 
group cohesion (p. 149). In this way, according to Killebrew, Israelite ethnicity can be understood only in the 
context of the larger eastern Mediterranean context; it is a circumstantial, situational identification, one in which 
allegiance is a “result of political and economic interests and strategies” (p. 8). For Killebrew, the Israelite 
ethnogenesis was flexible and a response to changing circumstances. For all scholars who delved into Israelite 
ethnicity, it is understood as dynamic and takes place on many levels among the various groups, and it is used for 
political/defensive purposes. 
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had been in Egypt and went through the exodus and imposed that experience onto others who 
came from Canaan. This is similar, he notes, to how Americans celebrate Thanksgiving as 
though we ourselves all had come aboard the Mayflower. Spiritually, he states, we are all 
pilgrims, and that is what makes us Americans. We are what we believe we are.62  Israel was a 
confederation of peoples, and the Bible even hints at it. The literary tradition maintains this 
remembered ancestry, but incorporated all Israel into one family story, unified by Yahwism, 
although that is not available archaeologically.63 
Cultural Memory: Making the Past Present, Regardless the Price 
 What does the archaeology of the emergence of Israel in the Early Iron Age have to do 
with contemporary discussions about collective memory and diaspora? As outlined in the first 
chapter, Halbwachs described how memory is determined socially, through language, action, 
communication, and an individual’s emotional ties to one’s social existence. As Jan Assmann 
makes clear, through remembering, one descends not only into the interior reaches of the self, 
but gains appreciation of the order and structure of socially conditioned life, thus linking the 
individual to the social world. In this way, he reminds us, consciousness and memory are socially 
mediated.64 
 For Halbwachs, memory is lived and embodied. For Jan Assmann, cultural memory is 
communicative, but exists in a different temporal structure than does collective memory. It 
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incorporates not just the group remembering through everyday communication, but also fateful 
events, whose memory is maintained through institutional structures.65  In this way, memory and 
symbolism become intertwined. People constantly confront markers that enable them to live in a 
tradition, to belong to, and to realize their membership in a community.66  A major vehicle for 
this sort of recollection is ritual. As Assmann states, rituals “dramatize the interplay of the 
symbolic with the corporeal.” In other words, symbolic action acts as a memory aid, a sort of 
bonding mechanism that through its enactment connects its actor to the obligations, intentions, 
and purpose of the original circumstance,67 despite the change in context. In fact, most major 
elements of cultural life, and more particularly everything that is associated with religion, affect 
memory retention. Often these actions contain counterfactual elements and introduce into the 
present sentiments, memories, and circumstances that are alien to the present milieu. Therefore, 
their repetition at regular intervals is needed in order to prevent such memories from 
disintegrating. Collective identity, and memory, is brought about through processes of symbolic 
dramatization.68 
Deuteronomy: The Act of Living across Time and Space 
Between the seventh through the fifth centuries BCE, the Israelite community 
established what cultural historian Jan Assmann describes as a bonding memory based on the 
foundation of certain prescribed memory techniques. The Book of Deuteronomy impressed on 
this community a memory that was to aid its transition into a new existence. As depicted in 
Deuteronomy, the Israelites, at the time when Moses recounted to them their experiences thus 																																																								
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far, were poised to depart the desert and to enter fertile land; wandering was coming to an end, 
at least spatially.69 What was addressed to the eyewitnesses who embodied this experience of 
exodus and wandering was the presentation of something to be handed down and recounted, 
relived, and forever remembered by succeeding generations. In other words, biographical 
memory of those who supposedly experienced the wandering was to give way to cultural 
memory, the content of which was accessed through the techniques and rituals spelled out and 
prescribed in Deuteronomy: education, visibility on doorposts, as well as by markings on the 
body, and the commemoration of festivals of collective remembrance.70 As Assmann states, 
Deuteronomy is the canonization of the text of the covenant.71  Deuteronomy codifies the 
transition from the lived, embodied tradition to one of learning, from direct witness to living 
memory. In this way, he states, Israel became a community of learning and remembering.72 
 Assmann continues in his explication of Deuteronomy to state that what is being 
presented to the community is a counter memory, a counterfactual account. It introduces into 
the present something alien.73  It presents a recollection of a way of life that is not buttressed or 
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called for by the framework of their soon-to-be new environment, their envisioned reality in the 
Land of Canaan. While the Israelites are poised to overcome their spatial separation by returning 
to the Land of Canaan, they simultaneously begin a separation or alienation in time and 
consciousness. Deuteronomy’s injunction that the Israelites maintain in their new location that 
which they gained during their wandering in the desert (e.g., the covenant at Sinai, food laws, 
etc.) inaugurates disorientation and also a change of existence. This knowledge gained along the 
way to their (re) emplacement in the Land is to be remembered through rituals enacted in the 
present, thus preparing the way for a future redeemed life. 
Deuteronomy is a normative text detailing what should be done through the 
transmission of practical knowledge regarding correct action, which serves to answer the 
question of who the community believes itself to be.74  In this way, Deuteronomy serves as a 
consolidation of memory.75  These are extraterritorial and revealed (i.e., something not of natural 
occurrence) laws coming from elsewhere, and through obedience to them the Israelites become 
strangers not only on earth, but also in the region and, especially, even paradoxically, in their 
renewed home, where it is assumed that they will be tempted to forget that which they agreed to 
in the wilderness (i.e., the covenant itself).76 The memory techniques found in Deuteronomy 
prescribe and inscribe Israel into the prototype of a nation,77 and the community is formed 
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through the imperative to keep and remember. They become a new people78 in the land, with 
dictates gained elsewhere. 
 Because the Israelites were enjoined to resist forgetting their identity, it can be argued 
that Deuteronomy is the constitution of an ethnic resistance movement.79  Included in this self-
definition is the attempt to forget the community’s polytheistic past, and in this way, 
Deuteronomy’s call to remember is also a call to forget.80  Ronald Hendel is more explicit in his 
characterization of the identity that is created from Deuteronomy’s prescripts. He states that 
Deuteronomy allows the Israelites a religion of interior choice and commitment; one is to obey 
the law that God has now inscribed in one’s heart, and the rituals are reminders of this 
commitment and law. As well, God is transcendent and single, not a multiplicity of local deities. 
The implication of such injunctions is the condemnation of old shrines as foreign. Israel’s 
developed distinctiveness entails alienation from its native traditions.81  In other words, Israel set 
itself against the other indigenous groups, which now were interpreted as oppressive and 
contrary to the foundational, normative stories that Israel told of itself to itself, and thus not part 
of their ethnic domain. 
To carry the point further of Israel’s newly developed sense of ethnicity, Deuteronomy 
includes a ban on mixing with the other inhabitants of the land; this injunction would not have 																																																																																																																																																																												
which impart knowledge that establishes identity and its reproduction.  An example of this is the Israelite enactment 
of Pesach upon their arrival in the Land, as depicted in Deuteronomy. 
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been so pronounced, Assmann argues, if it were not for the fact that the Israelites did not have 
to protect against the “Canaanites residing in their own hearts.”82 Through its composition while 
in exile, Deuteronomy interiorized identity, which previously had been enacted publicly and 
institutionally, for example by pilgrimage to the Temple before exile. Afterward, spiritual Israel 
could exist wherever the group assembled. For Assmann, Deuteronomy developed an art of 
memory that separated identity from territory, 83  akin to others’ literary and textual 
understandings of Israel’s diaspora. Spiritual Israel, then, could be assembled whenever groups 
gathered to study the texts and revive the memory.84 
Text, Memory, and History: Who Mediates What, and When? 
 It bears repeating that despite outward appearances this chapter is not intended as an 
exercise in biblical criticism, or in philological study, or in historical reconstruction, although the 
latter is a necessary component. This explains why such a significant portion of this chapter was 
devoted to recounting the results of biblical archaeologists, such as Dever. Rather, this chapter is 
intended as an examination of the imagination of origins, with, or despite of, actual physical 
attestations that corroborate those narratives. 
What is important to keep in mind in this description of Deuteronomy and its 
concomitant vision of the new community of Israel is that Deuteronomy was written six 
hundred years or so after the events it describes occurred. It follows Maurice Halbwachs’s 
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assertion that the past can survive only in the reconstructed framework of the cultural present; 
the past, then, is a cultural production of a projection into that past. Only from within the social 
frames of the present (which for our purposes includes the seventh through fifth centuries BCE 
while the Israelites were in exile in Babylonia, and henceforth every periodic recreation) can an 
individual, and a community, recollect the past, and only those past events that people can 
recollect can be reconstructed within the framework of the present.85 It is this constructed 
recollection that is continually recreated in ritual. 
The picture that emerges from Deuteronomy is one of a community reentering a land in 
which its forebears had lived, from which it departed, and in which its descendants will establish 
a covenanted life as a new people, a holy nation guided by commandments. These 
commemorative commandments originated elsewhere (At Sinai? On the eastern side of the 
Jordan River?  In Babylonia?), but will be enacted in this renewed land, and the enumerated 
dictates are necessary in order to ensure the continuity of this memory in a land that may 
provide countless temptations for deviation, a land that supposedly will not buttress a holy life, 
either internally or externally. As well, this narrative was written while the community as 
depicted in the story became exiled from that land again in the future, now retelling its 
foundation myth. Diaspora (i.e., alienation and separation) already exists on multiple levels, 
operating simultaneously. Yet, we must dig deeper. 
 As Assmann attests, the stories of exodus, revelation, and the re-presentation of those 
events, occurred extraterritorially, independent of the land (of Canaan), and thus they remain 
universally valid wherever Jews found themselves.86 The Israelites took on commitments while in 
their wanderings (i.e., revelation), were enjoined to keep them in the renewed land with all of its 																																																								
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temptations, and furthered this isolation and alienation by declaring their monotheistic intention 
that included not intermarrying with others, which as Assmann surmises, frustrated the 
formation of inter-ethnic community.87 
 This developed tradition, and condition, then, is most definitely mediated, and in the 
process lost the Israelite’s actual presence in the Land; it lost Israel’s (partial) indigeneity. As 
Assmann reiterates, memory develops through socialization; while the individual possesses the 
memory, its contents are created collectively. Therefore, what one learns and hears from others, 
and how others respond to what others consider to be significant, all depend on social 
intercourse. In this way, there is no memory without a perception that is already conditioned by 
existing social frames of attention and interpretation.88 
 Such a state of affairs places into relief Benjamin’s proposal for the development of a 
presence of mind in the time of now and also whether or not such an attainment can occur. Is it 
possible to have a community, and any identification beyond the merely individual, which is not 
already mediated? In other words, is presence of mind a call for isolation and repression of 
memories, all the while presenting itself as in fact the way to incorporate, re-member, and re-
incorporate a more complete picture of that past? In light of those who insist that individual, 
subjective poetics are the responsible way to represent the past and memory (e.g., the raison d’être 
of Rites of Return), which privilege individual feeling and autobiographical memories as the way to 
include otherwise absent perspectives/voices, then tensions emerge. Such methods of 
historiography fail to acknowledge the interplay among an autonomous individual with particular 
memories, contextualization of a group’s past into larger frameworks of consideration, and any 
understanding of how these endeavors relate to international law, for instance. All narratives 
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seemingly speak past one another, and each explanation presents only a narrow understanding of 
what constitutes diaspora. 
 As we are coming to see, however, diaspora is not necessarily precipitated by a physical 
departure, especially in light of archaeological evidence. Rather, it results from an ever-present 
condition originating as an act of remembrance. Yet, any attempts by those who perhaps do not 
identify with the developed “religious” narrative but who still maintain connection genealogically 
(not biologically, necessarily) to attested and verifiable presence, experience, and who wish to 
maintain those memories as part of their developed identity, are hastily marked as nationalists, 
colonizers, etc., when in fact interspersed throughout that religious narrative, in the poetics of 
that “spiritual constitution,” are glimpses of actual history and physical presence, in the case of 
early Israel and Judaism.  In this way, poetics betray realia and there is a mixing of the personal, 
communal, memory, and history. 
We must not forget that in cultural battles, the Boyarins are correct: No group is 
autochthonous. Factions of what became the Palestinians, for instance, themselves have foreign, 
colonizing, and migrating elements, too. In highlighting how narratives themselves are relative, 
Benjamin speaks not only to the muddled authority with which various myths/narratives can be 
approached, but also the partiality of their messages. He states: 
[…] all rulers are the heirs of prior conquerors. Hence, empathizing with the 
victor invariably benefits the current rulers…Whoever has emerged victorious 
participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which current rulers step 
over those who are lying prostrate. According to traditional practice, the spoils 
are carried in the procession. They are called “cultural treasures”…in every case 
these treasures have a lineage which he cannot contemplate without horror. They 
owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great geniuses who created 
them, but also to the anonymous toil of others who lived in the same period. 
There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism. And just as such a document is never free of barbarism, so barbarism 
taints the manner in which it was transmitted from one hand to another.89 
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When seen in this light, storytelling, myth telling, and even ritual, let alone “history” and 
“personal reflection,” acquire an air of suspicion and are approached with doubt.  
It is in this way that Bernard Lewis may help in sorting through the various ways in 
which people re-present “history.” He explores how people utilize history, and in fact how 
people envision and imagine their pasts, for various purposes. In doing so, he differentiates 
among remembering, recovering, and inventing the past. As he states: 
There are many ways of defining and subdividing history; traditionally, by why, 
and when, and where; then, in a more sophisticated age, by topic – by what, and 
how, and, for the intellectually ambitious, why; methodologically, by types of 
sources and the manner of their use; ideologically, by function and purpose – of 
the historian more than of the history, and many others. The classification used 
here…is into three types, as follows: (1) Remembered history. This consists of 
statements about the past, rather than history in the strict sense, and ranges from 
the personal recollections…to the living traditions of a civilization…It may be 
described as the collective memory of a community or nation or other 
entity…(2) Recovered history. This is the history of events and movements, of 
persons and ideas, that have been forgotten…for some reason rejected by the 
communal memory, and then…recovered by academic scholarship…But 
reconstruction begs the basic question, and disguises what would be better 
described as construction…(3) Invented history. This is history for a 
purpose…devised and interpreted from remembered and recovered history 
where feasible, and fabricated where not.90 
 
In other words, history, however it is presented, is necessarily partial – in both outlook and 
content. As well, it behooves those who engage it to self-consciously question what is being 
presented, who is presenting it, and why it is being presented. After all, as Benjamin points out, 
the storyteller (i.e., historian, scientist, myth teller) has as much difficulty relating experiences as 
modern humanity has in contextualizing them. The result, often, is confusion and partial 
knowledge, thus faulty grounds for self-understanding and action based off such information. 
In the material dealing explicitly with this chapter, we see as operative each element that 
Lewis details in his study. For example, developed Jewish tradition, which takes the 																																																								
90  Bernard Lewis, History: Remembered, Recovered, Invented (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 
11-12. 
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Deuteronomistic History as constitutive in the image of Jewish self-construction, the past has 
been remembered in a certain way that has been described as a countermemory. Some 
archaeologists, such as Keith Whitelam,91 have continued inventing history in the same vein of 
earlier “pan-Arabists,” who, according to Lewis, retroactively extended the lifespan of Arabism 
by millennia, set an early date to Arab claims to the Middle East in asserting that Canaanites 
were Arabs, thus “proving” that Arab claims to Palestine antedate Israelite settlement, among 
others. As Lewis states: 
In other Arabic-speaking countries, the reaction to the recovered ancient past 
was later, slower, and, on the whole, politically less significant. The Iraqis paid 
some attention to Assyria and Babylon, but did not identify themselves with 
them to the extent the Egyptians did with the Pharaohs. In Lebanon, the 
Phoenicians were claimed more particularly by the Maronites and were therefore 
denounced by the Muslims as representing an anti-Arab or anti-pan-Arab 
force…During the heyday of pan-Arabism a solution to this problem was found 
by the retroactive posthumous naturalization of all the ancient Semitic peoples, 
except one, as Arabs. This served several purposes. In the first place, it 
accentuated and underpinned the Arab identity of these countries and countered 
any dangerous tendencies towards what they contemptuously called the 
“pharaonism” of the Egyptians and its analogues elsewhere. In the second place, 
it extended the time-span of Arabism by millennia and vastly increased the Arab 
contribution to humanity, by claiming for it the achievements of all, or nearly all, 
the Semitic peoples of the ancient orient. In the third place, it set an early date on 
Arab claims to the Middle East – and, in particular, by claiming the Canaanites as 
Arabs, was even able to produce an Arab claim to Palestine antedating the first 
Israelite settlement. It had a further use in that, through the Carthaginians, it 
served to extend the range of ancient Arabism even to North Africa. Since, 
according to this doctrine, the ancient Semites, apart from the Israelites, who are 
still extant and therefore excluded, were all Arabs, the great Islamic expansion of 
the 7th and 8th centuries was not a conquest but a liberation, and indeed is so 
presented in schoolbooks – as the liberation of Arabs from Persian, Byzantine, 
and other imperialisms. 92 
 
In this way, locating one’s origins, and even the enterprise of origination itself, is self-created to a 
large extent. Endeavors to interject origins, either imaginatively through remembered tradition 
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or imaginatively through “professional’ historiography, are never one-time occurrences, but like 
collective memory are dependent on present interests to determine what is considered originary. 
 That concerns in the present determine the usefulness of the past raises questions about 
boundaries, as well as issues of origination. As a result of the activities of the present regarding 
the past, such as inventing it to suit particular socio-political desires, much harm is caused to 
those who became the unwitting objects of displacement (i.e., those whom the concerns of the 
present overlooked or erased). Time is highlighted as being susceptible to issues of (ir) relevancy, 
but what we have seen is that underlying the fluidity of time is the inescapabilty of actual 
presence in some instances, such as ancient Israel. This presence serves to disrupt whatever 
conceptions of origination with which others replaced it. In fact, as in the case of Jewish 
tradition, the presence of early Israelites disrupts the self-conception that Jews had concerning 
even their own past. The remembrance of this past recovered a presence that provides a foil to 
the later invention of traditional narrative. The result of these disruptions is a complication of 
the category of diaspora, questioning the ways in which people feel distance and alienation, and 
from what it is they believe they are separated. 
Another way of approaching this convolution of planes of diaspora is to examine 
Tomoko Masuzawa’s investigations into “origins.” Throughout her perusal of the writings by 
scholars of religion regarding the purported origins of the phenomenon of religion, Masuzawa 
emphasizes that origin itself comes under suspicion.93  The now taken-for-granted idea that 
myths are creation stories and that their enacted ritual is simply periodic “recreation” of mythic 
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entire modes of scientific and religious lifestyles devoted to the recovery and re-discovery of first origins, of the 
primordium of existence itself. 
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times, of some primordium, an “axial” event, unravels when pushed further.94 She likens the 
search for origins of religion to Benjamin’s study of art in his “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction.” The study of origins, like the invention of photography for 
Benjamin, decreases the distance between a purportedly original work and the viewer, or 
practitioner. New technologies and the investigations of the scholar into origins diminished what 
Benjamin called “aura,” the “forbidding” atmosphere of distance around an object, thus bringing 
that object closer, diminishing its autonomy and independence. Now all reproductions contain 
that aura, albeit in diminished, recreated, and repetitive form.95 
 Behind every representation, Benjamin argues, was thought to be a unitary origin, a 
primordium. This presumption changed when the avant-garde artists heralded the idea of the 
grid; they divested their work from prior creations and saw each moment as one of creation in 
the here and now. As Masuzawa explains: 
[…] the avant-garde artist divests everything that has hitherto claimed priority of 
its power, and reinvests it, in toto, in the very moment of his or her own 
creation, that is, in the Hier und Jetzt of the avant-garde artist him- or herself, and 
in the ground zero of his or her creation…The avant-garde, eager to disown 
every claim placed on it by what supposedly comes before, almost universally 
favors this form, the grid, which carries with it no precedents or tradition, no 
authorship or copyrights that might threaten the present with the nightmarish 
weight of the past…it is everywhere without beginning. More important than 
this ubiquity, the pristine structure of the grid emblematizes the absolute present; 
for this structure shuts out the possibility of a prior origin – what comes before – 
in the form of a model in nature.96 
 
It never was, but in the sense of its immediate creation, it always was. The implication of this 
revolutionary concept of creation without prior origin, as Masuzawa points out, is continual 																																																								
94  Tomoko Masuzawa, In Search of Dreamtime: The Quest for the Origin of Religion (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), 1-3. 
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96  Ibid., 317. 
 
	 98 
(self-created) repetition. As she argues, because the grid, or the blank slate, exists in the public 
domain and without author, any enactment of the work is already a repetition, albeit one without 
a fixed point of reference.97  Any attempt to live in, build off of, engage with, and enact this 
endeavor of immediate newness is fated to be a repetition, an ongoing list of fresh starts without 
appeal. 
 When Masuzawa applies this art-historical concept to the study of religion, she confronts 
Eliade’s notion of the myth of the eternal return, a thesis that posits “archaic” people’s relation 
to time and history, which is echoed in the works of Assmann on ritual. As Masuzawa attests, in 
this framework all rituals refer to cosmogony, a primordial event, and they attempt to dwell in 
that “paradise of archetypes.” As she states: 
[…] a cult always presupposes a certain narrative of the beginning of time, and 
this narrative organizes, justifies, and gives meaning to ritual behavior and all 
other types of behavior, insofar as they are “meaningful”…It is certainly a 
striking picture of the “archaic” person; we are struck by the image of his violent 
conservatism – his “revolt” against the unprecedented occurrence, his demand 
for the “abolition” of nonparadigmatic temporality…he is “imprisoned within 
the mythical horizon of archetypes and repetition.” Even as he dwells in the 
“paradise of archetypes,” archaic man forever suffers from cosmic nostalgia.98 
 
Yet, she maintains, if her argument is correct in that it is the objects of the scholars’ studies who 
engage in this behavior and search for origins, then the archaic is the “other” of us, a double to 
modern (Western) scholars and those who purport to have overcome the ill-fated search for 
origins that can never be located. Masuzawa states: 
The archaic, the other of the modern, is at once the other of us, the 
contemporary scholars of religion. But the other of oneself is always a double of 
oneself, a mirror image, a picture in reverse, a representation that doubles and 
couples the self and the other. This other – the archaic – is presented as 
peculiarly marked by a singular obsession with the moment of origin. What does 
this reflect, vis-à-vis the modern scholarship on myth and ritual…This 																																																								
97  Ibid., 318. 
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scholarship is peculiarly marked by its obsession with cosmogony, paradigms, 
archetypal narratives…Does this not signal a certain displacement? A certain 
shifting that repeats and veils – which is a telltale sign of repression – a 
displacement, that is, of that very desire which we once renounced and continue 
to deny ourselves?99 
 
Hence, modern scholarship itself is marked with displacement and repression. The modern 
scholar is displaced from that which he renounces and denies himself: origins. 
 When seen in this light, this very chapter can be said to deal with the two aspects of 
Masuzawa’s study: investigating the content of “origin” of early Israel, at least materially, and 
assessing the pronouncements of scholars regarding the idea of early Israel’s origins. We have 
seen how the content of the book of Deuteronomy interweaves with the materiality of early 
Israel’s beginnings, at times implicitly and at other times more overtly. The force of Masuzawa’s 
analysis, however, comes to the fore when applied to scholars who denounce, for whatever 
reason, the (partial) indigeneity of early Israel and instead posit a beginning elsewhere, if 
anywhere at all. For instance, we see the trend of scholarly questing after origins operating in the 
works of Jonathan and Daniel Boyarin, and even Assmann himself, who, in claiming that Israel 
“originated” elsewhere, imply that they know that it did not begin in any particular place, let 
alone where biblical archaeologists have claimed (i.e., the central hill lands of present-day Judea 
and Samaria). Its origination occurred elsewhere, which as yet, for them at least, is undefined and 
need not ever become defined due to the “message” that they have selectively culled from 
Judaism’s sources (an ironic conclusion, given the materiality of Israelite presence in the place 
from which the Boyarins disallow Israelite “origination,” at least materially/physically). 
This also raises the question of what exactly these scholars refer to when they speak of 
“originating.” Are they speaking of an ethnos, an ideology, a literary tradition, etc.? Ancient 
Israelites exist in many locales: archaic poetry, historical accounts from external sources, the 																																																								
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material excavations by archaeologists such as Dever, and in literary accounts of their own 
tradition of ethno-genesis. To which locale are the Boyarins, et al., referring when they state 
Israel did not originate somewhere, especially if all locales are interwoven with each other, both 
in the imagination of the people and in the physical remains? Even their denunciation of 
purported origins, albeit for something less specific, still cannot dissociate itself from the quest 
of beginnings, thus signaling disquiet with the alleged implications of origin, either theoretically 
or politico-historically. 
 Space is important, and it exists. Acknowledging this fact raises many questions about 
the significance of the grid for diaspora studies. If the grid, or the construction of a tradition that 
has no traceable point of origination (at least materially?), is itself a displacement, a separation, a 
diaspora, then from what are we displaced? We may be displaced, or at least out of touch, 
temporally – but this is not to say that space is relative. In fact, it is quite real, and the results of 
actions directed to it, and the implications of actions taken in its name, are the most real. In this 
vein, it is the grid itself, the open space of speculation and supposed clearance, that is originary, 
and whatever guise one places onto it assumes ultimate significance; this action of emplacement, 
then, is forever recurring, by many invested parties, for various purposes, with both recovered 
and invented bases, but all of which claim remembrance. Diaspora is ever-present, but never 
realized/actualized, let alone ended/overcome, and attempts at reconciliation fail on both the 
temporal and spatial planes. One cannot return, even through ritual, to the beginning time, since 
there are conflicting sources about when that was, and one cannot wholly return to the space 
because that “site” is contested and given different meanings over time, despite recurring 
repetitions of attested ritual meaning and scholarly dismissals of the findings of other scholars. 
As Eisen stated, even if one is home, one still is not Home. 
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 Furthermore, if we take seriously Masuzawa’s assertion that the project of origins, the 
obsession scholars have with the primordium, is an otherness of ourselves, a reflection of 
ourselves, then we must question what this means for displacement from that obsession, from 
the origin that never was but that always is and has been. To what do we hope to return? If not 
to where, since Masuzawa seems to hone in on time and not space, then to when? How could 
we leave that which never existed or that which is still here, unless we confront the idea that 
arrival itself is an impossibility, or has already been achieved but not as we imagined it to be? 
How else could it be as we imagined it because imaginary primordium is so ill defined and self-
created? 
 Assmann asserts that rituals realize meaning, and the Pesach seder, for instance, the 
Jewish repetitive, annually recurring ritual that marks Israelite “origins” in space and purported 
time, makes present the story of the Exodus and the precursor to revelation through songs, 
homilies, anecdotes, and discussions. The meaning of this text is kept alive, he states, by 
constant adaptation to changing circumstances.100  Yet, as Ronald Hendel points out, inherent in 
the story of the Exodus is already recognition of Benjamin’s presence of mind. He states that 
following the Annales School’s breakdown of the event, conjecture, and longue durée, the Exodus 
memory partakes of all three scales. In the story, including its presentation in the 
Deuteronomistic history, are elements of the temporal rhythm of everyday life, processes of 
social time such as the rise and fall of empires and economic cycles, as well as geological time 
and other long-term patterns.101 Just as Deuteronomy is a countermemory, which sought to 
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revise and replace a previous accepted memory of the past,102 so too is any attempt to engage 
with the text, history (including archaeology), and memory now, such as during the seder. 
Diaspora always was a condition of Israelite narrative, and its operation continues to be 
present temporally and spatially, a constant negotiation with memories and representations of 
the past.103  What has become tradition, was “originally” presented as a countermemory, an 
assumption about the people who were instructed to live a certain way, who were instructed not 
to forget, but who in their instructions were not presented with the entirety of what it is they 
were to remember. Furthermore, this instruction was given to a people who were told that they 
were strangers, but who in “actuality” continued to propagate an at-least partial indigeneity. 
Being a stranger, then, one who is in a diasporic state, is itself an imagined condition.  Origins, in 
many instances, are self-created, but biblical poetry, poetic construction, external attestations to 
the people (e.g., the Merneptah stele), and other archaeological realia help to recover physical 
presence. While any presumed “Ur” fades further into the hazy past, we must recognize the 
possibility that it is ever-present and thus continually recurrent. Yet, each (re) construction, while 
seemingly new, carries over traces of a once before. Digging beneath it may help in the recovery 
of history, or may prove to be an invention, but we must continue to question what any 
reconciliation between time and place would mean. 
 It is to the coalescence of the elements of space and time that we segue into Chapter 
Three. One underlying theoretical framework that we can add to the Benjamin-Taussig stream 
underlying this study, which is buttressed by Masuzawa, is Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea of the 
chronotope. It is this notion that allows for the “intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial 
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relationships as expressed in literature” to come to the fore.104  Whereas Dever concentrated his 
attention primarily on space, Assmann focused his on the element of time, and Masuzawa 
allowed for a more in-depth discussion into one, if not both, of them as related to beginnings 
(both of the scholar and of the content of scholarly investigations), Bakhtin attempts to 
understand narrative in various guises, with disparate elements, which conjoin both space and 
time in our understanding of the present and of separation. In particular, Bakhtinian analysis will 
place into question the notion of homeland, from which we are now exiled, and the ways in 
which that imagining occurs through time and across space. 
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Chapter Three 
Imagining the Diaspora: Travel, Reflection, 
and the Convolutions of Emplacement 
 
 Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi asks a simple question of the various Jewish authors (mostly 
novelists and poets) whom she discusses in Booking Passage: What is it that they, and in particular 
the characters they created in their fiction, actually remember in their works about exile, home, 
homelessness, return, the future, and travel? Throughout her reading of these texts, she noticed 
that the authors juxtaposed images of the Land of Israel as pristine, but also as ruinous. The 
imagined pristine Land came to embody a point of reference for these characters, an idealized 
place of yore as depicted in scripture and foil to current unredeemed homelessness. The Land 
lying in ruins, a physical reality at the time those authors were writing, offered hope of recovery, 
re-connection, excavation, and eventual closure. In other words, the Land in ruins offered an 
idealized image of a past they hoped to resuscitate and work to implement in the future; it 
offered a telos, an encompassing goal, which influenced how they perceived themselves, which in 
turn guided their actions in the present.1 
 In this chapter we explore similar questions in representative examples of Hebrew 
literature by S.Y. Agnon, in particular his novels In the Heart of the Seas, To This Day, and Only 
Yesterday. These texts, as well as those in Chapter Four, deal with the themes of group formation, 
travel, separation, (physical) return, and enactments once there. Scholarship that understands 
physical return to the Land as a fait accompli misunderstands the calls for continued alienation and 
separation, regardless of location, and leaves unexamined many components of diaspora. 
Through a consideration of the theoretical frameworks of Walter Benjamin’s explanation of the 
threshold, Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the “chronotope,” Thomas Tweed’s theory of religion as 
necessitating acknowledgement of both its transtemporal and translocative elements, and 																																																								
1  Ezrahi Booking Passage, 6-7. 
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Abraham Joshua Heschel’s claim that the Land itself is a chronotope, a threshold, and thus 
requiring emplacement for ethical decision making, that in moments of encounter, while being 
emplaced, one uncovers recollections and makes present unforeseen and unanticipated 
memories. These shocks and confrontations destabilize that which has become taken-for-
granted and thus present opportunities to renew creativity, even, and especially, while being 
physically emplaced. In effect, even while being emplaced, possibilities exist for re-
diasporization. Self-reflective thought allows one to feel distanced from the Land considered 
“home” in order to return to the condition prior to homecoming. As stated, this threshold that 
re-presents unforeseen memories is a call for ethical action now, and in the future, of the yet 
unredeemed, of being in imagined diaspora. 
How to Write about Home 
 As Ezrahi explains, for Jews in exile, writing (and thus imagination and projection) 
became a response to displacement, an alternate form of sovereignty. She explicitly states that 
until the Second World War and the Shoah (i.e., Holocaust), Jewish fiction dealt with a 
constructed future as a projection of a lost past. While the teleology seemed rigid in these texts 
(entailing past wholeness, current loss, recollection of wholeness, repatriation, return, and 
closure), the adventure to that projected future was open-ended. The destination remained 
deferred,2 which served to strengthen the creativity of the diasporic imagination. Just as the 
ancient rabbis created a portable Jewish civilization that could be read and performed anywhere 
after the physical Temples had been destroyed and Jews dispersed away from that center, so too 
did Jewish authors before the creation of the State of Israel allow for creativity, imagination, and 
projection without the need for (re) territorialization and thus closure. This supposed closure, 
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she writes, produces the end of physical wandering and of creative alternatives to geographical 
rootedness, and also raises the specter of negative implications associated with emplacement. 
 In her periodization of the authors, Ezrahi states that the pre-Holocaust (-Shoah) 
authors depicted and imagined the Land, and Jerusalem more particularly, as a ruined shrine 
waiting to reacquire redemption.3 The language used to describe the Land in these authors’ texts 
took on elements of metaphysical longing and recognition that traveling to that Land promised 
both mental and physical anguish.4  Jews living in exile maintained an unredeemed Land in their 
imaginations/memories, and the Land represented suspended time, potential for redemption.5  
When Jews imaginatively traveled to this Land, their point of departure was not so much 
“home,” she states, as it was exile, and they realized that they could never reclaim or settle the 
Land by themselves.  She states: 
Pilgrimage presupposes travel within the known and ‘complete’ world to a previously 
established site of revelation…In the Jewish vocabulary, the point of departure is, by 
definition, not home but exile…there remains a profound distinction between the 
travel narratives defined as pilgrimage and those defined as voyages of discovery, 
commerce, education, or speculation…Because the Jewish pilgrimage to the Holy Land 
was being redefined at the end of the nineteenth century as a mission of reclamation 
and settlement, the return to the (profane) diasporic source takes on added valence as a 
skeptical gesture, as a refusal to find anchorage in that dream and in the aesthetic it 
generated.6 
 
Jews inevitably returned to and re-emerged into their diasporic existence, due to their inability to 
“find anchorage” in the Land of ruins, which remains a dream and recollection.   
Even though Ezrahi includes the works of S. Y. Agnon in this category, despite his 
writing after the Shoah, she understands his fiction as in fact offering redemption to both the 
wandering Jew and to the tortuous voyage itself. Through the Jewish voyager’s eventual death in 																																																								
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the Land, the wandering Jew, here personified in Agnon’s figure of Isaac Kumer, gained “eternal 
life” and unification with the Land.7  An actual life enjoyed in the Land, however, never 
materializes in the work of these authors. Because of this, Ezrahi claims that creativity prospers 
and there is no concomitant socio-political dilemma associated with such physical return. 
 Throughout these voyages and travels in the pre-statehood era, Ezrahi sees creativity and 
the potential for redemption because the Land has not been settled, re-territorialized. Once that 
later reality is reflected in Jewish literature, by Israeli authors and others, she issues a challenge to 
writers reflecting on and depicting that imagination-turned-reality: to keep images of return and 
of the Land itself from becoming concrete, heralded presuppositions; she discourages their 
reification. Ezrahi hopes that Jews after emplacement will keep archaeology from becoming 
eschatology.8  In other words, she argues exactly what many others have cautioned, both before 
and after her exposé on the anticipated state of contemporary Israeli writing – that physical 
homecoming need not be a fait accompli that prohibits creativity and presupposes an already 
achieved redemption. Rather, it seems as though Ezrahi offers an unarticulated desire. I 
understand Ezrahi as arguing that even while being emplaced, possibilities exist for “re-
diasporization.” In fact, the example that Ezrahi uses in Agnon’s writing, which she feels 
exemplifies unification with the Land, and thus supposedly achieved redemption, anticipated 
closure to creativity, and the beginning of social turmoil in the Land, rather represents the birth 
pangs of re-diasporization. Agnon’s “return” signaled not the death knell to diaspora creativity, 
but the emergence of creativity of emplacement. 
In other words, one needs to feel distanced from the Land considered “home” in order 
to return to the condition prior to homecoming. This realization, once enacted from a situation 
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of emplacement, is a threshold that has the potential to re-present unforeseen memories and 
serve as a call for ethical action now, in the time of the yet unredeemed. Thus, regardless of 
location and mindset, one must always be in imagined diaspora, even if one has physically 
returned “home.” This mindset and the actions issuing from it present an ethical and creative 
alternative to studies that echo Ezrahi’s presentation of emplacement as enclosure and 
restriction. This opens up the possibilities of what constitutes diaspora, once its physical 
component has been “overcome.” 
Moving from Then to Now, while Here…and There 
 To better understand the call for viewing emplacement in the Land of “home” as 
something contingent and not as something achieved and accomplished, this chapter will 
consider the theoretical frameworks of Walter Benjamin’s explanation of the threshold, as 
recounted in his autobiographical account “A Berlin Chronicle;” of Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of 
the chronotope, as presented in his The Dialogic Imagination; of Thomas Tweed’s theory of 
religion as necessitating acknowledgement of both its transtemporal and translocative elements, 
as recounted in Crossing and Dwelling; and of Abraham Joshua Heschel’s claim that the Land itself 
is a chronotope, a threshold, and thus requiring ethical decision making, an argument he makes 
in Israel: An Echo of Eternity.  These authors emphasize the moment of encounter, the practice of 
travel, and the possibilities for uncovering recollections and making present unforeseen 
memories, as offered at the moment of such confrontation. These situations destabilize that 
which has become taken-for-granted and renew creativity. It is through these frameworks that 
we can contextualize and make more explicit the fundamental anxiety that Ezrahi pinpoints. 
 We have seen various attempts by different scholars to address the interweaving of and 
interconnected valences of space and time. For example, the Annales School situates any study 
in the longue durée, a concept that we discussed in Chapter Two. This is reflected in Killebrew’s 
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description and analysis of early Israel’s development and later reflection on itself in the world of 
the changing Near East and eastern Mediterranean from the Bronze to the Iron Age. We also 
have seen Benjamin’s and Taussig’s calls for attempting to break free from a reliance on 
explicitly mediated experience in order to gain a better appreciation for how things came to be as 
they are, or seem. All of these attempts can now be brought to bear on Jewish fiction through 
the literary device of Bakhtin’s chronotope, in Tweed’s account of movement across both space 
and time and the reflexivity of the interpreter herself, in Benjamin’s travel around Berlin and the 
unforeseen remembrances such sightings bring about in him, and the theological call to reassess 
writing about the Land now that Jews have physically and politically returned. One way to make 
these frameworks more accessible will be to explore their applicability to fictional works in 
which they find expression. As our case studies for this chapter we will examine three of S. Y. 
Agnon’s quasi-autobiographical novels: In the Heart of the Seas (Bilvav Yamim, 1933), Only 
Yesterday (Timol Shilshom, 1945), and To This Day (‘Ad Hena, 1952 rev. ed.).9 
Punctuating the Space-Time Continuum: Relativity’s Ethical Dimension 
 In his attempt to fashion a theory of religion that addressed the complexity of movement 
and difference entailed in human practices of contact, exchange, configurations of time and 
memory, as well as the role of the individual doing the reflecting, Tweed noted that religion 
involves purposeful wandering.10 Someone occupying a particular place at a particular time 
reflects on those travels, and that individual must account for the vast stretches of time and 
space in which practitioners envision and imagine themselves and their communities.  As Tweed 
																																																								
9  Many of these themes are reflected and echoed in the more contemporary, journalistic writings of Israeli 
authors Eliezer Schweid, Amos Elon, David Grossman, Amos Oz, and Ari Shavit, which we will delve into in 
Chapter Four. 
 
10  Thomas A. Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 11. 
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notes, religions move across time and space, and they leave traces that transform people, places, 
and the social arena. He states: 
If religions can be imagined as flows, what kind of flows?  I suggest that these flows are 
spatial and temporal…[they] move through time and space. They are horizontal, 
vertical, and transversal movements…They are movements through time, for example 
as one generation passes on religious gestures to the next…And religious flows move 
across varied ‘glocalities,’ simultaneously local and global spaces.11 
 
Tweed explicitly acknowledges the term “chronotope” of Bakhtin as the preferred conception of 
the work that religion does. We are dealing with flows cross “space-time,” as well as the tension 
between the individual and the collective. 
 Bakhtin posited in the idea of chronotope (time-space) an intrinsic connectedness and 
inseparability of the temporal and spatial.12  Bakhtin describes these moments that allow for 
greater realization and awareness (of the intricacies and interconnectedness of space and time) as 
organizing centers for narrative events. As he states: 
What is the significance of all these chronotopes? What is most obvious is their 
meaning for narrative. They are the organizing centers for the fundamental narrative 
events of the novel. The chronotope is the place where the knots of narrative are tied 
and untied. It can be said without qualification that to them belongs the meaning that 
shapes narrative. We cannot help but be strongly impressed by the representational 
importance of the chronotope. Time becomes, in effect, palpable and visible; the 
chronotope makes narrative events concrete…An event can be communicated, it 
becomes information, one can give precise date on the place and time of its 
occurrence…It is precisely the chronotope that provides the ground essential for the 
showing-forth, the representability of events.13 
 
This journey, which offers chance encounters that bring forth unexpected memories, 
reminiscences, past events, and recourse to the many ways that contemporaneity emerged, is 
similar in outlook to Benjamin’s interest in “related possibilities.” 																																																								
11  Ibid., 62. 
 
12  Mikhail M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and 
Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 84. 
 
13  Ibid., 250. 
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In other words, one thing gives rise to the next; one sight, sound, smell, etc. opens up 
pathways to previously un-accessed memories and remembrances from one’s past. All of these 
possibilities are spurred on, emergent from, and related to the encounter. Benjamin likens this 
occurrence to the opening of a fan of memory, whose unfolding of segments is never 
completed. He states: 
He who has once begun to open the fan of memory never comes to the end of its 
segments…he has seen that is can be unfolded, and only in its fold does the truth 
reside; that image, that taste, that touch for whose sake all this has been unfurled and 
dissected; and now remembrance advances from small to smallest details…while that 
which it encounters in these microcosms grows ever mightier.14 
 
Only in its folds does the truth reside; all else is but a semblance to wholeness and thus is partial, 
incomplete, and not yet accomplished. 
Benjamin continues by explaining that one who wishes to extend this process of (self-) 
discovery must perform activities similar to an archaeologist; one must dig repeatedly and be 
unafraid to encounter the same material in order to turn it over and over, each time gaining new 
insight. As Benjamin states, “[…] the matter itself is only a deposit, a stratum, which yields only 
to the most meticulous examination what constitutes the real treasure hidden within the earth: 
the images, severed from all earlier associations.”15 This is a repeated call for unmediated access 
to memory, and history, and we must not forget that those uncovered images still can take on 
various associations and be placed into countless guises (i.e., used for different purposes). As 
Lewis cautions, the unfolding segments may themselves be personal memories, but also 
recovered pasts that fit into more general contexts, or even inventions to fit a contemporary 
																																																								
14  Walter Benjamin, “A Berlin Chronicle” [1970], in Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 6. See also 
Walter Benjamin, “A Berlin Chronicle,” in Walter Benjamin Selected Writings, vol. 2, 1927-1934, eds. Michael W. 
Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Others (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press, 1999), 597. 
 
15  Benjamin Reflections, 26; Benjamin Selected Writings, 611. 
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circumstance. The point is that one encounter, in the here and now, brings forth unforeseen and 
unanticipated remembrances of past places and times in unfolded segments. 
It may seem that an individual’s carrying with himself these experiences, in memory, 
wherever he happens to be, is just a variation of the “portable civilization” that the Talmud 
afforded the Jews through time and space, offering a way to engage imaginatively with the past 
and projected future (in the Land of the past) without having to be in the space of occurrence. 
Yet, if we follow Heschel’s pronouncements on the qualities of these recovered 
images/remnants (of the Land, in this case), we will see that these unfolded segments take on 
spiritual significance only after they have first been emplaced. In fact, as Benjamin makes clear 
through his presentation of his “chronicle,” the encounter that spurs the unfolding of the fan of 
memory is made possible only in moments of emplacement. 
Benjamin likens the multivalence of the encountered symbols (such as a coffeehouse, for 
instance) as a social map of Berlin society, of a particular generation, at a particular time. As he 
reflects: 
In an attempt to create a “physiology of coffeehouses ,” one’s first and most superficial 
classifications would be into professional and recreational establishments...When the 
German economy began to recover…the physiology of the Romanische Café began to 
change. The “artists” withdrew into the background…while the bourgeois…began to 
occupy the place as a place of relaxation…The history of the Berlin coffeehouses is 
largely that of different strata of the public, those who first conquered the floor being 
obliged to make way for others gradually pressing forward, and thus to ascend the 
stage.16 
 
One encounter elicits many “related possibilities” and associations. Other examples of 
chronotopes are the road and parlors/salons, both places associated with encounters, 
intersections of spatial and temporal paths, places where “webs of intrigue” are spun, where 
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dialogues occur, etc.17 The individual, group, subjective reflection, and more contextual histories 
coalesce, opening up unforeseen vistas of interconnection among the various constituent 
elements. 
In his usage of the chronotope, Tweed focuses on the body, home, homeland, and 
cosmos as places where religion negotiates collective identity, where one can imagine the group’s 
shared space, establish social hierarchies within the group, and create taxonomies beyond it into 
which all else it placed.18 In this way, religion itself positions the body, the individual, and the 
group in relation to other chronotopes as a way to assess and recognize the image individuals 
have of the group through time and across space. 
 There exists a particular type of chronotope in which time falls out of the normal course 
of biographical experience, however; things become instantaneous during the chronotope of the 
threshold, or the instance of crisis and breakage.19 Tweed refers to these as limit situations. 
During these moments an individual approaches the threshold of the humanly possible and 
faces the limitations of embodied existence. As Tweed states, “[…] members of a society cross 
thresholds (limen) that lead from one social status to another. Through rites of passage the 
individual leaves one status, passes through a liminal, or transitional, state, and arrives at a new 
developmental stage and social role.” 20   It is during these instances that individuals are 
“propelled to imagined pasts and desired futures, but also summoned to the present,” and much 
of this work is done by religion. Yet, as Tweed cautions, the work of translocative and 
																																																								
17  Bakhtin Dialogic Imagination, 243-44, 246. 
 
18  Tweed Crossing and Dwelling, 97-98. 
 
19  Bakhtin Dialogic Imagination, 248. 
 
20  Tweed Crossing and Dwelling, 143-44. 
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transtemporal experience is never done, never totally accomplished.21  It is in this way that the 
chronotope and the way that religion operates here correspond to Ezrahi’s call to be wary of 
thinking that redemption, via physical arrival/return, is imminent, if not already achieved. The 
threshold, while reached during moments of immediacy during emplacement, ought not be 
equated with achievement and fulfillment, but rather potentiality on the way to an elsewhere, 
itself often unspecified. 
 Throughout his recollections of his youth spent in Berlin, Benjamin recounts times that 
confronting an image or object that brought to mind boundaries, enclosures, and walls evoked in 
him a remembrance of encountering poverty and those who lived outside of his social class 
environment. The notion of crossing the threshold, of crossing frontiers both socially and 
topographically, opened up networks that were exciting and unknown. Yet, he states that he 
hovered on the brink, on the edge of the void, and he never committed to the crossing over into 
the new.22  This prolonged liminal phenomenon (i.e., the threshold itself) is the presentation of a 
choice on performance – to enact the new or to remain on the brink/void/threshold, to cross 
over or to remain/retreat, etc. This is an opportunity to question to what one shall commit 
himself, with what to identify.  In Benjamin’s other reflections we see that these choices at the 
limen entail ethical issues from which one can never escape. Peter Demetz refers to these 
experiences as ontological thresholds that entail speculative potentialities, which determine what 
sort of individual one will become.23  Individuals at moments of encounter, and especially while 
digging to uncover more of those confrontations, bear the responsibility of deciding how to 
																																																								
21  Ibid., 162-63. 
 
22  Benjamin Reflections, 11; Benjamin Selected Writings, 600. 
 
23  Peter Demetz, “Introduction,” in Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, 
ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), xviii. 
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engage and deal with the past, be it remembered, or recovered, or invented. The decision 
remains. 
These moments that concretize events that may have happened a long time ago or in a 
different place (ritual), or that alter one’s status and that present a sense of immediacy and 
struggle (rites of passage and threshold experiences), also are moments of decision; they are 
ladened with moral ambiguity, and thus offer possibilities for ethical action. The individual or 
group experiencing this moment, like the interpreter who relates and explains it to others, is 
situated, and from that emplacement he negotiates public power; people have a choice in how to 
present and enact their identities. It is through these decisions that one enacts moral principles 
and constructs meaning.24  Not everything related to the group or individual was revealed in that 
moment. Even not everything relevant to the particular occurrence each time it occurs is 
revealed the same way each time these moments take place. 
Therefore, it behooves the practitioner and interpreter to recognize that the represented 
world “can never be chronotopically identical with the real world it represents.” As Bakhtin 
states, all that becomes an image in a literary work and which enters its chronotopes, is a created 
thing and should not be confused with the force itself that creates. He continues, “Every image 
is a created and not a creating thing.”25  This holds true for representations and reflections on 
one’s autobiographical details as culled from memories sparked by a sound, image, smell, etc., as 
well as for depictions and projections of “home” and homeland, even when one has returned 
home. Emplacement, in fact, entails creativity and potential possibilities for action. The 
chronotopes, memories, and ethical choices are never exhausted, are always changing, but always 
in need of being emplaced and situated. They emerge out from somewhere and point toward an 
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imagined future, and it is a mistake to confuse mere emplacement as already having completed 
the telos. Rather, it is creativity and potential. 
Recreating the Wheel: Modernity’s Perilous Forgetfulness of Myth 
 In one section of his “chronicle” Benjamin asserts that when events from the past reach 
us in the present it is as if one is experiencing an echo awakened by a call. An individual who is 
cognizant of this moment of encounter confronts a sound heard before in the darkness of past 
life. This shock of the unforeseen, albeit previously enacted and thus constitutive of 
contemporaneity, arrives in the form of a sound, a word, a tapping, and a rustling that enables 
one to be transported.26  While this may seem rather uncharacteristically passive for Benjamin, 
the metaphor of the past striking one as an echo resonates with Heschel’s adage that in 
Jerusalem, and not only for Jews, the past is present, and heaven is “almost” here. All history 
(relevant to that Place) is within reach, and the location itself is a witness, an “echo of eternity.”27  
All one has to do is “stand still and listen.” 
 The problem with this literal call (to action) that both authors see, especially in Heschel, 
is that modernity can be characterized by a general human inability or failure, according to him, 
to take scripture seriously. As he laments, “Its [i.e., the Bible’s] grandeur is becoming 
inaccessible, a preserve of the past, not a perspective of the present. Its challenge vanishing from 
																																																								
26   Benjamin Reflections, 59; Benjamin Selected Writings, 634. This metaphor also resembles Emil 
Fackenheim’s insistence that the power and force of the past (for his intentions he was speaking of the destruction 
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27  Abraham Joshua Heschel, Israel: An Echo of Eternity (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1969), 7. 
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our thinking, from our convictions, it survives for illustration, for edification, remaining outside 
our imagination or our decisions in shaping thoughts, deeds.”28  People are increasingly alienated 
from the myths and stories of their past. This contemporary dismissal of or inability to take 
scripture seriously is ironic given, as Heschel states, its incomplete nature. He insists that the 
Bible, for example, is not sealed and completed; it lives on, always being written and 
“continuously proclaimed.” The myths, laws, and injunctions reverberate in our anxiety, 
according to him,29 but they are not recognized as things of which to take heed. We have not 
heard the shofar blast.30 
 Therefore, Heschel devoted the entirety of his theological treatise on Israel to 
resuscitating not only how people respond to and understand scripture, but also the Land and its 
intimate relationship to this dialectic of encounter, reappraisal, and call to action. He asserts that 
history lacks genuineness when people act, or believe, with detachment from any commitment 
to the past, access to which can be gained partially through scripture. For Heschel, history is the 
encounter between the eternal and temporal.31  This encounter with time, however, is not solely 
imagined; it continues to operate in the world, and people (Jews and non-Jews alike) need to 
heed its morals. Myths in the Bible risk being forgotten or dismissed to the peril of those who 
choose to abandon the moral undergirding of life in the Land. “Before God sanctified time,” 
cautions Heschel, “God created things of space.”32  In order to master things of time, one first 
needs space from which to act. Time needs space, but time is eternal. Yet, it is not always 
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sanctified. Living a sanctified time, then, is what is genuine, and this occurs under two 
conditions: committing oneself to acknowledgement of the past, and occupying a space from 
which to perform acts of sanctification. In seeming dialogue with scholars who wrote three 
decades or so after Heschel wrote his treatise, he targets the implied universality of Judaism, 
which entails possibility of enacting it any where, at any time (and thus implicit denial of any 
need for temporal territoriality) by stating that the light of a spirit is not a thing of space, 
imprisoned in a particular place. Yet, in order for the spirit of Jerusalem to be everywhere, it 
must first be somewhere (i.e., the Land).33 
 Heschel’s seeming nationalist justifications are tempered with indictments of 
misunderstanding and misuse of scripture by those in the post-statehood era, particularly by his 
co-religionists in the Land. If Jerusalem is more than just a place in space to the glories of the 
past, as he attests, if it is a prelude, an anticipation of days to come, then Jews have lost the key 
to the gate (of understanding and of appropriate action). He reflects: 
Who will fan and force the fire of truth to spread across the world, insisting that we are 
all one, that mankind is not an animal species but a fellowship of care, a covenant of 
brotherhood?...Let Jerusalem inspire praying: an end to rage, an end to violence.  Let 
Jerusalem be a seat of mercy for all men…Jerusalem must not be lost to pride or to 
vanity. All of Jerusalem is a gate, but the key is lost in the darkness of God’s silence. 
Let us light all the lights; let us call all the names, to find the key.34 
 
Many people have approached the Land, especially after physical and political return to it, as 
simply a place to visit, a place of pleasure and tourism. He laments the fact that Jews have not 
continued the act of clarifying its meaning, using it as an opportunity for spiritual renewal and 
moral re-examination. Jews, he points out, have disregarded the challenge of the Land, a fear 
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echoed years later by Ezrahi et al.35 He states that familiarity destroys any sense of surprise and 
that Jews have become beset by what he dubs “spiritual amnesia.” Those currently in the Land, 
as either citizens or sojourners, have taken the Land for granted; they see the state functioning 
normally and believe that it has always been this way. They lack any notion of distress and strain, 
of longing and dreaming of those who worked to enact this state of affairs; not only has the 
shofar blast been silenced, but so too has knowledge of the conditions that occasioned its 
blasting. 
 What Heschel describes is a theological reflection/dimension of the theoretical 
frameworks of the threshold and moment of encounter described by Tweed, Bakhtin, and 
Benjamin. Heschel relates that people celebrate the Land now as completed, rather than realizing 
that its economic, political, social, and spiritual developments are still in their initial stages. The 
Land, he argues, is itself a spiritual revolution, continuously adapting and changing, not a one-
time event. He offers a contemporary midrash, a commentary on a scriptural passage in order to 
elucidate meaning and message.  When the People Israel approached Sinai, he relates, God lifted 
up the mountain and held it over their heads offering a choice: accept Torah or be crushed. 
During the days of distress (i.e., the Six-Days War, of 1967) Jews around the world especially 
those in the Land, felt as if the mountain were again held over their heads. They either accepted 
the commitment to Zion or risked being crushed. Many times this supreme test, according to 
Heschel, has been imposed on the people, and now that emplacement exists, all eyes (of 
previous generations and of the future) are on the people and how they decide to act.36 
 The Land itself is a threshold, and it demands ethical decisions. Being alive, Heschel 
reminds us, means being exposed to contradictions and defiance, facing challenge and 
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disappointment. The actual physical return to the Land is a creative challenge to previous 
stabilization (relatively speaking, of course). While the past entailed numerous (existential) 
challenges and much suffering, Jewish reflection on the Land remained stable and constant, as 
Ezrahi has demonstrated. Emplacement shakes up inertia and demands new action, he argues, 
contrary to Ezrahi’s perhaps premature apprehensions. Life in the Land is a challenge to us. 
Furthermore, he states that it is the religious duty of a Jew to participate in the process of 
continuous redemption, which has not yet been achieved. As he poignantly argues, “To be or 
not to be is not the question. We all want to be. How to be and how not to be is the essence of 
the question. This is the challenge we face. The Bible is the challenge and the way.”37  For 
Heschel, tradition, also, is the homeland. It does not matter if one actually resides in the Land, 
for community entails being a community of concern, regardless of distance. He states, 
“Community means community of concern, sharing joy and anxiety…The state may be 
thousands of miles away, but the care we feel is intimate and strong.  Such care may serve as an 
example to all mankind. To be concerned for the security and well-being of man everywhere is a 
concern that we must cultivate all the time without qualification.”38  He argues that we must 
learn how to be responsive. 
To be responsible for our tradition and to sanctify the Land, in particular Jerusalem and 
time itself, we need (that) space. The Land, then, is that liminal phenomenon from which, and 
out of which, or toward, we make ethical decisions for action. As we have seen, this encounter 
needs constant reappraisal. The fact that Heschel wrote this after the Six-Days War is testament 
not only to his general worldview, but also is his indictment to the world, especially the Arab 
world, for having failed yet again to live up to the world’s ideals; many of these ideals were culled 
																																																								
37  Ibid., 225. 
 
38  Ibid., 211-12.	
	 121 
from the Bible that he argues is the challenge. As well, it is his challenge to the Jews, and Israel, 
on how to act now that more land is under their political control. 
Constructing Liminality: Myth and the Selective Uses of History 
 While staying emplaced in the Land, and with an eye toward Lewis’s division of history 
as being remembered, or recovered, or invented, Nachman Ben-Yehuda alerts us to some of the 
ways in which Jewish history has been selectively used to construct a particular sequence of 
events and thus impression for current generations. He states that there is a large number of 
pasts, and each one is not entirely divorced from any other.39  He cites Victor Turner’s adage 
that myth is, or functions as, a liminal phenomenon, which presents people with the opportunity 
to rethink and reevaluate their cultural ancestry, and thus to what they now want to commit.40 
According to Ben-Yehuda, and following Halbwachs, myth is a particular sequence of events 
(real or imagined) that is distinguished from a “regular” historical account by its aim to convert 
and transmit attitudes and feelings of those receiving the story. These narratives are special and 
peculiar, and they help to create attitudes, stir emotions, and construct social realities for a 
particular purpose.41 
 The social effects of myths, in this vein, are to bind people together in an integrative 
belief in a shared past, which shapes personal identities, and creates an ethos and image;42 after 
all, as Heschel reminds us, communities share concern. Using Halbwachs’s observation that 
memories of a shared past are preserved by members of specific groups who experience them 
and that there are many different collective memories for many different groups, which together 																																																								
39  Nachman Ben-Yehuda, The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel (Madison: The 
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form society, Ben-Yehuda offers that collective memory is an act of remembering together. 
What is more, the past that the group uses is socially constructed to fit the needs of the present 
group, which usually requires deception and fabrication of that past. What that said, he asserts 
that there is no “past;” various groups in the present construct different pasts that can thus 
appear and disappear, depending on how those pasts are constructed in and for the present.43 
 An example of this phenomenon is the construction of the Masada narrative. Scholars 
and authors in the twentieth century, who resuscitated the ancient story for modern purposes, 
ignored selected facts regarding the nature of the community of Jews living on Masada, 
dismissed the fact that they were contrary to most other Jewish groups of the time, glossed over 
their often violent and bloody military exploits, and deleted the fact that the community 
members arrived to Masada before the siege of Jerusalem was completed; they were not, as later 
scholars presented them, the last remnant surviving from that siege.44  Masada has come to 
symbolize a heroic last stand, and its mythical narrative is used to create cohesion and social 
integration on many levels, but ignores many aspects of how the myth came to be what it is. 
Lewis explores examples like this and many more, which are commonplace, even in so-called 
objective “histories” of locations, peoples, events, etc. This serves to complicate the processes of 
unfolding and digging for which Benjamin advocated. 
 The process that Ben-Yehuda noticed in how scholars and others constructed this past 
has three steps: leveling, the reduction in the amount of information included in the 
construction and thus its simplification; sharpening, in which the message becomes shorter, 
simpler, and sharper; and assimilation, where information is freely subtracted and added to the 
original narrative, thus making it coherent and conform to the needs of the present group doing 
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the construction.45 While it may seem that there is discontinuity between the past and the 
present, given the explicit threefold process he outlined, Ben-Yehuda maintains that there does 
exist continuation between the past and present, but that there is no one indisputable past. 
Rather, the “past” is an endless collection of selected events, usually sequential, which those in 
contemporaneity mold for their purposes; the result of this construction, which differs from 
Lewis’s invention because the events in fact happened albeit in altered or diminished or omitted 
form, is that the “past” shapes our understanding of the present.46 Nevertheless, he insists that 
the lack of an indisputable past does not equate to the opposite supposition, in which there 
likewise is a lack of indisputable facts about such past(s).47  Even an invented past relates in 
some way to “actual” events to which it purports to be part, and it is up to later generations who 
inherit that past to question its historicity and place within their continued, created identity and 
attribution of meaning to the group. 
The absence of questioning, then, is the pitfall into which many groups fall. The 
challenge is that we need to be cognizant of both elements: selected events and the fact that the 
recognition of their being selected, if not altered, does not negate historicity and accuracy of 
whatever “truth” one group is compelled to tell. Whatever the actual historicity may be regarding 
a particular claim, or narrative, or assemblage of “facts” that tell a story, it is important to 
remember that this constructed story connects the past with the immediate present, bridging 
gaps of often thousands of years, and helps people to make sense of the present and the past; 
the times and the places are linked in the presentation of the constructed myth.48 																																																								
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One Part Dream, One Part Reality, Mix: S. Y. Agnon’s Transversality 
 We return to the beginning quandary of the chapter, just how does one write about 
home and homecoming, especially once one has in fact returned “home,” and what is it that one 
remembers? Three of Agnon’s novels deal explicitly with the experience of travel (“home”), and 
accordingly, each contains within it numerous chronotopes and moments of encounter, thus 
exemplifying the themes spelled out by Tweed, Benjamin, and Heschel. In Agnon’s texts we 
encounter forces beyond individual control, the Land, and with oneself, as they are presented at 
varying times and as they travel across space. Before we delve into the respective chronotopes 
and ways of remembering/myth construction, it is useful to present brief summaries of each 
story. 
Myth, Fantasy, and the Question of Truth 
 In the Heart of the Seas is a tale about Hananiah, his journeys both physical and spiritual, 
the faith of his co-religionists who likewise join him on these journeys, and their eventual 
arrival/return to the Land, from Eastern Europe. Agnon starts the story with an individual, 
Hananiah, who begins to have doubts about whether or not the Land actually exists. He 
therefore sets out on a quest to travel there, despite the hardships he encountered along the way. 
Even though he ends up traveling for quite some time, even sojourning through lands that make 
him lose track of time and forget what day it is, thus transgressing the Sabbath and holidays, he 
reasons to himself that it would be better to perish on the way than to lose faith in the Land.49 
He eventually reaches a village where he encounters a group of ten men, and their wives, who 
also desire to travel to the Land. Hananiah helps them prepare for the trip, all the while doing 
nothing to aid himself, except have unrelenting faith in the reasons for his trip. 
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 Agnon provides accurate geographical details about the route their boat takes as it 
navigates the Danube River until it reaches the Black Sea, thus mixing elements of fantasy and 
reality in the tale.50  Once on the Mediterranean Sea, after passing through Constantinople, those 
villagers on the boat experience many travails, such as pangs of severe doubt, being attacked by 
hordes of mosquitoes, and noticing that Hananiah is not among them. Telling themselves tales 
of the Land is their only comfort. When they look out to sea, they occasionally see a light 
sparkling on the waters with a kerchief floating on it like a ship; Hananiah’s sole belonging was a 
kerchief, his clothes and shoes having been stripped from him during his trip to the village. On 
this floating kerchief was the image of a man with his face toward the east, the direction in 
which they are traveling to the Land.51 
Even though the ship got caught in a storm and actually ended up back near 
Constantinople, the villagers were so committed to their journey that they did not despair and 
proceeded again, arriving in Jaffa only five days later. What they encountered there, however, 
was far from paradise. The Land was too hot for them, yet they endured, despite the absence of 
Hananiah.52  Eventually they encounter him and realize that he had arrived before them, on the 
kerchief. They live out their lives in the Land, and when Hananiah dies, they cover his face with 
the kerchief and bury him in the Land. 
 To This Day (sometimes translated Until Now) is, using Agnon’s own words as the 
narrator describing the topic of the book, “[a] story about a man who had neither country nor 
room, left the land he lived in and went elsewhere, where he lost his room...[going] from 
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neighborhood to neighborhood, street to street, house to house.”53 Eventually the “narrative I” 
who is recounting the story is unable to find a room in Germany so he returns to Palestine, 
where, we learn throughout the story, the narrator had lived prior to moving to Germany. The 
story takes place during the First World War, and “nothing in the country was functioning 
normally.”54  In fact, in a rare instance of insight into the world around him, in which he is 
emplaced, rather than discussing only himself, the narrator explains that due to it being wartime 
there were no longer any human beings, just soldiers, officers, casualties, prisoners, and 
enemies.55 After many chance encounters throughout the country, the various cities he traveled 
among, and the numerous neighborhoods in Berlin in which he attempted to live, the narrator 
returns to Palestine, buys land, builds a house, and tells us that because of the many things that 
befell him, which he survived and has lived to tell us about, he is calling the book “To This 
Day,” in the language of thanksgiving for the past and as a prayer for the future.56 
 Finally, Only Yesterday is the story about Isaac Kumer, the son of a poor shopkeeper but 
who descends from a somewhat religiously distinguished lineage, who left his country and city, 
his “home,” to go to the Land, to build it, and to be rebuilt by it.57 In fact, Isaac’s entire focus 
while living at home in Europe was to be in the Land. He leaves for Palestine alone, leaving 
behind his father and siblings (his mother having passed away earlier), and as Arnold Band 
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explains, this sense of homelessness leaves him open to temptations, of secularity (despite his 
being a Zionist and not a religious pilgrim), of his ideals, etc.58 
 The structure of the book, which is by far the longest and most intricate of the three 
novels outlined here, presents the character of the protagonist, his commitment to an idea, and 
his setting out to live that idea, all in the Prologue. We encounter Isaac establishing himself in his 
hometown as a committed Zionist focused solely on doing what he can to support pioneering 
efforts in the Land, while living a traditionally religious life. He secures his father’s approval to 
go to Palestine, who helps him prepare for his journey by buying what he considers to be 
appropriate clothes, and finally Isaac boards a train that will take him to Trieste, Italy, where he 
will find his way to a ship, which will sail to Jaffa, Palestine. Along the way, on both the train and 
ship, Isaac has numerous encounters, which we will explore further, and once he arrives in the 
Land, his idealized expectations are met with the state of reality of the Second Aliyah 
(immigration to the Land during the years 1903-1914) as well as an environment distinctly 
different from Eastern Europe. He remains in the Land making trips from Jaffa to Jerusalem, 
and back again. He finally settles in Jerusalem, gets engaged, and soon after his wedding dies a 
tragic death. 
 In his analysis of the three novels, Band begins to explore some of the many themes 
relevant to travel, encounter, and transversal movement. The important elements of In the Heart 
of the Seas are the tripartite division of characters: the enthusiastic ones/inspired ones, the rest of 
humanity (i.e., those not “possessed” by the ideal of the Land), and the miraculous Hananiah.59 
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Band states that this story fits the genre of fantasy literature, as a figment of the author’s 
imagination, but nonetheless, each detail carries deep symbolic meaning.60 
 As stated, in To This Day (Until Now) the “narrative I” is projected into the past of the 
First World War. This projected time, also a time of war, allowed Agnon to speak of fighting 
and turbulence but not of the time in which he was writing, the post-Second World War and 
War of 1948 era. Band states that Agnon projected the narrator into this earlier period to create 
detachment from his own contemporaneity in order to call into question the moral implications 
of personal detachment in a period that called for total commitment,61 both periods of war and 
questioning of previously-held identities. Agnon’s narrator is an unsympathetic character; he 
moves through a world of pain, suffering, literal shellshock, corruption, and tragedy but 
complains of only his personal inconveniences, which are petty in comparison.62 Band quotes 
Agnon’s character as explaining that during times of war, every person is anxious only for 
himself. Individuals are not open to the troubles of others. 
 The narrator walks around aimlessly, divorced from the trials surrounding him, forming 
no binding relationships with others, and while of military age, does not share in the realities of 
his contemporaries. The narrator is an Austrian subject, but considers himself Palestinian, a Jew 
transplanted to a predominantly non-Jewish society; he does not identify with wartime 
Germany.63  Along the way he encounters a shell-shocked soldier, around his age whom he dubs 
the “golem,” a traditionally non-Jewish character formed from earth lacking the human 
characteristic of a soul.  This soldier, who also is aimless in a society he once knew but now so 
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transformed, is actually the son of the narrator’s former landlady. Once the soldier finds his way 
home, the narrator is again without a home, however temporary as it originally was. 
 Band explains that in the story Agnon divided the first seven chapters among the 
narrator’s geographical wanderings, meeting in each place different people in varied social 
settings. The remaining chapters are more limited in the scope of travel, focusing on the 
narrator’s migration from apartment to apartment within Berlin, his second trip to Leipzig, his 
return to Berlin, and finally his return to the Land.64 What is intriguing about this description of 
war-torn Germany is that nowhere in Agnon’s writing does one find mention of (in) famous 
battles, or graphic depictions of specific upheavals. What is encountered is the turbulence of the 
human spirit and experience, and a grappling with fundamental human questions of the 
“apocalyptic” days.65  Also evidenced in Agnon’s writings, especially in these three novels, is an 
antithesis between galut (exile)/diaspora and the Land. The former is characterized by violence, 
coldness, poverty, foreignness, and the profane, while the latter is the opposite.66  This is 
epitomized nicely in the scene from In the Heart of the Seas when Abraham, the town mohel 
(circumciser) symbolically passes the scalpel underneath the feet of the “enthusiastic ones,” a 
gesture that “separates them from the soil of the galut.”67 
“Are You My Mother?” Or, Is Home Where the Heart Is? 
 The notion of tension between life in the diaspora and the idealized image of life in the 
Land occupies a central place in Only Yesterday. For example, one of the stops during Isaac’s train 
ride was to Lemberg (in Yiddish and German, L’viv in Ukrainian, Lwów in Polish, Lvov in 
Russian), capital of Galicia, and home to the “great Zionists of the [Austro-Hungarian] Empire.” 																																																								
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While there Isaac saw magnificent and gorgeous things, but like his ancestor Reb Yudel, covered 
his eyes so that he would not be too pleased with the beauty Outside the Land before his ascent 
to Palestine.68 He met with dignitaries who were impressed that he was going to the Land; 
Agnon states that they were accustomed, rather, to going only to (Zionist) Congresses in 
Europe, not with actual travel to the Land. Isaac and the narrator (perhaps Agnon himself, or 
another omniscient and omnipresent voice) recount to themselves that for many Jews outside 
the Land, particularly for Zionists, the Land was “the end of all ends,” yet when these people 
realized that the “end” was far away and difficult to reach, and that the means nearer to them 
were close and easy to attain, they traded the distant and difficult for the close and easy.69 Isaac, 
alone in this way, broke with others over his commitment to maintaining action directed solely 
toward this ideal. While for Ezrahi this dichotomy may in fact highlight the teleology/creativity 
divide she articulated, in which Isaac’s monomaniacal focus on emplacement “there” bespeaks a 
future lack of creativity upon arrival, Agnon proves a less than predictable cultural commentator 
than Ezrahi presents him to be. 
 Amos Oz states that the direction of Only Yesterday proceeds from the cold diaspora to 
the warm, beautiful Land, but that once emplaced in the Land, the direction is reversed, from 
the hot desert to his home that he abandoned, to Galicia.70 Yet, this is not necessarily always 
accurate. For Isaac, the direction is always unidirectional, with occasional fluctuations and 
punctuations of challenge (i.e., with encounters and confrontations that expand his fan of 
memory). While there may be moments of fortuitous situations that impede but also spur his 
actions, his imagination, even while in the Land, remains constant amidst changing landscapes. 																																																								
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Even Oz seems to echo Ezrahi’s analysis. Yet, perhaps both miss Agnon’s portrayal of 
“diaspora,” and both certainly overlook the insights of Benjamin, Bakhtin, Tweed, and Heschel. 
Oz emphasizes this tension by explaining that the Land of Israel as Garden of Eden and 
the lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as Garden of Eden are in fact part of the same 
continuum, revealed as two in one. One is always slipping away to whatever “side of the sea” 
one happens to be on when one is fantasizing.71  In To This Day, Agnon’s narrator says that when 
he was in Galicia he wanted to live in Germany, and now that he is in Germany he wishes to be 
back in Galicia. He concludes that perhaps this is all that Zionism amounts to: wishing to be in 
the Land, but once there realizing that you miss “home.”72  Agnon continues this strand of 
personal recollection by having the narrator state that when he was in Berlin he wanted to be in 
Lunenfeld, and when in Lunenfeld he wanted to return to Berlin. All the while he was in Berlin, 
he desired to be elsewhere, yet he was returning to Berlin because it was impossible to live 
anywhere else; living in Berlin also proves to be only a dream.73 
Yet, the notion of travel and the purposes for it differ among these stories. In the Heart of 
the Seas is a tale inspired by religious faith and devotion, guided by the miraculous, albeit 
undertaken by human initiative. Travel and migration in To This Day reveal elements of longing, 
but longing for what exactly remains undefined. The narrator chances upon events and moves 
accordingly, never feeling satisfied wherever he happens to be. The desire to settle down with his 
scholar friend’s collection of traditional Jewish books, which is his original motivation to travel 
from Berlin to Lunenfeld, remains in the background of the story and ends up being the reason 
he builds a house in Palestine. Yet, this desire is not overtly expressed as a guiding principle for 
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the continued wandering. Isaac Kumer, in Only Yesterday, travels as a secular, Zionist ideologue, 
not as a religious pilgrim as was his ancestor, Reb Yudel. 
Oz goes so far as to claim that Isaac, being of the acculturated, assimilated, and 
bourgeois milieu of Theodor Herzl, wished to carry out Herzl’s vision of establishing a new 
Vienna in Palestine,74 as opposed to a religious outpost of sorts. But in contrast to Herzl, Isaac 
has a religious component inherited from Reb Yudel and simply from his upbringing. Perhaps a 
different way to view this is to say that the chronotope of Isaac the sojourner epitomizes 
Agnon’s transveraslity; in it/him we see both history and memory coalesce. These components 
otherwise are differentiated from and opposed to each other in the images of the shtetl (small 
Eastern European town with significant Jewish populations) and in Herzlian political Zionism 
(i.e., in the images of the religious and secular Jews). 
Agnon best represents this dichotomy in a scene from Only Yesterday, in which Isaac 
meets an elderly Jewish couple on the ship. They ask him why he is traveling to the Land, and he 
responds to work it. The old man inquires whether the Land was not made only of synagogues 
and prayer houses; was not the Land in fact designed only for prayer? What, he asked, did 
working the Land (alluding to the mostly secular pioneers in the pre-state period who acquired 
tracts of land to establish communities – different in character from other, pre-existing Jewish 
settlements of religious Jews who were in the Land as prelude to the coming of the Messiah) 
have to do with the needs of heaven?  The old man believed that Isaac was part of the cadre of 
individuals who wished to strip the Land of its holiness and make it like all other lands. Isaac did 
not respond verbally. Rather, he asked himself why he should argue with someone who was 
going to the Land simply to add to it another grave.75 
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Forgetting and Purifying: Two Necessary Steps for Travel 
 Some of the accusations leveled at the character of Isaac is that he begins to forget his 
purpose, his goal, because on his travels he encounters unforeseen worlds of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and places that he never imagined while living in his small village.76  This is 
not entirely true, however, for elsewhere on his train journey he passed through Przemysl, a city 
supposedly known as a citadel, a fortress as the entire state. He had heard legends about what is 
there, but as the train approached, entered, and left the citadel, he saw nothing of its storied 
qualities. 77   Agnon gently interweaves elements of fantasy, of reality, and of his own 
autobiography into the stories; the result is a creation of fiction that smoothly and unobtrusively 
glides between differing realms of time and place, all while being on a train and a boat. 
 Oz states that the vision that Isaac, and the readers, had of shaking off the dust of the 
exile is proven wrong, for wherever the characters turn, they carry the exile with them.78  This 
characterization is somewhat more accurate, and it reflects Tweed’s assessment that the work of 
transversality is never done, never reconciled. Isaac’s vision, imagination, belief, and trust orient 
him to other chronotopes along the way, and those encounters are always shifting. Perhaps it 
could be argued that this “forgetting” is just symptomatic of the occasional punctuation of his 
imagination and revealing of the fact that he is still in diaspora; his diasporic existence is not yet 
purified. Yet, when he visits Vienna, he descends the train and walks around. While the city is as 
magnificent as he imagined the capital of the Empire to be, he does not forget his end, his goal 
(which for Ezrahi still is the end of creativity and the beginning onset of socio-political turmoil, 
but also the supposed end to diaspora). Here Isaac’s telos reemerges and is seen to remain as his 																																																																																																																																																																												
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motivating force. Periodically throughout his visit to the city, he thinks to himself things that 
most other people, even Zionists themselves, have forgotten – that perhaps he is standing in 
places where Herzl once stood and that if it were not for Herzl Jews would live out their days 
only in exile and not go to the Land.79 In this case, it is precisely because he is (still) in the 
diaspora that his commitment to his imagined end is strengthened and overcomes others’ 
forgetfulness, mire in exile, and false consciousness. 
 The tension that reviewers see in Agnon between the diaspora and the imagined Land 
also finds expression in Only Yesterday between Isaac and those Zionists who have lost sight of 
the goal. While Isaac occasionally thinks back on his hometown, his mind also wanders to girls. 
Yet, unlike his contemporaries whom he chastises for dismissing what he considers to be the 
true goal for more ephemeral and temporary pleasures, Isaac’s sexual fantasies betray another 
level of focus. He sees himself as a savior figure to the imagined maidens in the Land, helping 
them fight off unwanted advances by other men and aiding them in the field physically with 
manual labor.80  His life is one lived through biblical paradigms. The conclusion of these 
fantasies is not sexual fulfillment, but rather a giving of himself totally to Zionism and the 
hoped-for recognition he would receive from others upon realization of his strength and 
prowess gained from that devotion. 
We are beginning to see that the unfolding segments of memories and paradigms 
operative in Isaac’s mind, all uncovered through random encounters, entail continued creativity, 
but also a renewed existence in diaspora. The biblical period has ended, and Isaac straddles both 
“reality” and an imagined life in the renewed Land through projections into it of the lost past. 
This oscillation between the two and ability to navigate between them is not an either/or 
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scenario for Isaac. Just as he is neither a man solely of imagination nor of pragmatism, so too is 
he not just a hybrid of the two. He represents a life within both imagination/idealization and the 
socio-political world of contemporaneity, at times emphasizing one more than the other, but 
always encapsulating a chronotope within himself. 
Sisyphus Redux: Physical Return and Emotional Revolt 
 On the ship, the old man asked Isaac whether or not Isaac had family in the Land. To 
this Isaac responded with a rather postmodern sensibility, or rather a decidedly modern way à la 
Marx. He explained to the old man that he did not need relatives (read as biological relatives), 
for all children of Israel are comrades, especially in the Land.81  The old man responded by 
saying that in theory all people assent to this sentiment, but in practice it is more difficult to 
succeed in the Land without already having family there. Isaac’s mind was not changed until 
their eventual arrival to Jaffa, where those aboard ship were met by all sorts of relatives.  In 
stereotypical Isaac fashion, he began to imagine that those people were coming aboard to meet 
him and invite him home with them. He relates that (actual) events are one thing and 
imagination is another.82  Agnon concluded the Prologue by claiming that as people were being 
ferried to shore, and Isaac was left alone on the deck of the ship amidst the bustle, he was 
orphaned many times over. 
 Oz echoes this idea when he says of Isaac that while in his hometown his imagination 
took him to the land of the pioneers, while in the Land his imagination carries him to an ersatz 
home, an orthodox family that represents elements of the diaspora within the Land. Oz states 
that Isaac travels from one family to another, never quite reaching home, albeit while being 
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emplaced in his idealized home (land).83  The experience of travel, in all three of these novels, 
presents the main characters in liminal situations, in encounters that push the boundaries of the 
humanly possible, both internally and externally, and it is to these situations that the characters 
must respond. 
 As with the arrival of the villagers to Jaffa in In the Heart of the Seas, Isaac’s initial 
experiences in the Land are “sobered” by the harshness of the weather, and of the social 
conditions there. Isaac went to an inn, decided the following day to look for work in the fields 
(working the land), but the innkeeper persuaded him to eat breakfast. By the time Isaac finished, 
the innkeeper told him that the wagon going to the fields had already left and that another was 
not coming until the next day. Quickly Isaac understood that the innkeeper would find things 
with which to delay Isaac, and for which to charge him.84 
Isaac traveled by foot, and by the time that Isaac finally found someone with whom to 
talk, it turned out to be a worker who mocked Isaac’s Eastern European accent. The two 
eventually became amiable toward one another, entered a coffeehouse for lemonade, and tried to 
cool off. To Isaac’s surprise, he found many idle workers, not having worked in the fields, but 
rather sitting around complaining about the conditions in the Land. They told Isaac that 
contractors would not hire them because they could find cheaper work with others, that the 
government officials were corrupt and self-serving and looked down on the mere workers, and 
throughout all of it, Isaac came to realize that his clothes (from the diaspora) were insufficient 
for the weather of the desert.85 
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Nevertheless, the narrator in Only Yesterday explains that included in the midst of the 
workers’ list of complaints about current conditions were reminiscences about the earlier 
settlers, and the idle “workers” proceeded to recount the earlier settlers’ exploits. They came to 
see, however briefly and to no tangible ensuing action, that those who were there before them 
were heroic in that they came to a wilderness, dealt successfully with reducing cases of malaria, 
handled their own corrupt officials, and built a life. They actually made it to the Land, endured 
the troubles, and built communities. Throughout this discussion, Isaac understood what they 
were saying about the economic conditions created by the contractors, but failed to understand 
how this could happen in the Land. Throughout the discussion of the list of grievances, Isaac 
was happy to reflect on the fact that this conversation occurred in Hebrew, among comrades, all 
while being emplaced in the Land.86  While on the one hand, as Isaac moves closer to the Land 
he grows increasingly alienated, from family, from the idea of home, and from the comforts of 
both. On the other hand, he endures the travails because of his imagination of the Land and 
those who reside there, both then and now. These images, challenges, contradictions, and 
uncertainties are things to be happily endured, so long as he is there. Perhaps in his liminality 
Isaac embodies Heschel’s vision and call to action. 
Final Destination as an Impossible Mission 
 Band characterizes much of the motivation to leave home as tied to the disintegration of 
traditional religious practice and belief, as well as to a general tastelessness of life, which he says 
is symptomatic of a generation.87 Isaac finds tranquility only moments before he dies (i.e., when 
he gets married, lives a relatively religious life, is not intent on becoming a pioneer, and whose 
Zionism, according to Ezrahi, supposedly had been fulfilled simply by moving to the Land). 																																																								
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This attainment of tranquility of spirit, however, is short lived, and only the narrator and reader 
realize that it has been reached. Isaac strives for meaning in his life, and before he can 
understand what it is exactly, he departs from the story. This is hardly redemption and 
unification with the Land as Ezrahi concludes. Isaac’s creativity was not abandoned or 
outgrown. Agnon left it unfulfilled and open, but emplaced. 
 Yet, what are we to learn from this state of affairs? Is metaphorical return to tradition, to 
previously moored beliefs and myths, the only way to attain redemption and tranquility, which 
may or may not necessitate actual physical departure and travel at all? Is nostalgia, and not 
physical (re) territorialization, all that is needed for unification to be realized? Agnon’s 
sophistication as a storyteller and revealer of truth betrays the answer to that question. Band 
relates that Agnon portrays the world of pious Jews in many ways, crossing generations in their 
commitment to belief, etc., wherever they happen to be located. Yet, in modernity these 
yearnings cannot be realized, or fulfilled. The “golden world” is nothing but fantasy, and in this 
way nostalgia, he claims, turns into nightmare. The ideal world can never be (re) captured.88  This 
is to say that redemption (unification?) is always deferred. The moment of arrival/encounter is 
not a closure or end to diaspora, except as the culmination, perhaps, of part of a physical trip, 
and it certainly is not a restriction on creativity. Rather, it is an ethical call, a shofar blast, an echo 
– especially for Isaac who so evidently lived a bifurcated existence between explicit biblical 
motifs and immersion in harsh reality.  These stories do not depict, as Ezrahi claims, concretized 
myths for realization in our world, but rather various quests exposing us to possibilities and ways 
of being, for which Heschel pleads. 
 Isaac, and even the narrative I in In the Heart of the Seas, are denied the possibility of 
return through repentance and physical return. If we follow Band’s assessment of Isaac as not 																																																								
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solely an individual, a typical pioneer of the Second Aliyah, but rather as a chronotope of all of 
Western civilization that behaved without moorings, or with moorings that were misunderstood 
about how they could be brought about, during the 1930s and 1940s (when he published this 
work),89 then there is no redemption at all for humanity, or it is eternally deferred. There are 
things that prohibit and frustrate these efforts at (psychological, spiritual, etc.) return, despite 
physical return. In other words, even though he re-emplaced himself in his “home” (away from 
home?), Isaac, and the narrative I, remain in diaspora. 
 The traditional promise of redemption, of being steadfast in faith, loses it valence in 
modernity, or at least in the particular way that it was hoped it would be achieved. As Oz states, 
the promise of a Zionist utopia has to remain a promise.90  One cannot settle for the status quo, 
for what was hoped for was not achieved or accomplished. The narrative I eventually found 
what it was looking for, but it remains to be seen how it actually panned out, especially given the 
restlessness so characteristic of the uncommitted individual. Even for the deeply committed 
individual, such as Isaac, the many layers of his life are never reconciled with one another. Jaffa, 
the new life, of labor, of national revival, and of the pioneer woman who rejected him are left 
un-integrated with Jerusalem, a return to religious behavior, tradition, and to his religious wife 
who perhaps he could have found even in his home village in Europe. Furthermore, once he 
actually achieves marriage and a “stable” life in Jerusalem, he dies soon thereafter. Both of these 
experiences, these liminal situations, are likewise not integrated into his experiences with his 
family, his “home,” his past. The many realities of his life are incompatible with his imaginations, 
his imagined realities. Isaac’s travel, then, is perpetual, and so, too, is the creativity each 
encounter demands. 
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Oz sums up this conundrum by stating that from Agnon truth emerges, as it is for 
Benjamin with the unfolding of the fan of memory. That which was broken (i.e., tradition, the 
life, practices, and outlook of Reb Yudel, for instance), was broken irremediably. Things 
collapsed under their own contradictions, and thus there is no way back. Those who “take 
refuge in the shadow of wisdom, return to ruins,” and those ruins are not to be confused with 
the return to “home.”91  Physical return is possible, and other types of return are dependent on 
how one answers the inherently ethical call of the confrontation with the threshold, and this 
liminal position that emerges, especially once physical return and emplacement have been 
reached, is itself the place of re-diasporization. 
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Chapter Four 
“Re-Diasporization”: Emplacement, Generation, 
and the Choice of Jewish Diaspora Creativity 
 
Life Imitating Art Imitating Life 
 
While Chapter Three dealt with the theme of travel, along with concomitant elements 
encountered throughout the journey, such as chronotopes, unforeseen recollections and 
memories, and the ethics necessitated by decisions made regarding those memories, this chapter 
focuses on issues related to being physically situated, once the travel to “there” has supposedly 
ended. Agnon’s characters, for instance, returned and became emplaced, although in various 
ways. In To This Day, the narrator considered himself to be Palestinian and ended up back in the 
Land after spending time in Europe; in In the Heart of the Seas, the characters are portrayed as 
religious pilgrims who, while traveling real routes and dealing with real struggles along the way, 
are guided and accompanied by the miraculous. This travel/return, however, is to a place that 
they felt attached to and separated from, albeit imagined – the Land of their dreams and 
collective history. In Only Yesterday, Isaac travels to the Land, to the place of his longing, 
although where he “ends up,” it could be argued, was in a situation that could have been attained 
in his other, natal home. In this way, Isaac returned to tradition, to a life that was expected of 
him elsewhere. 
As well, whereas Chapter Three engaged texts that can be classified as fiction and novels, 
albeit interspersed with autobiographical components from Agnon’s life (e.g., his origination in 
Galicia, emigration to Palestine, return sojourn to Berlin, and final settlement back in the Land), 
this chapter deals with texts that are considered journalistic and as ethnography (i.e., 
“nonfiction” narratives). A caveat, however, is needed. The themes of ethnography, reportage, 
and constructed and presented identity, especially as practiced in the initial ethnographies, blur 
the lines of fiction and nonfiction. The methods and personalities involved in the creation of 
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these ethnographies and later accounts involve accusations of, if not actual implementation of, 
deception, (dis) guise, a constant tension between concealing and revealing, and the desire to 
include as many voices as possible in the process. This latter endeavor has the effect of upending 
many previously held conceptions regarding characteristics of certain identities. It must be 
recognized, however, that the process of identity creation, especially one that attempts inclusivity 
of voices and perspectives, is never-ending and is wrought with many pitfalls. As well, all parties 
involved confront often-troubling aspects of their pasts found as a result of this inclusion. 
Now that we are emplaced, however, we are better able to confront issues of generation, 
commitment, and rebellion – all concomitant elements of the threshold. As we posited in 
Chapter Three, this is how emplacement has come to be interpreted/enacted. Involved in this 
assortment of “related possibilities” are the elements of fabrication, masking, “passing,” and 
ultimately of questioning whether the product is hybridity or something else. The overriding 
concern of this chapter, then, is to gain an understanding of emplacement as a site of challenge, 
creativity, tension, and the ground from which to transmit ethics, values, and concerns, both 
from one’s imagination and lived realities. In this way, achieved identity, as overcoming longing 
and reaching origins, remains unfulfilled and one becomes re-diasporized (i.e., able to identify to 
what it is one will commit) from within bounded space. It is through being emplaced that one 
achieves perspective on movement, one’s situation into tradition, historical and autobiographical 
contextualization, and appreciation of the past. Emplacement is a location of liminality, out of 
which one co-produces and enacts diasporic identity. This conception places into question 
stances that advocate for location’s eraser and dismissal of its importance, both in its necessity 
for identity construction and acknowledgement of its entrenchment in socio-political realpolitik. 
The themes of identity in these stories have been depicted and spelled out in social 
scientific, anthropological, and ethnographic works of the twentieth century. To make better 
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sense of these connections we will begin with the juxtaposition of two ethnographies about 
Jewish life in the pre-Shoah period (i.e., the life of the shtetl) in Eastern Europe. The presentation 
of Mark Zborowski’s and Elizabeth Herzog’s Life is with People and S. An-sky’s Jewish 
Ethnographic Expedition, his work from forty years earlier, highlight issues such as 
“generation(s),” generational gaps and conflicts, and the construction of identity and social 
presentation of the self/group. To make sense of these issues we will examine both Margaret 
Mead’s and Pierre Nora’s understandings of the concept of “generation” and all that this implies 
for society and the various groups comprising it.  
To bring this discussion back to the issue of diaspora and the Land, we will apply these 
insights to Israeli reflections on the ways that various generations have approached the Land and 
ask whether or not reconciliation is possible, or desirable, and what this means for one’s 
supposed return. I consider Eliezer Schweid’s The Land of Israel, Amos Oz’s In the Land of Israel, 
David Grossman’s The Yellow Wind, and Ari Shavit’s My Promised Land. While acknowledging the 
fact of being physically emplaced, a tension results from the inability of succeeding generations 
to identify with and recount the motivations and passions of previous generations. It is by being 
emplaced that we see societal cleavages, continued alienation, and renewed separation. Through 
an exploration of these gaps we are left asking the same questions of living individuals as we did 
of characters in literature: “To what shall one commit, and how shall one commit, if at all?” The 
resulting intentional separation produced by self-reflective confrontation makes the quotidian 
extraordinary and the already achieved something to be anticipated. This counters previous 
understandings of the Jewish diaspora and “homecoming.” The Land remains contingent, never 
accomplished, and always in a state of “permanent revolution.” 
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Ambiguities of Identity 
 In the Preface to the 1962 edition of Life is with People (originally published in 1952), 
Margaret Mead stated that the purpose of the Columbia University series of ethnographies 
devoted to contemporary cultures, which was co-headed by Ruth Benedict and funded by the 
Office of Naval Research, was to “light up” the inner meanings of these peoples and cultures as 
they were carried from one place to others before they were destroyed.1 She recognized, 
however, that this created product, this picture into the “inside” of a culture, was in fact drawn 
from the outside, through the eyes of other cultures as well as disciplines used to present the 
findings, as is the case with most ethnographies. The co-author of central importance in this 
study devoted to Jewish life in Eastern Europe was Mark Zborowski, a person who, as Mead 
states: 
[…] combined in one person the living experience of shtetl culture in the Ukraine and 
Poland and the disciplines of history and anthropology through which to interpret his 
memories and readings…For him, this book is a realization of a plan cherished for 
many years…2 
 
The goal of this project was to experiment with research methods “developed to test working on 
cultures at a distance…[distance] whether provided by time – cultures no longer existed as 
organized societies, only in the minds of individuals…or by distance [erected by] man-made 
barriers.”3 The shtetl culture no longer existed after the Second World War due to its eraser by 
the Bolshevik Revolution and later destruction by the Nazis. 
 In order to undertake this study, the Jewish Research Group at Columbia interviewed 
Eastern European Jews, observed their life and households (in the United States), studied their 																																																								
1  Margaret Mead, “Foreword,” in Life is with People: The Culture of the Shtetl, by Mark Zborowski and 
Elizabeth Herzog [1952] (New York: Schocken Books, 1962), 21. 
 
2  Ibid., 16-17. 
 
3  Ibid., 14. 	
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histories and literatures, read their drama, and investigated relevant pictorial records and films. 
As opposed to “traditional” anthropology, Mead relates that:  
In this new kind of anthropology, members of different disciplines, from 
different modern cultures, work together, using the senses, the memories, the 
perceptions and insights, the organizational skills and capacity to develop and 
test hypotheses, of the different members of the group, as a delicate and unique 
research tool.4 
 
The goal, as Mead states, was to gain access to the “dialectics of the shtetl” through the 
microcosm of the seminar.5  What resulted in the book was “a portrait rather than a series of 
photographs, a composite picture of a way of life, not the factual record of a single village.”6  
This amalgamation was justified, for as she attests, the Jews for whom this was a study in their 
disappearing culture, “lived as communities within a larger society, who themselves did not 
constitute a nation, and who therefore had always to include in any picture of themselves the 
picture which their neighbors…had of them.”7 Mead acknowledged that this study presented a 
“composite picture” and not a series of photographs, “not the factual record of a single village.” 
What this ethnography did present, though, was a “common core” that all shtetl Jews supposedly 
shared. This admission allowed for the researchers much leeway in how to organize and discuss 
the lives under investigation. 
 This totalizing endeavor is echoed in the Introduction, in which Zborowski and Herzog 
claim, “[…] this is a portrait of a culture and not a…diagram. Its subject matter is not 
ethnographic minutiae but rather prevailing patterns…Despite countless local variations, the 
Jews of Eastern Europe had one culture…the culture portrayed is that of the shtetl and not that 																																																								
4  Ibid., 17-18. 
 
5  Ibid., 18. 
 
6  Ibid., 18-19. 
 
7  Ibid., 19. 
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of all Jews”8 Constructing the study in such a way, of identifying a “core culture,” allowed the 
editors to by-pass the “shades and levels of acculturation…in such developments as secularized 
schools, modifications of dress, political and labor activities, and generally increased 
participation in the life of the larger society.”9  The composite picture did away with lived reality 
and understood Jewish (i.e., shtetl) life as in fact frozen and immutable. They reduced the 
“locality” of the shtetl and the life therein to the minds of its descendants. As the editors claim, 
“The effort is to portray the living culture rather than to trace the origin of its manifestations. 
The emphasis is on interrelations rather than on initial causes.”10  They even went to far as to 
claim that the shtetl’s locality and physicality were secondary to the people who lived in it. They 
state, “’My shtetl’ means my community, and community means the Jewish community. 
Traditionally, the human rather than the physical environment has always been given primary 
importance. Emphasis on the Jewish portion of the community was inevitable, for historical 
developments had excluded it from membership in the larger community. Socially and legally it 
was an entity in itself.”11  While this acknowledges the emplacement of the shtetl within distinct 
temporal and spatial confines, it denies any agency to the people living within it, except as pawns 
in the pre-ordained, determined life of Ashkenazi (Eastern European) Judaism. 
 For the editors of this study, shtetl life was contained within a veritable hermetic bubble. 
As they relate/construct: 
[…] the small-town Jewish community of Eastern Europe – the shtetl – traces its 
line of march directly back to Creation.  The Exodus from Egypt, the giving of 
the law on Mount Sinai…[are] historical events no less real than the Spanish 																																																								
8  Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog, Life is with People: The Culture of the Shtetl (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1962), 23. 
 
9  Ibid., 23-24. 
 
10  Ibid. 
 
11  Ibid., 22-23. 	
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Inquisition…According to the shtetl, the Children of Israel have survived solely 
because of the Covenant made with God – accepting His Law.12 
 
The history and involvement of Jews in Europe are reduced to intermittent migrations, 
the establishment of a few centers of learning, being shut off from surrounding cultures 
and knowledge, and the building and maintaining of a consciousness that extends from 
Creation and continues, unabated, into the small Jewish culture of Europe. 
 In their composite portrait, the editors denied the inhabitants of the shtetl, here 
given personification itself, any involvement in the surrounding milieu. As they claim: 
[…] despite the multiple impacts from without, until the late nineteenth century, 
a very large proportion of the shtetl population grew up in ignorance of the 
world beyond…The whole world was commonly assumed to be just one shtetl 
after another…Space and time…were fluid, vague concepts…The geographical 
data of the Bible were fused and confused with the names of contemporary 
countries…Isolation was most complete during the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries.  From then on the waves from without pounded 
increasingly against the Gates of Torah…From the mid-eighteenth century, 
however, there was ever-strengthening attack from within. Its most effective 
manifestation was the Enlightenment, the Haskala, which emanated from 
Germany and spread across Europe. It was the intellectualized form of rebellion 
against legalism…13 
 
Such a presentation ignores other, well-known and attested to forms of identification 
that Jewish communities used during this period.  Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett states: 
[…] the team identified shtetl with Jewish community.  Second, they imagined its 
spatial organization in terms of isolation, self-containment, and homogeneity. 
Third, they envisioned it as timeless…the authors did not distinguish clearly 
between shtetl (town), kehile (corporate Jewish community), and an 
anthropological notion of communities as the “basic units”…of an organization 
and transmission within a society and its culture. The book argued… “’My shtetl’ 
means my community, and community means the Jewish community,” an 
identification they attribute to the exclusion of Jews from “membership in the 
larger community.” However, a single kehile often had jurisdiction not only over 
																																																								
12  Ibid., 30. 
 
13  Ibid., 158-61. 	
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the Jews in a particular town, but also over smaller Jewish settlements in the 
environs.14 
 
She continues to note that Jews were not isolated, a counter-notion further borne out by 
the fact that hasidic life, for instance, transcended borders of towns, as did other 
specialized institutions of Jewish life, such as membership in yeshivot (schools of 
advanced study of Talmud). 
 That the shtetl as the editors presented it is seen as timeless (i.e., that its 
inhabitants see it as continuing Jewish life from time immemorial) and that it is being 
bombarded from without by economic, political, and intellectual threats but does not 
change, allows Jewish life no recourse except abandonment and destruction; change and 
creative, reciprocal interaction with the surrounding milieu is not allowed in this scheme. 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett points out that this presentation deals inadequately with its own 
inconsistencies. As she states: 
General claims that the shtetl was “not a static universe,” that it was a “whole” 
made up of “conflicting and interacting parts,” and that “through the centuries 
the tradition has been both tested and invigorated by the impact of influences 
from without” have limited analytic consequences. They do however provide a 
rationale for integrating inconsistent data and, as disclaimers, they tacitly 
acknowledge the book’s overwhelming emphasis upon continuity.15 
 
The shtetl is a unified whole existing somehow amidst the larger, European backdrop. 
 As acknowledged, the main architect of this project was Mark Zborowski. He 
was born in 1908 in the Ukrainian city of Uman, population around 60,000. He and his 
family later moved to the Polish cities of Lwow and Lodz, both relatively large and well-
known locales. In 1928 he moved from Poland to France in order to study anthropology. 
																																																								
14  Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Introduction,” in Life is with People: The Culture of the Shtetl, by Mark 
Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog (New York: Schocken, 1995), 5. 
 
15  Ibid., 7. 	
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It was there that a Soviet agent approached him and offered him the opportunity to 
study in Russia, tuition-free, if he would monitor and provide information to the Soviet 
authorities on the activities of anti-Soviet Trotskyists.16 By 1941 Zborowski and his wife 
fled France for the United States. While he continued to report on anti-Soviet Russians 
abroad, he also furthered his involvement in studying Jewish life by securing a job as a 
librarian at the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research in New York City. While there he 
met both Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead.17 
 The book was published in 1951, and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett tells us that already 
within two years of its publication allegations spread about Zborowski’s activities as a 
spy; he even was implicated in the death of Trotsky’s son. For some scholars, such a 
revelation casts doubt on the merits of the produced volume and the selected emphases 
that the editors presented as characterizing Jewish life. Questions emerged over how 
Zborowski understood the shtetl and the relationship of the Jewish community to its 
larger surroundings. Steven Zipperstein tells us that Zborowski “exerted decisive 
influence on all aspects of the book,”18 and as we have seen, other scholars called into 
question the ways in which Zborowski portrayed shtetl life. Zborowski presented himself 
as in fact coming from such a background, but Uman, for many scholars, did not 
constitute a shtetl; it was a city. Zborowski maintained, however, that the shtetl was a 
state of mind, not delimited to its physical scale. 
																																																								
16  Steven J. Zipperstein, “Underground Man: The Curious Case of Mark Zborowski and the Writing of a 
Modern Jewish Classic,” Jewish Review of Books, Summer 2010, 2. 
 
17  Ibid., 3; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett “Introduction,” 14. 
 
18  Zipperstein “Underground Man,” 4. 	
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 As many observers have noted, there exists a link between ethnography, espionage, and 
surveillance. One not only observes, but records.  Both reveal that which is concealed. Both 
ethnographers and spies are strangers, ask many questions, and attempt to situate themselves 
into a location to gain trust, and truth, while concealing aspects of their own identities from 
those they hope will trust them. 19  The process is what Nathaniel Deutsch calls strategic 
dissimulation. The link between the two was made explicit with Zborowski in Life is with People, 
for the co-author of the book was in fact a Russian spy who interjected his own biased 
recollections into the interpretation of others’ memories and into his readings of secondary 
material about Jewish life in Eastern Europe, a world out of which he originated but from which 
he was estranged. That he spent his professional life reporting on the activities of others, in an 
effort to have them silenced and even killed, casts doubts on his credibility as an anthropologist, 
who was supposed to present a total account of Jewish life through documenting all ways that 
people there existed.20 The effect of Life is with People is, as Deutsch points out, a synthesized 
product of local differences into a “representative portrait of a single shtetl.” The book created an 
imagined and imaginary land, unlike other ethnographies that strive to present reality as it is lived 
while it is being lived. Zborowski’s account was a heavily mediated representation of the 
imagined world that he claimed to embody. 
 Even though Zborowski was a Russian spy, should that negatively impact one’s 
appreciation of his study of Jewish life, definitional issues of “shtetl” aside? Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett asks, “…is there any aspect of the volume we might explain in terms of Zborowski’s 
																																																								
19  Nathaniel Deutsch, The Jewish Dark Continent: Life and Death in the Russian Pale of Settlement (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 25. 
 
20  Ibid., 318-19. 
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biography that could not be accounted for just as persuasively without reference to his life?”21 
After all, he did not write the book alone. Others agreed to the presentation of shtetl life as such. 
Nevertheless, she argues, once the book took on its current characteristics and mode of 
presentation, in which Jewish life in Eastern Europe is seemingly frozen, isolated, and focused 
on what Zborowski et al. stated it focused on (e.g., personal status, wealth disparities, and also 
continuity – in fact the very elements that factored in to his estrangement from his father), 
Zborowski had no need to explain himself or his own interjections. In fact, as she argues, such a 
constructed view provided a “safe haven” for him.22  Zborowski’s imagined shtetl became so 
entrenched in the collective imagination about Eastern European Jewish life that he even wrote 
the 1971 entry for “shtetl” in the Encyclopedia Judaica, a serious reference work in English. As 
such, we are left with the view that the shtetl was a “planned whole, designed and governed by 
the Almighty…It is a complex whole, but basically it is characterized by order, reason, and 
purpose. Everything has its place, its course, its function…the universe of the shtetl is an 
unbroken continuum.”23 This constructed image, however, is the severely mediated production 
of interviews, research, and the dubious impositions of the editor’s sentiments and own 
imagined recollections. 
Guise of Disguise: Or, Deception in the Service of Truth 
 The author and playwright S. An-sky, born Shloyme-Zanvl Rappoport in 1863, in the 
town of Chashniki in the Vitebsk province, and he received a traditional Jewish upbringing. 
Similar to many youths his age, he began reading literature produced by those “enlightened” 
Jews of the Haskalah, and he also immersed himself in Russian literature, becoming entranced 																																																								
21  Kirshenblatt-Gimblett “Introduction,” 20. 	
22  Ibid. 
 
23  Zborowski and Herzog Life is with People, 409-27. 
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by the idea of the (common) people.24 Turning his back on any religiously defined concept of 
Jewish identity, he traveled to Paris in the early 1890s to surround himself with secular, 
European culture. While there he encountered East-European born Yiddish-speaking 
intellectuals and their works, such as the poems of I. L. Peretz and novels by Sholom Aleichem, 
as well as other Jews influenced by the emerging enthusiasm of the Zionist Congress and the 
creation of the Jewish Socialist Labor Bund. This was an association that aimed to unite Jewish 
workers into a party in order to more effectively join the Russian Socialist Democratic 
movement. Both the Zionist Congress and the Bund were founded in 1897. 
He came to realize that Jews, contrary to popular belief among his non-Jewish neighbors 
and even some secular co-“religionists,” were a people, and they were his people.25 Nathaniel 
Deutsch quotes An-sky, in which An-sky recounts his transformation: 
When I first entered literature 25 years ago I wanted to labor on behalf of the 
oppressed, the working masses, and it appeared to me, mistakenly, that I would 
not find them among the Jews…possessing an eternal longing for Jewishness, I 
[nevertheless] threw myself in all directions and left to work for another people. 
My life was broken, split, torn…I lived among the Russian folk for a long time, 
among their lowest classes. Things are different for us now than when I wrote 
my first story. We have cultural, political, and literary movements.26 
 
Slowly he incorporated all elements, the Russian revolutionary and focus on the narod (the 
people) as well as the split Jewish revolutionary/Zionist/secular and traditional shtetl life, into his 
creative ouvre; he began writing Yiddish poetry, and in 1902 he composed “Di Shvue” (“The 
Oath”), a poem that was adopted as the emblem of the Bund.27 
																																																								
24  Steven J. Zipperstein, “Introduction: An-sky and the Guises of Modern Jewish Culture,” in The Worlds of 
S. An-sky: A Russian Jewish Intellectual at the Turn of the Century, eds. Gabriella Safran and Steven J. Zipperstein 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 3-4. 
 
25  Deutsch The Jewish Dark Continent, 6. 
 
26  Ibid., 6-7. 
 
27  Zipperstein “Introduction,” 5. 
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 An-sky is known for many works, in particular: 1) “Di Shvue”; 2) his reporting on the 
destruction of Jewish life in the Russian lands during wartime (“Khurban Galitsye,” “The 
Destruction of Galicia”); and 3) his play “The Dybbuk” (originally called “Tsvishn Tsvey Veltn,” 
“Between Two Worlds”) a tale of spirit possession in a hasidic village. Yet, it is his ethnographic 
work (the Jewish Ethnographic Expedition) that is of interest to us here. After leaving his 
hometown to live an assimilated life as a Jewish intellectual in Western Europe, but after being 
influenced there by secularized Jews producing works in Yiddish as well as by the emerging 
Zionist movement(s), he maintained his interest in the narod (people) but desired to create a 
distinctively Jewish ethnography. It was this medium, he believed, which would allow for travel 
to and immersion in the lives of (his) people. He carried this interest with him, however 
modified, from his interest in Russian literature, and it was strengthened by his experiences 
confronting the reality of Jews. 
However much Russian Jews identified with the proletariat, they could never be 
identified as belonging to the Russian people, despite their similar socio-economic conditions. 
During the 1880s he lived through the passage of the May Laws, a series of restrictions on Jews 
that specified how they were to conduct business, which imposed school admittance quotas, and 
instituted more residence restrictions; these policies increased Jewish marginalization, 
impoverishment, and contributed to Jewish political radicalization. It strengthened the 
stereotype among the Russian populace of Jews as economically parasitic, as social aliens, as 
lacking attachment to land and legitimate forms of labor, and whose culture was defined by 
reactionary religious traditions.28 He was a native of the Pale of Settlement, a region on the 
western end of the Russian empire bordering Galicia and Prussia in which Jews were allowed to 
																																																								
28  Deutsch The Jewish Dark Continent, 3. 
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reside, dating from the late 1700s to the Russian Revolution of 1917. Yet, he spent many 
decades outside its confines in Western Europe, and he ended up identifying with both. 
 In 1909 he began to secure funding for an ethnographic expedition, in which he and his 
retinue of musicologists, photographers, and fieldworkers would tour shtetls in the Russian 
provinces of Podolia, Kiev, and Volhynia. Over the course of two years he visited 60 towns, 
took 2,000 photographs, transcribed over 2,000 folktales and legends, recorded and transcribed 
1,500 folksongs, and produced a book-length questionnaire with more than 2,000 questions that 
covered material dealing with daily life, work, and general experiences from birth to death and 
beyond. In order to get a better sense of the scope of this questionnaire, it is helpful to see just 
what sorts of topics it covered. 
The questionnaire was broken into five sections and numerous subsections. The first 
section dealt with the child, from conception to kheyder (traditional Jewish instruction). 
Subsections include pregnancy, types of cravings the expecting mother has, whether or not a 
midwife will be sued, the location of giving birth, incantations, what the couple will do with the 
placenta, what happens if the child is born with extra fingers, how the mother will nurse the 
newborn, what prayers are said, circumcision, gifts, when the first haircut will occur, etc. The 
second section covered the period from kheyder until the wedding. Its subsections include 
preparation for school, who takes the child, whether there is a teacher’s assistant, the curriculum, 
punishments, manners in school, if the children learn hasidic philosophy, the role of secular and 
heretical books, if children run away, payment, how to educate girls, military conscription, 
converts, etc. The third section covered the wedding. Its subsections include matchmaking, 
interviews of potential matches, breaking off matches, scheduling the wedding, entertainment on 
the Sabbath before the wedding, musicians, dancing, veiling the bride, unusual wedding vows, 
false ceremonies, ritual cleanliness, etc. The fourth section covered family life. It asked about 
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boarding the bride and groom when the son-in-law is a religious scholar or works in the father-
in-law’s business, in-laws, love and beauty, quarrels, unknown fathers, kinship, barrenness, 
divorce, widows/widowers, deserted spouses, inheritance, senility, illness, exorcisms, and dying. 
Finally, the fifth section dealt with death. It asked about body purifications, shrouds, graves, 
mourning, the Angel of Death, the afterlife, reincarnation, and resurrection. 
An-sky also had specific instructions for how to answer the questions. He paid particular 
attention to the age of the informants, their locations, how they came to know the answers to 
each question, information about people who told them answers, etc. The endeavor ended with 
the outbreak of the First World War. An-sky died in 1920.29 By going to the people and 
immersing himself within their milieu, he would not ask them to erase or choose between 
competing interests in presenting their identities; his project would enable Jews, from all realms, 
to present themselves as they say fit,30 just as he was doing for himself. 
In this way An-Sky’s project was similar to but ultimately differed from that of 
Zborowski’s, as well as from Bhabha’s and Gilroy’s understandings of identity. Gilroy’s 
presentation of black identity, for example, which emerged out of the experiences of slavery, 
movement among Africa, the Caribbean, the United States, and England is one of “new 
configurations,” creolization, métissage, mestizaje, and hybridity. He states that through the 
chronotope of the ship, which signifies motion, movement across space, and embodiment by 
those populating it, one gains access to the traversed space, the Atlantic. This produces, as he 
claims: 
A complex unit of analysis…of the modern world [which produces] an explicitly 
transnational and intercultural perspective…The fractal patterns of cultural and 
political exchange and transformation that we try and specify through manifestly 
inadequate theoretical terms like creolisation and syncretism indicate how both 																																																								
29  Zipperstein “Introduction,” 26. 
 
30  Deutsch The Jewish Dark Continent, 29. 
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ethnicities and political cultures have been made anew in ways that are significant 
not simply for the peoples of the Caribbean but for Europe, for Africa…and of 
course, for black America…Britain’s black settler communities have forged a 
compound culture from disparate sources.31 
 
Gilroy explicitly states that such movement and the identities that developed from it intermixes 
distinct cultural forms. It cannot be understood simply in nationalistic or ethnic terms. He states, 
“The specificity of the modern political and cultural formation I want to call the black Atlantic 
can be defined…through this desire to transcend both the structures of the nation state and the 
constraints of ethnicity and national particularity.”32  He continues by juxtaposing explicit 
political and cultural movements, such as Afrocentrism, with the idea of the black Atlantic that 
he articulated. 
Other movements fail to include the elements of flows, exchanges, and “in-between” 
elements that he sees operating in his conception of identity construction. As he relates, “The 
Africentric movement appears to rely upon a linear idea of time that is enclosed at each end by 
the grand narrative of African advancement. This is momentarily interrupted by slavery and 
colonialism, which makes no substantial impact upon African tradition or the capacity of black 
intellectuals to align themselves with it.”33 In a move similar to that of Afrocentrism, Zborowski 
amalgamated disparate accounts of Jewish life in Eastern Europe, as well as his own 
recollections and interests, into a coherent picture of an idealized locale. He created a place for 
which others would feel nostalgic and which disallowed change, even within a system that 
supposedly was tethered and connected to ideas of a chain of continuity. Zborowski’s shtetl 
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identity maintained a clear linear trajectory, and it dismissed the otherwise-revolutionary 
movements of Enlightenment and Zionism. 
By contrast, An-sky presented his ethnography as encountered in situ. As we will see, 
though, he did offer his own interpretation of Jewish identity, but he did so without imposing it 
onto the experiences of others. Bhabha and Gilroy understand identity as created in the 
interstitial spaces and movements, in the third space, between otherwise relatively fixed, albeit 
transformed, locations. Theirs is a melding, but one attuned to and cognizant of confluence, a 
hybridity. An-sky’s product, on the other hand, is not a hybrid identity, but rather a new 
paradigm as a way of being in the world. His personification, as well as his hope for the Jewish 
folk he was studying, was one of being comfortable with multiple positions, not their mixture 
into something new. An-sky did not wish to transcend European, or “Jewish,” or secular, or 
religious categories. Rather, he envisioned the complexity of Jewish experiences as a means to 
resuscitate Jewish sense of peoplehood and creativity, wherever one happened to be situated. 
The results of his Expedition were meant to demonstrate how such emplaced identities are 
living formations, embodied by practices that showcase continuity and reciprocity. 
Jewish life and folk culture, he thought, was common to non-Jewish folk as well, 
although Jews maintained distinct characteristics uniting them with experiences as recounted in 
their scriptures. As Deutsch points out: 
Jewish folk culture was…different…in two fundamental ways: it valorized 
spiritual over physical qualities and it reflected an unbroken tradition extending 
all the way back to the Hebrew Bible…this distinctively Jewish ethos was 
grounded in the most fundamental Jewish difference of all, the adherence to 
monotheism, which served as a unifying thread for all stages of Jewish cultural 
production from the biblical period to the modern era…Jews were at once 
profoundly like their neighbors…and fundamentally different from them; Jewish 
culture was constantly being influenced by (and influencing) the cultures around 
it, and yet it also exhibited an essential unity from the Bible on. In short, Jewish 
culture was universal and particular, same and other.34 																																																								
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In An-sky’s view, it was this everyday living that constitutes the Oral Torah. The usual 
designation of this category is applied to the teachings, interpretations, and instructions that 
accompanied the Written Torah from generation to generation, which were finally committed to 
writing after the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE, took the name the 
Mishnah, and which later was expanded into the Talmud. An-sky played around with this 
designation and applied the term Oral Torah to ways that everyday people take on roles as 
culture producers and interpreters. 
His project had a dual goal: to expose to non-Jews the legitimacy of Jewish life, with its 
folk culture that was both distinctively Jewish but embedded within a local environment, and to 
expose to Jews, especially the assimilated ones, a deeper knowledge and appreciation of their 
own folk traditions. He hoped that Jews would redeploy the traditions encountered in his 
exhibits as the building blocks for new, “authentically Jewish” creations, a continued 
propagation of the Oral Torah.35  Ethnography, then, is An-sky’s way that people perform 
Judaism,36 and this intra-Jewish category, then, and method of enacting it, was applicable to all 
Jews, at all times, in all locations. It was not confined to a period of time or locale. Yet, its 
enactment, its act of being emplaced, was not something to be transcended, but rather 
incorporated into its living engagement. In the same way that the Oral Torah is ongoing and 
renewable for changing circumstances, so, too, were Jewish traditions. An-sky saw the various 
ways Jewish communities, of every strand of Judaism even then, believed themselves to be 
																																																																																																																																																																												
 
35  Ibid., 11-12. 
 
36  Ibid., 35. 
	 159 
faithfully transmitting traditions but constantly incorporated new things into their lives, thus 
being both Jewish and fully embedded in their surrounding environment.37 
What a Difference a Day Makes: Generation and the Problems of Commitment 
 The elements that emerge from these two examples of how to do ethnography both 
conform to and depart from generalized notions of anthropological work that developed in the 
twentieth century. In fact, An-sky prefigured many of the criticisms that later theorists, such as 
Clifford, leveled at the presuppositions of anthropologists regarding ethnography and the issue 
of boundaries, as discussed in Chapter One. While for the most part both An-sky and 
Zborowski studied populations within territorial confines, variously conceived, An-sky’s study 
allowed for a malleability of identity construction that was unlike ethnographies even fifty years 
after he wrote. Judaism was not limited to a particular locale, but developed and was enacted 
from within them, albeit inherently in relation to each other. Jewish identity, in its many guises, 
was, as he stressed, both universal and particular. His concept of Oral Torah was flexible enough 
to allow for an incorporation of both continuity and innovation, the given and the 
performed/translated. What both studies share, however, is that they gave shape and expression 
to the daily lives, both imagined and enacted, within a given realm of existence, a location, an 
emplacement. Once this ground has been laid, we can return to Mead in another of her areas of 
inquiry: generation and the question of commitment. 
The Blind Leading the Blind: Generation, Liminality, and Committing to the Unforeseen Future 
 Once Zborowski and An-sky determined what populations to study, and where and how 
they would study them (both utilizing the methods of “ethnography”), questions of how to 
represent peoples emerged. As we have seen, Zborowski’s product was an amalgamation of 
difference into an idealized, coherent, and imagined whole, while An-sky’s product was an 																																																								
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attempted comprehensive look into the minutiae of local communities, which nonetheless 
shared an attachment to “Judaism,” however they conceived of, contributed to, and enacted it. 
What makes these two studies even more remarkable is that An-sky conducted his fieldwork 
forty years before Zborowski’s project commenced, and the understandings of what constituted 
not only Judaism but ethnography itself were quite different from one another. An-sky 
foreshadowed postmodernist critiques of identity (even providing a new paradigm that nuances 
their insights) well before their time. As Deutsch explains: 
[…] he [i.e., An-sky] emphatically chose not to anchor [Jewish identity] in divine 
revelation but, rather, in the workings of the Jewish “soul,” “heart,” and 
“thought”…a profound transvaluation of Judaism itself. Just as generations of 
rabbinic scholars had devoted themselves to compiling, learning, and legally 
interpreting the traditional Oral Torah, so An-sky imagined that the Jews of his 
own day and of future generations would devote themselves to collecting, 
studying, and creatively reappropriating the Oral Torah of the “common folk.”38 
 
In other words, people would co-produce their tradition in a sort of “auto-ethnography,” while 
being committed to its situation in a continuity of reflection on itself. No one “class” of Jews 
would carry any more significance than another in defining what was “Jewish” life or how to live 
it. What mattered, then, was the desire to identify as Jewish and understand oneself as living a 
life of Judaism. 
 Given this outlook on reapproaching both Judaism and the lives of Jews in Eastern 
Europe, it seems inevitable that tensions would emerge among various groups with different 
conceptions of what it is that constitutes their lives and tradition. Margaret Mead also has 
reflections on how to integrate these discrepancies, as well. It was the same Margaret Mead, who 
hired the Russian spy Zborowski, who in 1969 delivered a series of lectures devoted to what she 
presciently perceived as a conflict of generations. In these lectures she delved into what is a 
generation, explored how societies have dealt with the category in the past, and proposed a way 																																																								
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to address it in the future. The central concern for Mead, which, as it turns out, is the central 
concern for Benjamin, Heschel, and for the later Israeli authors, is that of commitment. She asks 
“to what past, present, or future can idealistic youths commit themselves?”39  In her view, as 
cultures developed and changed according to and in conjunction with events around them, 
commitment became a matter of choice among systems of thought. To phrase it differently, 
Mead highlighted the fact that cultures were perched on a brink, on the limen, the threshold, and 
what the situation demanded was decision. These actions would impact society as a whole; in 
this way, what constituted a generation was commitment, and this was an ethical concern. 
 In her presentation of the various models of generations, she discusses three variations. 
The first is what she dubs “postfigurative” cultures. This model is the one that scholars have 
used in generalized understandings of socialization and “usual” progressions of cultural 
transmission. Children learn primarily from forebears; authority is derived from the past. The 
entire system exists, in which there are three representative figures, each denoting a distinct 
generation: 1) grandparents, 2) parents, and 3) children, and the system repeats with the 
preceding generation taking the place of the former as the former gives way to the next; parents 
become grandparents as children become parents, etc. In this linear depiction of generations, the 
answers to questions are predetermined. While each generation is expected to rebel, as 
individuals mature and grow they will be expected in turn to become the figures against which 
they rebelled as youths.40  Continuity is maintained by smoothing over the issues of former 
generational rebellions, which might have disturbed a sense of developed identity. 
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 Another model, which often operates simultaneously with those cultures adopting a 
postfigurative positionality, is that of “cofigurative” identity. In this model people learn from 
their contemporaries, not the older generation, and this often occurs in experiences of migration 
to a new location. This moment of confrontation, of becoming emplaced elsewhere, has the 
potential to cause relative unease and create gaps. Mead states: 
[…] all these variations introduce a new element into the grandparents’ 
comments. “In the old country” it was different. This awareness of difference 
opens the way to a new choice for the child. He can listen and absorb the sense 
of there and here as being different places…he may cherish the contrast…or he 
may find these ancestral memories burdensome…Past grandeur is poor fare for 
an empty pot and does little to keep the wind from whistling through the chinks. 
So it is not surprising that many peoples…in the land to which they have 
migrated, let much of the past go.41 
 
There is a sense of discontinuity from the past, and this awareness opens up opportunities for 
the older generation to romanticize the past and for the youth to choose how they want to 
proceed. 
In this model the past does not quite provide a precedent for the new, and the young 
learn to form bonds among themselves through which they can navigate new conditions. As she 
states: 
Whether the young are the first native-born generation of a group of immigrants, 
the first birthright members of a new religious cult, or the first generation to be 
reared by a group of successful revolutionaries, their progenitors can provide 
them with no living models suitable for their age…Pioneers and 
immigrants…had no precedents in their own experience on which…they could 
base the way they reared their children…In its simplest form, a cofigurative 
society is one in which there are no grandparents present…With the removal of 
the grandparents physically from the world in which the child is reared, the 
child’s experience of his future is shortened by a generation and his links to the 
past are weakened…The expectation is that children will go away from or 
beyond their parents…When these who move…are all members of one culture, 
the locus of power is not the elders…but a younger age group, and the first 
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generation of adopted children set a style that may perpetuate a thinner version 
of the older culture…The new culture often lacks depth and variety.42 
 
Children’s ties to the past are weakened, and the expected experience of the future is shortened 
because the older generation did not experience youth in the same way or with similar 
expectations as the current generation does. Grandparents are not expected to be models for 
grandchildren here, and parents have tenuous control over their children. 
 Writing at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, Mead occupied a vantage 
point that in retrospect could see the generational divisions between the postfigurative and 
cofigurative forms and through which she could see a new form emerging. She states: 
I believe a new cultural form is emerging; I have called it prefiguration. As I see 
it, children today face a future that is so deeply unknown that it cannot be 
handled…as a generation change with cofiguration, within a stable, elder-
controlled and parentally modeled culture in which many postfigurative elements 
are incorporated. I believe that we can…apply to our present situation the 
pioneer model – the model of first-generation pioneer immigrants into an 
unexplored and uninhabited land. But for the figure of migration in space 
(geographical migration), I think we must substitute a new figure, migration in 
time. Within two decades, 1940-60, events occurred that have irrevocably altered 
men’s relationships to other men and to the natural world…all these have 
brought about a drastic, irreversible division between generations. Even very 
recently, the elders could say, “You know, I have been young and you have never 
been old.” But today’s young people can reply: “You never have been young in 
the world I am young in, and you never can be.” This is the common experience 
of pioneers and their children…the young are being transformed into strangers 
before our eyes.43 
 
In this new period the youth take on authority, and they face a future that is completely 
unknown, which calls for a new way of handling and preparing for it, a way that cannot be 
handled as the current, cofigurative model has been. 
 In the introduction to their collection of primary documents that best represent the 
decade of the 1960s, Judith Clavir Albert and Stewart Edward Albert provide an overview of the 
																																																								
42  Ibid., 29-34. 
 
43  Ibid., 48-49. 
	 164 
“seeds” of dissent, which later came to epitomize the 1960s. Many of those seeds originated in 
the 1950s, and the editors explain how they manifested themselves in later years. As they state, 
when the Korean War ended in 1953, “The demagoguery and national insecurity of the early 
1950s began to give way to a mood of self-satisfied boastfulness while the prevailing economic 
boom prompted an ongoing celebration of ‘our way of life.’”44  Despite this boom, many people 
still lived impoverished lives, and even the 1954 ruling that segregation in public education was 
unconstitutional did little to change the status quo for America’s minority communities, 
especially blacks. De facto segregation still existed, and children in those communities received 
inferior education. By 1955 Martin Luther King, Jr. led demonstrations to bring this 
inconsistency to greater public attention. 
 In the fall of 1955 Allen Ginsberg publicly read his poem HOWL, which portrayed 
America as repressed and warlike, but it offered a hope of redemption. The “beat generation” 
epitomized travel, smoking, jazz, and more relaxed sexual encounters. By the late 1950s, C. 
Wright Mills, “analyzed and condemned national power elites that consisted of interpenetrating 
military industrial, corporate hierarchical structures.” He rejected the popular notion that 
political power in America was “dispersed democratically,” and economists began stating that 
American diplomacy resorted to solving problems through military and other forms of conquest. 
Eric Fromm, “asserted that life in America was becoming a ‘joyless quest for joy.’”45 The 
improvisational sit-ins spread across the country, and new forms of political rebellion emerged. 
The Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) arose in 1960, which strove to help 
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develop black-led nonviolence movements and link other civil rights groups together in a 
network providing support and coordination.46 
 By 1962 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) wrote the Port Huron statement, a 
document that posited a vision for the “new left.” It depicted American society as undemocratic, 
militaristic, burdened by bureaucracy, and addicted to worship of material objects. The result 
was a populace of isolated and estranged individuals. SDS called for a society based on love and 
community, in which all were equally involved in decision-making processes.47 By 1964 this 
movement advocating for recognition that societal change was needed, if not already occurring, 
erupted on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley in the form of the Free Speech 
Movement (FSM). The initial cause of the demonstrations, sometimes drawing crowds as large 
as 7,000 people, and concomitant police amassment on campus, was the university’s 
announcement that it, and not the city of Berkeley, owned a strip of land at the entrance to 
campus. This land had been used for “off-campus” student political activity and viewed as a 
place where students could demonstrate and gather without interference.48 
 This announcement, and subsequent police intervention that prompted threats of 
violence, prompted protest meetings, rallies, silent vigils, and some violation of university rules. 
Emerging as a major spokesperson for FSM was Mario Savio, a Berkeley graduate student at the 
time. He portrayed the movement as reacting to “the greatest problem of our nation – 
depersonalized, unresponsive bureaucracy.” 49  He stated that campus officials, like all 
bureaucrats, operated under the notion that history and time had stopped – in the 1950’s 																																																								
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conviction of national prosperity, order, and unquestioned rule of authority. Savio argued that, 
“Someone may advocate radical change in all aspects of American society, and I am sure he can 
do this with impunity. But if someone advocates sit-ins to bring about change in discriminatory 
hiring practices, this cannot be permitted because it goes against the status quo of which the 
university is a part…an important minority…coming to the front today have shown that they 
will die rather than be standardized, replaceable, and irrelevant.”50 University students, in their 
departure from home and value-transmitting institutions, differentiation from their parents’ 
generations, and adaptation to new environments epitomized “radical” politics of the 1960s, as 
well as Mead’s concept of generation and possibilities for commitment while being emplaced.51 
Albert and Albert stress that it was the escalated military intervention in Vietnam that 
governed the direction of the protests of the 1960s. By the mid-1960s, America’s “patriotic 
apathy” gave way to idealism and dissent. The presidency of John F. Kennedy was a time of 
“rising expectations.” 52  In a few years, though, as more people became influenced by 
counterculture messages of “love and good vibes,” those in civil rights movements saw 
increasing fragmentation and disenchantment within their own ranks. The continued poverty 
and hopelessness of minority communities was fertile ground for voices like Malcolm X, who 
advocated taking political, cultural, and even military control over their own communities. The 
editors state that between 1964 and 1967 101 major riots occurred across the country, police 
made 28,932 arrests, Martin Luther King was murdered in 1968, and by the end of that year 
“racial upheavals led to a total of 208 deaths.”53 																																																								
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 The late 1960s also saw the emergence of the Black Panther Party, the student strike at 
Columbia University, a massive anti-war sit-in on the steps of the Pentagon in 1967, a worker 
uprising in France, and the election of Richard M. Nixon in 1968. He fueled this societal 
agitation by playing to voters’ fears of “disruptive radical activity,” which helped him push 
through wiretaps and break-ins into homes of even suspected “radicals.” By 1969 New York 
City witnessed riots against police harassment of homosexuals, and Chicago endured the 
indictment of the “Chicago 8,” organizers of the demonstrations during the Democratic 
National Convention. One result of this trial was to highlight growing discontent among other 
activists, especially women, who felt that the “Chicago 8,” all men, did not represent all struggles 
around the country. As well, many female activists claimed that the men on trial, and to a larger 
extent the men who still controlled the many activist movements, were not accountable to any 
constituency except themselves and continued the perpetuation of traditional gender roles.54 
Needless to say, Mead’s vision of the pioneer encountering uncharted territory could very well 
be applied to the culture out of which she was writing in 1969/70. 
 Mead questions those theorists who insist on making parallels between the past and 
present regarding the generation gap but who fail to see the irreversibility of changes that have 
occurred since the beginning of the industrial revolution. She stresses that we, and the condition 
persists to today, if not being more pronounced now than in 1970, live in a world in which 
events are presented to us in all of their complexity immediately; we no longer can rely on old 
distinctions, for example between war and peace, friend and foe, etc., for they have lost their 
meanings. Children, by and large, can no longer share in the responses their parents, and 
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especially their grandparents, had to events, or know how those generations lived firsthand.55  
What is more, she argues, the older generations are alienated too; this is not a conflict 
experienced solely by the younger generations. It is not only that the parents and grandparents 
are no longer guides, but rather, she states, that guides are no longer available in general. We lack 
a common language to describe this situation, for it is unprecedented. Therefore, she concludes 
that we must take the notion of the pioneer and apply it, in both time and space, to the future, 
among generations. Society needs a willingness to learn each others’ languages and to explore the 
premises of all generations, to engage in dialogue.56  Questions that others never thought to ask 
must be pursued, and we must recognize that “the future is now.”57 
 It is this new cultural form that presents possibilities for commitment. We can decide 
what it is we wish to commit to, and whatever the decision may be, it entails (ethical) action.  
Mead’s approach to generations does not specify what a generation is except to say that it 
includes elements of time, groups of people making commitments, and that it most likely will 
occur in some place. Her understanding of contemporaneity, stretching from 1970 to the 
present, places into question Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and ways of being in the world, but 
more pointedly, it highlights the fact that we exist in the limen; our new generation, which she 
argues includes all those here (i.e., grandpast, past, present, and future) is itself a liminal situation, 
existing within the threshold. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that there are no predetermined or preformed 
models for what comes next. Identity and action can continue elements of the past, but how that 
will look in the future, which must encompass all involved, is yet to be foreseen because it is 
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being constantly re-approached. This raises an issue with scholarship regarding ritual and the 
processes of action, which presupposes that there exist discrete units of identifiable 
performance: beginning, middle, and end, which can be completed. As Mead states: 
We must place the future, like the unborn child, in the womb of a woman, within 
a community of men, women, and children, among us, already here, already to be 
nourished and succored and protected, already in need of this for which if they 
are not prepared before it is born, it will be too late. So, as the young say, The 
Future is Now.58 
 
We see here that existing within the “middle,” the threshold is the new paradigm, with an 
unknown future, and less-than-distinct past. This mode of existing is distinctively An-skyian, not 
the static model dictated by Zborowski. 
Generation and the Self: Situating Difference within the Group 
 Likewise writing on the concept of generation, Pierre Nora begins by pointing out that 
even in France the Revolution was intrinsically generational; people saw it as an initiation and 
passage from one state of affairs to another, from the old to the new in which the old law no 
longer prevailed.59  Yet, the youthful aspect of its harbingers was not noticed, he states. When he 
turns his gaze to the worldwide events of the late 1960s, the same period in which Mead was 
reflecting on generation, he states that the generational symbolism was made explicit. The events 
of the 1960s constituted a “symbolic rupture,” in his view, in which horizontal identity (i.e., unity 
among contemporaries) triumphed over forms of vertical solidarity (i.e., heritage, lineage, 
tradition, etc.). He states: 
[…] what happened in ’68 was a symbolic rupture…A generation is a category of 
representative comprehension; it is a violent affirmation of horizontal identity 
that suddenly dominates and transcends all forms of vertical solidarity…The 
“youth movement” developed throughout the world, yet it had no crucial shared 
experience on which to find common ground, unless it was the experience of 																																																								
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having missed such traumatic engagements as the World War II resistance 
against fascism…it occurred at the peak of a period of rapid economic growth 
and in a time of full employment, as orthodox revolutionary ideologies were 
crumbling.60 
 
By questioning the concept of “generation,” Nora examines just what it was that held together 
the “Chicago 8” and their feminist detractors, who claimed that the men did not represent the 
struggles of all, despite their all being radical activists of the “counterculture,” for example. 
Despite his insistence on the concept of generation entailing the bringing of something 
new, not necessarily continued from the past but in some way connected to it, Nora maintains 
that the concept is full of contradictions and uncertainties. Some scholars have claimed that 
generation is solely a collection of age cohorts, a group of people whose sentiments and lifestyles 
are similar to one another’s, and whose physical, intellectual, and moral conditions have much in 
common. Others insist that generation is rather just a cohort, a group of people given in a 
certain year. As he posits: 
Most writers who use the notion have moved from a flexible, concrete, almost 
natural definition to a rigid mathematism, or vice versa. After World War I, for 
example, François Mentré saw a generation as embodying “a new way of feeling 
and understanding life, opposed to or at least different from what went before.” 
And until World War II…[generation was defined] as “united initially by shared 
hostilities and by having been subjected to the same influences between the ages 
of sixteen and twenty-five, if not earlier.” Yet neither writer had the slightest 
hesitation about drawing up endless, tedious tables demonstrating the march of 
generations from some arbitrarily chosen initial date…The generational concept 
would make a wonderfully precise instrument if only its precision didn’t make it 
impossible to apply to the unclassifiable disorder of reality…one is left with a 
situation in which some authorities confidently see a dozen literary generations 
from 1789 to the present where others see only five.61 
 
Regardless of delimitations to inclusivity in the concept, the problem that Nora uncovers is one 
of representativity. He concludes that generation is a concept that essentially is an individual 
phenomenon but that makes sense only when seen collectively. 																																																								
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As well, it makes sense only in terms of rupture and discontinuity; in this sense, it has a 
necessary connection to an idea of standing within a continuous tradition in some way. As Nora 
points out: 
[…] a generation is by its very nature a purely individual phenomenon that only 
makes sense when seen collectively. And…although the notion originated in a 
philosophical framework of continuity, it makes sense only in a framework of 
discontinuity and rupture…We are all conscious of belonging to several 
generations, to which we feel connected in varying degrees…What accounts for 
the special interest in this very distinctive type of periodization…is not the 
material and temporal determinism that it fatally entails but the dynamics of 
belonging that it authorizes.62 
 
To phrase it differently, Nora, as well as Mead, posit that the category of generation itself 
constitutes a threshold, itself a self-conscious chronotope that consistently needs to decide what 
to include in its community. 
 The issue of how this community of concern, to borrow from Heschel, represents itself 
of course is a concern uniting all groups, regardless of the issues about which its members are 
concerned. The fact that the concept at basis is individualized means that it becomes atomized 
and banal; in effect, as Nora points out, the concept of generation takes on many of the same 
characteristics as does the grid, as Masuzawa presented it, as discussed in Chapter Two. Because 
it is individual, it maintains its transgressive quality; old categories are done away with, and they 
are replaced by newly conceived identities. Generation is both a “simplified and complicated 
network of social allegiances,” but because of its plasticity and extensive permeation of society, 
the “void that it fills is now its content.”63  Due to its use by all people at all times to denote 
separation from something and creation of something new, albeit consciously distinct from 
others, it is a psychological category, a private and individual form of identity. 
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 Yet, Nora is quick to demonstrate that despite the seemingly individualized ties of 
allegiance that proliferate within society, and thus ability to be the ground of its own 
origination/generation, the concept of generation would be meaningless without a connection to 
that against which it differentiates itself.64  It is in this way that generation and grid depart from 
one another conceptually. Generation is not necessarily always a repetition, except that its 
existence itself is not new. For generation to exist it needs durable, constant elements. In this 
way, Nora argues, the category of children needs that of parents. Without the “investment of 
fathers in sons [sic], without a summons to complete the fathers’ work by killing them off,” he 
states, “it would be impossible to understand how a phenomenon that is in essence one of 
rupture and negation could also incorporate aspects of continuity and revival of tradition.”65 In 
this way, one difference between Judaism and Christianity can be seen as one generation (i.e., 
emergence of a community of concern) ending and another beginning. Judaism does not see an 
end to a generation, and Christianity sees itself as replacing and finishing an older generation. 
The latter needs the former, while the former continues in its way unhindered by the 
development of a “new” generation. Of course disputes inevitably arise regarding the often co-
constitutive aspects of each throughout their developments. 
 Nora maintains that another aspect of generation is its mixture of memory and history, 
the amounts of each shifting over time. Nora states, “A generation is not something that 
emerges spontaneously from the heat of action: it is an observation, a summing up, a self-
examination for the purpose of giving firsthand historical account. A generation is a product of 
memory, an effect of remembering. It cannot conceive of itself except in terms of difference and 
																																																								
64  Ibid., 516. 
 
65  Ibid., 518.	
	 173 
opposition.”66 As the concept progresses, however, especially more into the individual and 
atomized experience, one moves more into the realm of pure memory; in this guise, generation 
ignores and bypasses lapses in time, historical issues of cause and effect, and generations 
themselves become realms of memory that form the fabric of constructed identities. These sites 
become symbolically significant, and they “find expression” in public spaces, in which case they 
are individual collections of concerns, organized ex-post-facto, externalized, and then become 
available for personal re-appropriation.67 
 In this way, Nora argues, each individual becomes his or her own historian, and the 
expressed memories become increasingly separated from history and time itself. Yet, through its 
very creation and existence, generation converts memory into history; it institutionalizes and 
objectifies its inventions. This creation is a constant interplay and dialectic of memory and 
history, of a past that remains present, and of people who become witnesses to their own 
creations, and these witnesses are thus transformed into actors, and it is left to each generation 
to (re) write its own generational history.68 
In a Halbwachian (and thus Durkheimian) fashion, Nora explores the ways through 
which individuals, who coalesce around shared memories and sentiments, construct their own 
communities of concern, thus becoming a generation. It is to this experience that its members 
commit and propagate themselves into the future, all with a view of themselves as having broken 
with the confines of the past. The generation, then, exists within the threshold and is poised to 
confront the unknown together, recognizing that each member co-constitutes the very ideas of 
generation and tradition themselves (which the generation has become, once expressed in public 
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spaces). Before both Mead and Nora reflected on these ideas, An-sky heralded his idea of auto-
ethnography and “Oral Torah,” as the ways to enact Judaism and identity, concepts that he saw 
as always changing but nonetheless as durable (i.e., as possessing the characteristics of a 
generation). 
Out with the Old, in with the New?: Re-conceptualizing Identity through An-sky 
 Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern comments that many scholars have tried to portray An-sky as 
embodying the paradigm of return; he left Jewish shtetl life, integrated himself as best as possible 
into Russian culture, committed himself to socialism, came to see himself as a Jewish populist, 
through his encounter with secularized Yiddish life in Western Europe “reinvented” the Judaism 
into which he attempted to return, and at the end of his life understood Hasidism according to 
the image he had of the Jewish culture he left as a young adult.69  Other scholars take issue with 
this representation, asking whether or not An-sky actually returned, and answering in the 
negative, they present him rather as a new paradigm, that of “meshulah,” or messenger. 
According to this scheme, An-sky comes from another world and beckons us into a world that is 
difficult for us to understand. The messenger is a “go-between,” an intermediary between two 
worlds: that from which he was sent and to that which he was sent, and in the process transmits 
the two worlds into one another.70 
 In this way, An-sky himself embodies the threshold; he is a paradigmatic liminal figure, 
representing one who is “neither here nor there,” but rather is of and in both.71  An-sky 
prefigures Erving Goffman’s symbolic interactional presentation of self in everyday life, replete 																																																								
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with Goffman’s dramaturgical interpretation of action, and he certainly predates later scholars’ 
views of identity as being performed/enacted, not given and predetermined. In fact, An-sky 
adopted a stance toward ethnography that was based on a mixture of dramaturgy, participant-
observation, and espionage, and he would practice dressing like, speaking as, and acting like a 
traditionally observant Jew in order to gain access to his objects for his Expedition, for example. 
In the process, however, he often was perceived as an object by his objects, thus blurring the 
line between ethnographer and participant, subject and object; many participants believed that 
he was a spy for the Russian government. This is a sardonic twist given what we now know of 
the later “ethnographer” Zborowski, who in fact was an actual spy, and given the purposes of 
each. Zborowski created an idealized “Yiddishland” that was portrayed as a preindustrial 
backwater, which was disconnected from its surrounding environment – an image based 
primarily off texts and his own interjections; An-sky collected material in situ and demonstrated 
for both Jews and non-Jews alike the interconnected nature of both cultures with one another, 
and especially how ordinary, everyday folk co-constituted the traditions that they perceived to be 
immemorial.72 
 An-sky was a Jew, and an individual, ahead of his time. He was a Jew in a Russian milieu, 
but not entirely of it or the Russian people; also, when he was living abroad, he was not entirely 
of the assimilated world either, for he carried with him remnants and interests of Jewish life 
from Russia and of “his” folk (in this way betraying a Bourdieuian notion of habitus, gained early 
in life via unconscious means). He thus occupied a nowhere land, but he was not lost, according 
to Sylvie Anne Goldberg. He was paving his own path through his various constituent realms of 
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identity.73  This was, according to Goldberg, the formation of what became part of his cultural 
legacy: the search for different ways of being Jewish in a changing world.74 
Heeding the Call of the Messenger: An-sky’s Critique of Neo-Romanticism 
 Scholars have pointed out that many of the literary heroes of early twentieth-century 
literature express a desire to return to youth, to regain faith and honesty, and to avoid having to 
struggle with multiple identities in the modern world. Through a recreation of this romanticized 
past, oftentimes a past that was invented and later imagined, they would be able to confront and 
withstand temptations and meet challenges.75  Petrovsky-Shtern states, however, that it was 
Marcel Proust who demonstrated that this desire was impossible, that a return to a “paradise 
lost” was possible only through memory and imagination.76  Was return in ways beyond 
individual mental construction possible? Petrovsky-Shtern argues that the movement of neo-
Romanticism was based on a contradiction between the longings of its characters and the 
realities of life, and in this way, An-sky fit the mold but also offered a vision of a new paradigm. 
 An-sky drew inspiration from the Yiddish-language writer and poet I. L. Peretz, who 
presented a version of Hasidism full of neo-Romantic imagery. Through An-sky’s portrayal and 
imagination, however, this Hasidism embodied the epitome of folklore, ethics, and distinctively 
Jewish modes of thinking. It also was a new way of being Jewish in a changing world, even 
perhaps of a desired return to tradition (albeit with a recognition that it is always changing). Yet, 
An-sky’s depiction of Hasidism confronts the fact that its lived reality foretells return’s 
impossibility. The time is too late; Hasidism, especially as depicted in An-sky’s play “The 
Dybbuk,” has been corrupted both from without and within. 																																																								
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Regarding the former, Petrovsky-Shtern comments that the Russian political imagination 
portrayed Hasidim as engaged in ritual murder of Christian children, thus spurring denigration 
of the movement by journalists of the time. Regarding the latter, An-sky depicted Hasidism, the 
supposed bulwark of tradition, as being incapable of dealing successfully with either the material 
or spiritual demands of its community members. “The Dybbuk” takes place in a shtetl and tells 
the story of Leah, the daughter of a wealthy community member, and Khonon, a yeshivah 
student who has been drawn to kabbalistic (i.e., “mystical” and magical excursions, for our 
purposes) texts. 
Leah has been unsuccessful in finding a match for marriage because her father, Sender, 
believes no boy comes from a suitable enough family for his daughter. On a chance meeting in 
the synagogue, Leah and Khonon encounter each other, but nothing comes of the meeting 
beyond prolonged gazes. It soon becomes known that Sender found a match for Leah, and after 
learning of this news, Khonon reacts with dismay. He becomes socially detached and eventually 
dies while holding a book of incantations. Later we find out that he had been trying to forestall 
Leah’s engagement. Some time later, while on a walk with her childhood nurse, Leah discusses 
with her the fate of souls of people who died prematurely, such as her mother. Leah mentions 
that a soul has visited her in her dreams, and she expresses a desire to invite her departed 
mother’s soul to her wedding. Lead also starts to act in an unusual manner, and people fear that 
she has become possessed. 
Leah is taken to a learned leader, Reb Azriel. People tell him that they recognized in 
Leah the voice of the yeshivah student who died, Khonon. Reb Azriel questions Leah/Khonon 
and discovers the past history between Leah’s father and Khonon’s father. Many years ago they 
had made a pact that their children would be promised to each other, but over the years the 
promise was unfulfilled for various reasons. Sender even recognized Khonon when the student 
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visited the family for dinner, but Sender proceeded to look for a match among wealthier 
families. Reb Azriel begrudgingly accepts to help Leah. Yet, he questions his own abilities, 
saying:  
For forty years I have occupied the position of rebbe, yet to this very day I am 
still not sure that I can speak for God…there are times when I lose my 
confidence, when I am as small and weak as an infant…What do they want from 
me?...My soul thirsts for solitude.  Yet, they come to me with all their pains and 
sorrows, they appeal to me for help…I am no longer able to...77 
 
Even though Sender and Reb Azriel come to an agreement that Sender would apologize to 
Khonon’s soul, and even resolve to give money to the poor as a sort of penance for his wrong-
doing regarding the unfulfilled promise, the deceased (i.e., Khonon) does not consent. 
Furthermore, Leah wishes to remain with Khonon. Reb Azriel’s attempts to counteract 
Khonon’s incantations failed. His role as rebbe, and his attempts at recourse in his role as such, 
were inadequate to the task. 
 The following dialogue in An-sky’s conclusion to the play is telling of his insight into 
Jewish life of the early twentieth century: 
Leah: Who is here sighing so sadly? 
Khonon: It is I…I have forgotten. It is only through your thoughts that I can 
remember who I am. 
Leah: It is coming back to me now. My heart was drawn to a bright star. In the 
deep of the night I have shed sweet tears, and someone always appeared in my 
dreams. Was it you? 
Khonon: Yes. 
Leah: Return to me, my bridegroom, my husband. I will carry you in my heart, 
and in the still of the night you will come to me in my dreams and together we 
will rock our unborn babies to sleep. I am enveloped in a blaze of light. My 
bridegroom, my destined one, I am united with you for all eternity. Together we 
will soar higher and higher, even higher. 
Reb Azriel: We are too late.78 
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An-sky’s imagined Hasidism (perhaps Judaism or European culture writ large?) no longer 
offered a redeeming haven, and it was too late to reenact it. 
 Petrovsky-Shtern uses the term “dybbuk” metaphorically in the sense of obsessions or 
false impressions that take over a given situation; in a literal sense a dybbuk is “a possession of 
one’s mind and body by a transmigrating soul.”79  An-sky dealt with the theme of return in both 
his literary works, but also, as some scholars maintain, in his personal life. He attempted life in 
cosmopolitan France, but was unsatisfied with the socialist prevalence of random, superficial 
sexual encounters that produced no binding relations. He returned to Russia, met and married a 
“nice, Jewish girl,” who requested that he provide her with a “calm life, full of reason and 
peace.” In order to do this, he took up lecturing, and he soon discovered that his wife had been 
carrying on a relationship with another man, was unable to end it, and thus An-sky and his wife 
divorced – the dybbuk of unfulfilled marital life.80 
In this example, An-sky demonstrates that return is sought, but even once it is 
“achieved,” for whatever reason, it remains elusive and contingent, very similar to the experience 
of Isaac Kumer. This stands as a corrective to Ezrahi who maintained that Isaac’s death in the 
Land was redemptive and effected unification. The effected return for Isaac, much like An-sky’s 
ill-fated return to “normality,” was only nascent, still unformed, and thus was imaginary. Isaac, 
who is representative of so much more than solely an individual, and as epitomized by An-sky, is 
paradigmatic not of closure and achievement, but rather of potential and as-yet unrealized 
achievement; he is a warning to future seekers of return about the sort of life that is possible and 
how to approach life anew in the Land. Seeking and returning are a never-ending dialectic with 
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little substantiated resolution, at least if a traditional understanding of such categories and one-
to-one correlation persists. 
Creating the “Oral Torah”: Autonomy, Choice, and Commitment 
 David Roskies asserts that An-sky’s “youthful rebellion” produced no happy ending; the 
generational divide between parents and children left only “corpses, no victor.”81  An-sky carried 
with him a sense of forbidding doom regarding Jewish culture, a cultural crisis that was 
heightened by the state of the Jews at the time; in a more general sense, however, An-sky 
represents the notion of generation as understood by both Mead and Nora, and which we can 
see as operative of the threshold, the limen. As a way to confront his own anticipation of 
catastrophe regarding Judaism, An-sky crossed borders and mixed “otherwise incompatible 
identities.” Steven Zipperstein quotes Roskies as saying that An-sky, who was the “hero of the 
modern age, was a born-again Jew in a Judaism of his own making.”82 He (re-) approached 
Hasidism, which to others, ironically, was the epitome of unchanging Jewish life, but did so as a 
messenger. He used its entrenched status to highlight that Jewish lift has changed, but is 
continuous with its past and still has much to offer in terms of identity construction, if only its 
messages could be conveyed and utilized along with those of other worlds. 
 We have seen how An-sky conceived of the Oral Torah, and Goldberg adds to this by 
saying that An-sky saw himself as a sort of rabbi in the sense of being someone who acted as an 
intercessor between two worlds, much like Reb Azriel, though competent and effective. In order 
to connect the world in which people live with the supernatural world, he had to transcend the 
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boundaries of knowledge.83  He was a true messenger, and this act of performing the Oral Torah 
created dialogue not only between the objects of his ethnography and himself, but also between 
generations, the biblical figures, rabbinical figures, and the lives of everyday Jews. Through his 
literary creations, as well as his socio-political organizations, he transcended time and generations 
and opened up possibilities to what people could commit in the here-and-now. 
 Upon his completion of his ethnographic expedition, An-sky helped to create an 
organization that would house the artifacts that he collected: musical, literary, oral, etc. This 
organization, located in Vilna, was, according to An-sky’s insistence, headed by a nonpartisan 
board, which included Zionists, those coming from the Yiddishist Left, Bundist leaders, and 
traditional segments of Vilna Jewry. Accordingly, the Vila organization collected Jewish history, 
folklore, music, art, literature, housed a library, archive, museum, and included manuscripts of I. 
L. Peretz, the Vilna Goan (the representative of rabbinic culture, much opposed to the more 
mystical Hasidim, but still open somewhat to secular learning), and Shneur Zalman of Liadi (a 
representative of Hasidism).84  As head of this organization, An-sky maintained openness to all 
manifestations of Judaism, a stance that was unprecedented for his time, and even today. He 
strove for inclusiveness, which highlights just how marginal his viewpoint was, and continues to 
be. 
 The rootedness of the organization in Vilna in part allowed for An-sky’s inclusiveness to 
be realized. The city had for many years been recognized as a center of Jewish intellectual 
activity, its history demonstrated that openness to rabbinic culture and Haskalah was possible, it 
was a multiethnic border region that precluded the adoption of an overarching, dominant non-
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Jewish culture, and Yiddish was preserved among all social classes.85  This situatedness, then, is a 
living testament to the idea of “re-diasporization” for which Benjamin, Tweed, and Heschel 
advocated, as cultivated through the various chronotopes presented in Vilna of the early 
twentieth century. It is through being situated, and conscientiously so, that An-sky was able to 
appreciate the complexity of Jewish life in all of its manifestations, and to present it to the wider 
environment, both Jewish and non-Jewish, through time. 
 Jack Kugelmass connects An-sky’s program and methods to a more contemporary 
example of ethnography, Barbara Myerhoff’s Number Our Days. Both utilize the idea of return, 
the concern for salvage, and the transmission of culture through dramaturgical techniques that 
thus blur the lines between social science and fiction.86  While An-sky was more explicit in his 
motivation to preserve Jewish culture before it was destroyed, a crisis that he believed was 
imminent even in the 1910s, and Myerhoff tried to couch her desire for studying Jews in the 
universal language of anthropology, both turned to ethnography, Kugelmass argues, not so 
much to save their Jewish subjects, but rather to save themselves. In the process, Kugelmass 
continues, they found a creative outlet for their own understandings of identity.87  Even though 
separated by many decades and milieus, the sense of crisis/catastrophe persists, and this speaks 
not only to the necessity and (im) possibility of situating oneself in both cultures, but also of the 
perpetual states of being diasporic. The effort may be to fit comfortably into both, but as seen, 
that situation exists only in the creation and imagination of the artist/anthropologist and those 
who create works, and thus identities, which transcend time and space. This never-realized, 
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although constantly struggled for, position of “messenger” is the perennial condition of 
diaspora. 
Reflections from the Land: Case Study, Israel 
 Through exploring what constitutes categories such as generation and commitment (i.e., 
publicly enacted identity as a group), we have seen that this raises questions about the legitimacy, 
and effectiveness, of previous allegiances. If what has become taken-for-granted (especially the 
presumably apparent concept of group membership) in fact is so variable and transitory, we 
must ask ourselves, as did Mead, what continues to ground and orient action. This is especially 
important for us once a group has (re-) established emplacement. This emplacement, it must be 
remembered, could be physical (i.e., travel to and settlement in a new location), or temporal (i.e., 
Mead’s prefigurational pioneer model configured for unsettling feelings of tranquility within a 
location, among different groups), or both. It is this question that scholars and voices of social 
critique in Israel have been asking since the state’s founding, if not earlier, and these concerns 
are reflected in Agnon’s writings, which we used to frame these discussions in the preceding 
chapter. Agnon, as well as more contemporary authors in Israel, articulate these concerns for 
Jews, and Israeli society more particularly, but do not quite provide recourse, except to say that 
the answers entail open-ended potential for inclusivity (à la An-sky). Mere physical return is only 
a partial response, and our current situation is still too enmeshed in the relatively recent 
upheavals to offer adequate feedback. 
 To gain a better appreciation for how the questions of home, return, generation, and 
commitment operate once one has returned “home,” we will place into dialogue with one 
another five contemporary Israeli authors and selections from their works. Articulating the 
generational divide, and highlighting its very real implications regarding existential threats, both 
in perception and matter of fact, are Eliezer Schweid in The Land of Israel: National Home or Land 
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of Destiny and Amos Elon in The Israelis: Founders and Sons.  Bringing in the interplay between the 
idea of generations, commitment, and snapshots into religious life in the Land, as well as 
questioning whether or not it is possible to compare various narratives about these issues, is 
Amos Oz in In the Land of Israel. Extending the discussion to include more voices of those who 
identify as Palestinians, and demonstrating many of the similarities between the Palestinians and 
Israelis regarding ways of identifying, and bringing to bear on the conversation the costs of 
acting, or not acting, is David Grossman in The Yellow Wind. Rounding out this quick snapshot 
of life in the Land is the most contemporary text. In My Promised Land: The Triumph and Tragedy of 
Israel, Ari Shavit makes the case that Zionism, and the creation of the State, is an orphan’s 
movement and ends his assessment of life there with a cautionary tale that we have spent two 
chapters detailing: Yet again we (Jews and the world) are perched on a precipice, and this is a call 
for ethical action. 
Reality, Idealism, Impasse: Understanding Post- and Co-figurative Cultures in the Land 
 In his writings on Jewish thought regarding the Land of Israel, Schweid traces two 
distinct lines of reasoning about the particular location: holy land and earthly homeland (national 
heritage). These two conceptions are found in the Hebrew texts themselves. He states that the 
Land of Israel is presented as a promised land, and Israeli settlement there necessitates moral 
behavior. The people will achieve worthiness only there, and as a result of eventual attainment of 
that goal, along with concomitant settlement, God will dwell in its midst. Yet, the location is also 
promised as a national homeland, the physical site in which the people will establish economic 
and state power. The Land symbolizes both Israelite emplacement with corresponding socio-
political activities as well as a promise of universal morality.88 
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 Throughout his writings on this topic, he spends time detailing the explicitly theological 
conception of why this particular land is special and the implications that uniqueness poses for 
its would-be suitors, especially for the Israelites. The texts understand the land as being unlike its 
surrounding environs. While the neighboring lands “drink river water,” which presupposes 
control of territory and mastery of land, “Israel drinks rainwater,” a designation entailing divine 
providence (rainfall) and therefore dependence on God, which is demonstrated through 
enactment of justice and morality. Also, the Land is a middle land, between great powers (Egypt 
and Babylonia). The temptation to partake in warfare and self-aggrandizement is great in this 
location, but “the only way to live in the land peacefully and to bring a vision of peace to the 
world is by refraining from…pagan power struggles and by living a life of justice…in accordance 
with the Torah.”89 He proceeds to explain the reasons given for why Jews became exiled (e.g., 
punishment for sins, for failure to live up to the divine dictates), and explains that some Jews 
even voluntarily remained outside the Land. 
 The later sages, therefore, needed to create the possibility for Judaism and Jews to exist 
elsewhere (thus the rituals devoted to maintaining the Land in their collective 
imaginings/longings). Yet, this idealization of the Land “culminated in its absolute 
spiritualization,” he argues. Overtime, divergent attitudes developed toward memories and 
mythologization of the Land. One, exemplified by Judah Halevi, understood the Land as the 
point of contact between heaven and earth, the spiritual and material. It possessed its own 
sanctity and only in the land can the people achieve its destiny.90 The other, exemplified by 
Maimonides, posited that the Land is like other lands but achieves sanctification through 
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commandments, that is, through the enactment of politico-legal actions.91 This significance of 
the land is attested to through time by historical events that occurred there. 
 In the modern period many Jews continued the spiritualized view of the land and ceased 
to view exile as temporary, he states. Their current locations, which may have undergone 
emancipation, were seen as new, permanent, abodes. Yet, this condition proved untenable. Since 
the formation of the political State of Israel, however, these varying views regarding the land 
have not abated. In fact, since the actual re-emplacement of Jews in that land, tensions over the 
conceptions have reached explosive levels; adding to the litany of views are now those of Jews 
having been born post-emplacement. Schweid explains that since 1967, youth in the country 
have been unable to articulate their right to live there; the younger generation is unable to 
identify with the community of their “people” in the Land. 
As a result of being raised as individualists, following such a trend worldwide, the Land 
holds a particular place for them emotionally and with regard to family sentiment, but inwardly 
they are opposed to the communities who recreated significant Jewish presence in it. They yearn 
to flee and do not understand the ties that bind them to the Land, and the communities there. 
He states: 
Insofar as we approach it with a view to the native-born generation’s 
consciousness of the quality of its attachment, we find that its relationship to its 
homeland is weak and easily undermined…We must find a more direct 
expression of this failing…we need look no further than the stormy debates “our 
right to the Land of Israel” which broke out after the Six-Day War [1967] and 
have raged ever since…Native-born young people bear the main burden of 
defending the country…among the most willing to make such sacrifices are quite 
a few of those who are the most troubled and confused by this issue…The most 
outstanding feature of this main character is their inability to identify with the 
community of their people in the land, even though they act in its name and at its 
command…while they may not rebel openly against the community, they 
live…in continual opposition to it…they do not understand the tie that binds 
their community – their people – to the land…we find…internal brooding and 																																																								
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dialogue expressing…alienation from their parents’ nationalistic aspirations and 
endeavors on behalf of the Zionist cause.92 
 
Schweid highlights the central issue of the chapter: generational divide and intra-communal 
alienation in a group that has become emplaced. This emplacement, as seen, is itself multivalent. 
The humanist causes they have been taught to embody and help to realize find a foil in the 
nationalistic aspirations of those who taught them such ideals. 
Schweid contrasts the youths who became the elders of the generation under study, who 
never saw the Land until much later in life, who did not grow up there, but who internalized its 
idealized forms, images, and who were able to express a right to live there, with their children. 
The children, the ones who harbor internal brooding and confusion about their right to be there, 
were born there, grew up there, and were reared, supposedly, with its ideals and aspirations.93 
They also are at a loss to explain its history and perceived struggles. This divide he attributes to 
the continuity of generations, ironically. As Schweid explains this paradox: 
[…] the young people born in the land became estranged from their parents 
precisely because they accepted in good faith the educational message which 
their parents had transmitted to them…the alienation of the youth is a product 
of an educational success story. The children’ fulfillment of their parents’ dream 
removed them from the historical and cultural continuity within which their 
parents had lived…What had sustained the dream? The children had not 
experienced these things. They had experienced only their parents’ devotion to 
the visible land…but what was that significance?94 
 
Yet, until only recently, most Jews had not been able to share even this “success story;” most 
Jews continued to be born outside of the Land and formed an identification with the people not 
by growing up there, but by incorporating into their outlook something handed down to them, 
as had the older generations that reformed the Land. 																																																								
92  Eliezer Schweid, The Land of Israel: National Home or Land of Destiny, trans. Deborah Greniman 
(Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985), 206-07. 
 
93  Ibid., 210. 
 
94  Ibid.	
	 188 
There is a divide in how Jewish identity has been created, Schweid maintains. Different 
segments take different messages from different aspects of Judaism’s varied connection to the 
Land, from the biblical tradition to the present. He argues that there must be a return, or an 
attempt to return, which will include in its purview more aspects of the varied tradition than 
previous generations achieved in their partial returns. Jews, he says, must revive and fulfill the 
dual ideal of scripture – that the Land is both a national homeland and a land of destiny, both 
political and supernatural. He asserts: 
The proper image of the homeland cannot be formulated through learning alone. 
It takes its shape from the people’s way of life, and from the whole cultural 
pattern that is gradually worked together in the land…The founders had 
concealed the positive wellsprings of Zionism that lay within the Jewish heritage 
because of their rebellion against the exile, which demanded that they transform 
the image of the land that had crystallized over the centuries…A return to that 
image that can be gathered from the sources will oblige us to reorient ourselves 
in this respect. While this does not necessarily mean a total affirmation of the 
vision that guided the exile, it does require an affirmation of the “religious” motif 
that stems from the biblical concept of the promised land…Our path has led us 
from the biblical vision of a homeland which was at the same time the people’s 
land of destiny to the exilic dream of a land of destiny which was not then a 
homeland, and thence to the Zionist vision of a homeland which is no land of 
destiny.95 
 
Zionism, for Schweid, represents a partial success story. It resuscitated the visible land but lost 
the significance of it beyond the political mandates of the period, due to the rebelliousness of 
one concept of generation and vision. The youth/present is alienated and still in exile, from its 
heritage, because the elders struggled to end (political) exile and to provide their children with a 
life free of exile. In effect, Schweid’s is a contemporary call for continual/continuous diaspora, 
of re-diasporization, for it is only from a distance, conscientiously created, that one can disallow 
a sense of settling, falling into blind comfort, and adequately engage the tensions inherent in 
creating an identity that is inclusive of difference/creative, not predetermined. This entails an 
incorporation of both visions, not a hybrid of them. Whether this integrated existence is possible 																																																								
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remains to be seen. After all, integration for Schweid is intra-religious/communal. Beyond that, 
it remains to be seen whether or not competing national claims (intergroup identities) can 
achieve parity. 
Lest this be misinterpreted as a call for religious nationalism, we must gain insight into 
how he has understood Jewish connections to this space over time. Beginning with the biblical 
view, Schweid states that scripture is a series of covenants, which must be ever renewed between 
the people and God. There is no simple unity even in this view, for within this scripture are 
contrasting calls for human existence. The two dominant views are the priestly and the 
prophetic. The former stresses the motif of Temple life and the site of God’s indwelling, while 
the latter places emphasis on humans’ ethics and developed social conscience. The prophets 
sanctified behavior and morality, not ritual. The Land itself, in this view, becomes an enlarged 
sanctuary through the actions of the people living there. The holiness of the Land comes from 
the divine, but in conjunction with the will of the people who live there, in obedience to Torah.96  
In this way, Schweid introduces the notion of contingency. It would be a mistake to view only 
physical emplacement in the Land as constituting “redemption” and completion. The covenant, 
in that limited way, is still left unfulfilled. Action, and correct action, is a necessary correlate to 
emplacement; the latter is not completed without the former. 
Because the Land’s character becomes symbolic in this sense, as a place of destiny and 
that is the place that cultivates behavior allowing continued presence in it, this notion shapes the 
image of the Land as it is passed on throughout history and in memory. He states that historical 
memory is more than just a recollection of past events. Rather, it is a “continual tension” of 
anticipation toward an imagined future, and each generation contributes to it; it never is 
finalized. This image, then, reflects more a vision of the future than of the past, except as the 																																																								
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past that allows for its continuation into the future.97  Later scholars, then, would interpret verses 
in scripture dealing with the Land not by looking at the Land as it existed, then, but by looking 
solely at scripture; the text “remind[ed] people of what they were liable to forget.”98  People saw 
not ruin and religio-political destruction, but anticipated completion, albeit always in the future. 
This imagined locale was their homeland. 
The fact that both Christianity and Islam viewed the (same) Land as significant served to 
reinforce Jewish conceptions as such, he argues. The Land’s symbols, as Schweid points out, 
transcended mere geography, and any conflicts focused around places there only emphasized 
their “objective, universal validity.”99  In this way, the image of the Land that was inculcated to 
youth was buttressed by both religious imagination and socio-political circumstance; both served 
as constant reminders of some past and in the present of a projected future. 
Once Jews began settling in large numbers in the Land, they confronted a land that was 
unknown to them, as depicted in Agnon’s religious pilgrims as well as Isaac Kumer; what was 
imagined as familiar in fact was foreign to them, and for years afterwards many still felt lost, 
homeless while being home.100  Exacerbating this feeling was the fact that the Jews many of 
these nationalistic pioneers encountered reminded them of the “exilic existence” of religious 
Jews outside the Land; the earlier religious pilgrims had transplanted shtetl life to the imagined 
homeland, producing the paradox for other Jews of feeling increasingly separated and distanced 
from the “holy of holies” the closer they approached it physically.101 
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What this produced was a group of people who needed to break away from physical 
diaspora and familiarize themselves with life anew in the Land, not being content with the 
spiritual, economic, and political circumstance as they encountered it. They needed to break 
away from that form of diaspora while being physically emplaced.102  In other words, they 
needed, to paraphrase the condition that Shlomo Avineri used to describe the current state of 
Zionism, a constant, “permanent revolution” as the means to break from the status quo. It is in 
this way that Schweid’s analysis allows us to reconsider the biblical narrative of conquest. While 
the portrayal of Israelites and their supposed actions does not accord with historical and 
archaeological records, it fits our contemporary vision of created, produced, and performed 
identity. The biblical narrative prefigures later theorists’ calls for approaching anew that which is 
before you, in emplacement. One must reconfigure one’s own identity in order to highlight the 
decision for proper action, and this reconfiguration (as is clearly depicted with the image of 
“conquering”) is presented in terms reflecting what is morally acceptable at the time, however 
valid the underlying notion is for all times. 
In his book devoted specifically to the theme of generation (his book is aptly subtitled 
“Fathers and Sons”), Elon, a former correspondent for the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, later 
fellow at the Center for Law and Security at the New York University School of Law, and 
author, explored the development and transformation of Israeli society from the founding 
groups of early religious Jews and later Zionist settlers to a more unified, actual state with 
societal cleavages and gaps. This exploration, however, was not just an exercise in abstract, 
constructed concepts of societal change, interspersed with narratological perceptions. Rather, it 
was a serious study into what a previously well-known public intellectual and member of the pre-
state founding generation considered to be the sources of his disillusionment with his beloved 																																																								
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country; in a way, this book served as the pretext to his eventual settlement outside of Israel, to a 
family residence in Italy. The move signaled Elon’s sense of his own alienation from a society in 
which he used to figure prominently as social critic and cultural icon, but to which he felt he no 
longer belonged. 
In an interview by Ari Shavit in the relatively new, and unabashedly “left-wing,” 
magazine CounterPunch, Elon notes that his decision to leave Israel derived from despair, from a 
growing sense that he had said his piece, repeatedly, but to no avail. As Shavit characterizes it, 
“Amos Elon expresses the deep aversion to the new Israel. The nationalistic, religious, un-
European Israel. This is apparently the reason why Amos Elon is leaving us. He is turning back 
the clock, going back to being a European Jew.”103  Yet, Elon states that he is not alienated, 
rather disappointed. He relates: 
I have no common language with the people who are at the top in politics…And 
maybe there is alienation because I don’t know them anymore. I’m not involved 
with them…And maybe there is alienation because of the sharp rightward shift 
in Israel. Toward the right and toward religion…In Israel there’s the “Gush 
Dan” state and the political state. The “Gush Dan” state is a state of live-and-let-
live. Of tolerance. Of the desire for peace and a good life. But the political state, 
well, you know what it looks like…Quasi-fascist in the sense that abstract 
principles of religion are dictating our fate without any democratic process.104 
 
This critique of his former home is decidedly one-sided; in the interview he focuses his attention 
on only (Jewish) Israel and its actions, ignoring the context of emplacement, which he 
acknowledged elsewhere. 
 In previous writings Elon wielded his critical insight not just at the Israeli government 
and society but also at the state of affairs in which response and counter-response occurred. In 
his 1968 review of two books that dealt with the Six-Day War, for example, Elon explicitly states 
that “the origins of the third Arab-Israeli War are likely to be again obscured by events…the 																																																								
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rapidity and seeming ease of Israel’s victory overshadowed the pre-history of the war, its origins 
in the tactics of power, and the disastrous interplay between mass psychology and leadership. 
Now, a year later, the picture is further blurred by current preoccupations…”105 Elon wrote only 
months after the seminal war ended in 1967, in which Israel responded to and fought against the 
threats, political and military maneuverings (based off of faulty reports concerning Israel), and 
manipulation of four neighboring Arab countries (buttressed by the Soviet Union). As a result, 
Israel’s territory expanded, as did Arab anti-Israel hostilities. In such a fresh environment, Elon 
could still recount the “origins” of the war to the public, and proffer hopeful warnings regarding 
the future and desired courses of action all could take. 
 Elon recounts how Egypt’s Nasser was forced to respond to faulty Soviet reports of 
Israeli troops amassing at the Syrian border. Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to Israel, thus 
blockading any movement in the southern Israeli port of Eilat. While in 1957 Israel warned that 
any re-closing of the Straits would constitute a cause for war, in 1967 Israel’s immediate 
response to this mobilization was to seek help elsewhere; Israel’s Foreign Minister sought help in 
Paris, London, and Washington, but to no avail. As a result, Israel did not yet actually mobilize 
its own troops, and to Egypt, this appeared as an Israeli bluff, that it was ill prepared to act on 
previous warnings. Accordingly, Egypt amassed its troops in the Sinai, and now Israel was 
isolated in the south and had to confront a growing existential danger in the southwest – the 
border with Egypt. Compounding this military pressure was Arab media prodding. Nasser 
remarked that “Israel’s existence is itself an aggression,” and the head of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization in Jordanian Jerusalem stated that those Israelis who survive an Arab onslaught 
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can remain in Palestine, but he did not believe any Israelis would survive.106 Israel felt that no 
international aid would arrive, and unless Israel took action, no one would. 
 From this point on, in his review, Elon delves into a deeper contextualization of the 
situation, going back to much earlier Arab-Jewish/Israeli confrontations, in order to posit a way 
forward after the end of the Six-Day War. He states: 
Had they [the Arabs] agreed in 1919, not to turn Palestine into “the” Jewish 
homeland, but to incorporate “a” national home for the Jews, as stipulated in the 
Balfour Declaration, a Jewish minority would in time have been absorbed into an 
Arab-Palestinian state. Had the Arabs not rejected British proposals for a 
Palestine Legislative Council a few years later, the Jews would have at best 
emerged a minority within the general Arab framework…If, in 1937, they had 
agreed to the Peel Commission report which proposed partition…they would 
probably have swallowed the autonomous Jewish area within a generation. If 
they had accepted the Woodhead Commission proposal of 1938 for an even 
smaller Jewish autonomy; or the White Paper of 1939; or the plans of 1946 to 
admit no more than a final 100,000 Jewish immigrants; or the United Nations 
partition plan of 1947; or the armistice lines of 1949; or even the status quo of 
1966…If, if, if. On the other hand, had Israel after 1949 been more sensitive to 
the fate of the Palestinian refugees – had it permitted more to come back or 
compensated the rest…rather than allow the neighboring states to exploit the 
problem for political ends – perhaps some of the intense hatred of Israel…would 
slowly have abated. Instead, hatred and fear fed upon each other.107 
 
Since 1968 many archives have opened and documents become declassified, which allows for 
even more context to be included in reflections on and histories to be written about any number 
of conflicts, but the “ifs” also continue to grow. 
 In the final paragraphs of his review, Elon reflects on both Israeli and Arab societies and 
notes some lessons of the war. He is insistent that weapons alone are not enough for victory. He 
argues that, “they do not function independent of the conditions of society.” Groups, in order 
to be successful as societies, need “alertness, efficiency, individual dedication, and courage to 
grow out of a shared sense of social purpose. This seemed missing in Nasser’s army…What 
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failed was less the army than the societal structure of Egypt.”108 Even the possibility of guerilla 
warfare, he states, depends on a shared sense of social purpose. As well, Israeli society, even 
already by 1968 – twenty years since the founding of the political state – was beset by cleavages. 
Elon attests: 
Few people in Israel now recall the solemn statements of Eshkol and Dayan in 
June 1967, that Israel did not seek territorial gain…Most Israelis, according to a 
public opinion poll, have been…willing to exchange territory for peace. The 
chances for settlement [for peace] seem to have grown dimmer in recent months 
as Israel’s minimum terms appear to have grown and as Egypt’s shattered army 
arsenal has been replenished by the Soviet Union. Threats of annihilation and 
“liberation” resound again from Radio Cairo, and recently from Nasser’s own 
lips. Short of a miracle, there is little reason to expect Israel to take the risk and 
withdraw [from the territory it acquired as a result of the war] without the water-
tight guarantees which nobody is prepared to give.109 
 
How little has changed in almost forty years, except increasing religious control in increasingly 
right-wing-led coalitions, on all sides. Elon presented the “origins” of the war, as well as the 
origins for his eventual disillusionment with Israel. 
In his book The Israelis, Elon takes a closer look at Israeli society and offers reflections in 
retrospect. While Amos Elon does not speak of a permanent revolution, he articulates, 
nonetheless, similar sentiments that are included in its call. For those Israelis who have grown up 
in the Land, he states, many have taken its existence for granted. For those individuals, 
continued invocations of “Zionist ideals” and “national renaissance” sound like abstract 
“blather.”110  Yet, going back just one generation (chronologically speaking) from the “sons” to 
the lives of the “founders,” what has taken on the guise of common, abstract blather is redefined 
as existential struggles. While history, he notes, is a “seamless web” of arbitrary starting points, 
and the foundational texts of Judaism have posited an always remembered and longed-for 																																																								
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ancestral homeland in a particular place, it is difficult to pinpoint any exact moment of diaspora’s 
origination. Palestine was never without inhabitants who identified as Israelite, since the “origin” 
of Israelites, and the continued sense of wishing to remain/return to there (i.e., Zionism) is “as 
old as diaspora,” notes Elon.111 
Yet, he also notes that Zionism was a product of a new age of (European) nationalism, 
as was Arab nationalism. The conditions that brought Jews back to the Land were a 
combination, then, of this continual remembering and longing, in addition to external impetus. 
The clash between Jews and other inhabitants of the Land, was not one between “natives” and 
“colonialists,” then, but between two nationalist movements. 112  The impetus for modern 
Zionism, while containing religious ideas, was the failure of European states to enact 
emancipation and democracy, while a major impetus for Palestinian nationalism was also a 
dismissal of Jewish existence. It was only later when Nazism forced Zionism to become a 
“straightforward rescue operation” that clashed with British immigration policies (to Mandate 
Palestine) that emphases changed from “social to national issues.”113 
As Schweid noted, and as Elon reiterates, the different waves of Jews to the Land had 
different motivations spurring their action. Some lived with the Arabs, while others protested 
the Jewish exploitation of Arab labor, thus creating new, independent institutions from those of 
the earlier Jewish inhabitants. Some, like the man Isaac Kumer encountered on the ship, and 
those who Schweid states understood locality as “promised land,” went to pray. Others, arriving 
in the 1880s, were, as Elon claims: 
[…] Colonists. Yet, by temperament, motivation, circumstance, and choice they 
differed sharply from other emigrants of this period who colonized Australia, 																																																								
111  Ibid., 38. 
 
112  Ibid., 27. 
 
113  Ibid., 39. 
	 197 
Africa, Canada, or the United States. They were not in search of fertile land, 
gold, unlimited opportunity, or…a fast-expanding economy. Nor were they sent 
by chartered companies or governments anxious to rid themselves of surplus 
populations, expand the territories under their control, or make a flag follow the 
trade. This was colonizing without a motherland…Properly speaking they were 
immigrants…echoing the American “pilgrim,” they referred to themselves as 
olim, a near-mystical term supercharged with emotion, primeval faith, and historic 
associations…Those olim who went into agricultural work were called “chalutzim,” 
literally, “vanguard,” but in the current Hebrew usage…pioneer…service to an 
abstract idea.114 
 
Others, arriving between 1903 and 1905, were motivated by similarly abstract notions of 
socialism and revolutionary ideology, who supposedly were prepared to work in agriculture; they 
resented the relative “luxuriousness” of the earlier settlers. 
Elon notes that to be a Zionist meant different things to different people. Many early 
Zionists in the Land were, like Isaac Kumer, orphaned many times over. Some moved to the 
Land out of estrangement from parents in Europe, out of disillusionment with movements in 
their previous homelands, etc. That the rebels in one location became the vanguard in another 
manifested itself, generally speaking, in a leniency toward their own children. Those children 
born in the Land, to the founders, could “do no wrong.” It is the third generation, those born to 
the “sons” who were raised with more toughness. Their parents, the first-generation of Israelis, 
had less feelings of guilt and were tougher on their children115 – a typical generational immigrant 
progression, according to Mead. The rebels of the earlier age became for their children, and 
especially their grandchildren, the establishment, leaders of the rigid and conservative leadership. 
Other waves of immigrants/refugees arrived, the third wave from 1919-1924, the fourth 
from 1924-1929, the fifth from 1930-1939, and then again in the late 1940s from Arab countries, 
the Jewish “equivalent” to what became Palestinian refugees. What these generations, the 
“sons,” dealt with upon arrival and subsequent years of giving birth there, was an indefinite 																																																								
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prolongation of war, not just sporadic uprisings against their continued, albeit increasing, 
presence. As Elon attests: 
Let us observe the solitary kibbutznik [a member of a kibbutz, an agricultural 
settlement based on socialist principles] of Yad Mordechai from the vantage 
point of the narrow sand dune which divides him from the former co-occupants 
of the territory…It reveals the crushing force of circumstance…The 
kibbutznik…was swept to these shores by the storms and disasters of Europe. 
The Arab villager was hopelessly, and as tragically, crushed by forces far beyond 
his control. When Weizmann told the Council of Ten at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 that Palestine should be as Jewish as England is English, he 
added that the Zionists would not go into Palestine “like Prussian Junkers”; nor 
would they drive out other people. Weizmann was utterly sincere; and least until 
1947 when they were attacked, the Zionists too lived up to Weizmann’s solemn 
promise. The kibbutznik…originally bought land for himself and settled on 
it…He, too, was moved by circumstance not of his own making. The detached 
outsider might accuse him today of callousness. Such an accusation would ignore 
the true sequence of events – the Arab invasion of 1948, their refusal to make 
peace, the indefinite prolongation of war. In every war, superb idealism touches 
total selfishness…there is never a totally new page. History is always inscribed on 
the old, as on a palimpsest. The conflict was political and psychological, not 
economic.116 
 
After 1948, and because then of the memory of the Shoah, Arab threats of annihilation, which 
seemed plausible in that context, aroused cultural responses in the generations. This 
combination, Schweid and Elon point out, makes it increasingly difficult to live with the dual 
ideas that Schweid discussed, which aim for the creation of wholeness. 
After 1967, though, the “burden of war” was no longer confined to the borders of the 
country, but rather struck the interior. This state of affairs, however, caused in the sons further 
disillusionment with the founding ideals and leaders, who were still in control of the institutions.  
Elon speaks of “grandfather Israel” and the younger generations. The former is seen as the 
image of the wandering, persecuted Jew who came “home,” to the imagined, albeit having-to-be 
built, reality of the Land. This image was steeped in a relatively spiritually stable past, but headed 
toward an uncertain future. The latter is a continued response to the first. The “sabra,” the 																																																								
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Israeli born in the Land, is often ignorant of the (spiritual and historical) past, often indifferent 
to it, and necessarily living in every moment of the present.117  Elon states that this group exists 
in the gap between the past and the future, and it is challenged by both. 
This gap, then, is the interstitial place between “origin(s)” and contemporaneity – the 
middle path, to use Gilroy’s and Bhabha’s terminology, where identity develops. Even if the 
“poles” are imagined, they are not imaginary, and in fact they are the most real in terms of both 
points of reference in self-fashioned identity, but also in externalized effects and repercussions. 
The pole of the past is both tradition and religio-socio-political reality, while that of the future is 
uncertain, but inevitable, and as Mead attests, already upon us. This gap is the liminal space of 
potentiality, and as Elon related to Shavit, that potentiality is slipping further away in his view. 
Elon notes that each generation treats the other with condescending admiration. The older is 
forbidding, who offers lessons of the past, which is couched in terms of dogmatic heroism and 
selective uses of the past, while the young is less touched by historical considerations, 
acknowledges the daring of the past but cannot see their logic following through to 
conclusions.118  In this gap, Elon argues that moral vertigo grows. Yet, this is a growing pain. 
Following An-sky’s paradigm, there is a need to live in both, if for the fact that a hybrid 
is nonexistent, if not impossible. The new generations need to embrace the backgrounds of the 
founders from all sides, both inter- and intra-national, -religious, etc. One needs to embrace, or 
at least be able to identify with, the nationalistic movement of the Palestinians, as well as the 
existential threats propagated by that nationalism. For as Elon warns, “It is true that in their 
empathy with the Arabs, those afflicted with the malaise occasionally find themselves in a moral 
cul-de-sac. Bound as they are to moral principles, they are unable because of the ferocity of Arab 
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opposition and the absence of any significant reciprocity – to put those principles into 
practice.”119 The result of this moral cul-de-sac is, as Elon postulates, prolonged war and an 
entrenchment within ideological positions, which tend to ignore the “origins” and even 
contextualization of identity. 
Elon’s vision of home and homeland is now reduced to an identity based solely on 
individual reflection. He states, “I grew up in Tel Aviv in a middle-class family that lost its assets 
as a result of emigration to Israel…My father wanted to go to France but my mother said it had 
to be Eretz Israel. And so we ended up in Eretz Israel. That’s why I am not an ideological 
Israeli. I did not grow up here out of choice. But I did grow up here. Here is where I kissed a girl 
for the first time. And what is a homeland if not the place where you kiss a girl for the first 
time?”120 Apparently any semblance, or hope, of a common cause/purpose has been lost to 
Elon, both with other Israelis and with the Arabs. 
Competing Claims within the Status Quo: Religion, Politics, and the (Im) possibility of 
Comparison 
 Both Oz and Grossman are well-known Israeli novelists. What further unites these 
authors is that both also wrote books about Israeli society and about the relationship between 
Israelis and the Palestinians, based on interviews with people from all segments of society. One 
of the central motifs in Oz’s writings is the uncovering of gaps (generational, national, religious, 
etc.) in Israeli society and in human life more generally. His eldest child, Fania, a professor of 
history at Haifa University, describes Oz’s best-known novel, A Tale of Love and Darkness, as 
portraying “Zionism and the creation of Israel as a historical necessity for a people faced with 
the threat of extinction. It acknowledges the original sin of Israel – the displacement and the 																																																								
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suffering of the Palestinians – but, at the same time, defends Zionism against some of the 
European left and among the Israeli New Historians who challenge the state’s claim to 
legitimacy even now.”121 Oz himself continues the characterization of his novel as amounting “to 
the founding story of Israel as told through a child’s eyes…At a time when Zionism is under 
question, the book provides a dramatic, yet liberal justification for Israel’s existence…while the 
conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is between right and right…what has been lost 
over time is the desperate conditions that preceded Israel’s founding.”122 Oz, Elon, and even 
Schweid highlight the loss of “origins” and context as undergirding tensions and issues in Israeli 
society, which as a result is responsible for gaps, alienation, and (unintentional) separation 
among generations. 
 For Oz, he could portray that experience only through a story, a myth, an underlying 
cultural ethos and guiding narrative. He is adamant that this genre is no less “fact” than a 
journalistic exposé. As he relates, “I don’t like to be described as an author of fiction…Fiction is 
a lie. James Joyce took the trouble, if I am not mistaken, to measure the precise distance from 
Bloom’s basement entrance to the street above. In “Ulysses” it is exact, and yet it is called 
fiction. But when a journalist writes, ‘A cloud of uncertainty hovers…’ – this is called fact!”123 In 
his novels, Oz describes and incorporates historical occurrence as the context for the myth, a 
grounding that positions his characters and the audience. 
 In his decidedly “journalistic” book The Land of Israel Oz is just as honest and upfront 
about experiences as he is in his novels. He describes the displacement of Palestinians during the 
war of 1948 and the misery of the refugee camps. Yet, he also argues that, “the Arabs were 																																																								
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under no obligation to start a war after the U. N. partition plan.”124 Oz’s criticisms and honesty 
are not hindered by national or religious affiliation. After the Yom Kippur War of the 1970s, Oz, 
along with other liberal Israeli activists, created a grassroots movement called Shalom Achshav – 
Peace Now. The group advocates compromise between Israelis and Palestinians based on 
mutual acceptance, cooperation, and sharing of land. 
 In his role as expositor of myth in the guise of novelist, Oz presents his ideas, which 
often are at odds with the prevailing right-wing segments of Israeli society, but also with many 
liberals, too. His understanding cuts against the gain of all people entrenched in particular, one-
sided ideological stances. This is best depicted in an interview by Shusha Guppy for The Paris 
Review. The interviewer poses a situation to Oz, stating that the “left” accuses him of not taking a 
strong stand and condemning the treatment of Palestinians by Israeli forces. To this Oz 
responds: 
It is a question of diagnosis. The conflict between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis is not a civil rights issue, but an international dispute. We have not 
conquered the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to deprive the Palestinians of 
their human rights…nor in order to give them their human rights. We conquered 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip because Israel was attacked in 1967, and 
threatened with extinction. Once our security is safeguarded, we ought to go 
away from the Palestinian areas and let them be. Palestinian human rights is a 
Palestinian problem.125 
 
Guppy presses further and specifies that criticism of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians during the 
intifada is what is at issue. Oz replies: 
It is an illusion to think that there can be a rosy military occupation…I have 
invested every ounce of my energy in finding ways to terminate the occupation, 
not to improve it…We don’t need to improve the way we rule over them; we 
need to stop ruling over them. In some ways my attitude has been more radical 
than that of the human rights people. They have regarded the issue as a clash 
between two communities, or two social classes, while I have always considered 
it an international dispute between two nations…I have not wasted any time 																																																								
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trying to introduce certain American left-wing concepts such as regarding the 
Palestinians as our black Americans…I don’t waste time on these irrelevancies.126 
 
In this way, Oz reacts against one set of understandings with those of what he considers to be 
misunderstandings and impositions by American and other Western left-wing expectations. 
 Regarding how this Western outlook began, Oz recounts how: 
A few years ago in Germany I met some left-wing intellectuals who were 
enthusiastically pro-Saddam Hussein. I wondered why? They said because he 
represented a poor third-world nation standing up to American domination. I 
explained to them that Saddam represented a country far richer than Sweden. 
How come? they asked. I said that in terms of income-per-capita, Iraq is richer 
than Sweden. They said, But we see Iraqis living in hovels, in abject poverty. I 
said that if Sweden decided to have the third biggest army in the world, the 
Swedes, too, would be living in hovels. I told them that in truth they loved 
Saddam because he is a friend of Qaddafi, who is a friend of Fidel Castro, who 
was once married to Che Guevara, and Che was Jesus Christ, and Jesus is love, 
therefore we have to love Saddam.127 
 
The list of other misconceptions Oz points out continues, and underlying his rebuttal to them all 
is the fact that critics of any stance, policy, action, etc. usually suffer from the same affliction as 
we see in studies of diaspora: the failure to question what we have come to consider to be taken-
for-granted truths. Failure to question and gain context signals just another lapse into ideological 
quagmire. 
 In his book The Land of Israel, Oz set out to talk with people, all people, about their 
perceptions, outlooks, passions, worldviews, and how they felt about how the state of affairs 
began. The thing that religion and politics share in the Land, according to Amos Oz’s interviews 
with people there, is that both demand commitment to absolutes. As he notices, in some 
neighborhoods within Jerusalem the dominating figures are Adolf Hitler and the Messiah. 
Everything else, he notes, is transitory. Because of Hitler, one has no right to quarrel with what 
has taken shape amidst the transitoriness, with this sort of Judaism (i.e., haredi), which Hitler 																																																								
126  Ibid., 6-7. 	
127  Ibid, 7. 
	 204 
wiped out in Europe. Because of the (awaited) Messiah, the same Judaism “enchains” you and 
“threatens to reconquer what you have wrested from their hands.” 128   This immovable 
framework highlights the power play and tension between religion and the religious, and politics 
and politicians, often times with much overlap in membership.   
 This tension manifests itself outside of the Jerusalem neighborhoods in what are called 
the Israeli settlements, some of which began as “suburbs” of Jerusalem proper. For many of the 
inhabitants of these neighborhoods, what mainstream Israeli society lacks, and by extension so 
too those Jews who are not religious settlers, is commitment to absolute values. As Oz presents 
their views, the alternative to persistent battle, which they feel they confront from both Israeli 
society and external parties, due to their desire to live in these settlements, is creeping retreat. If 
tomorrow one settlement disappears, the day after will witness the same. In this way, they argue, 
psychological retreat begets political retreat. The only thing that prevents such retreat is the 
willingness to do battle out of faith.129  The settlers maintain that other Israelis, if not the 
majority of them at the time of Oz’s writing, do not believe in any absolute truth. 
 When he asked the settlers if the nation-state (i.e., the State of Israel) is simply a tool to 
further their ends, a return to their imagined Zion, many exclaim that they would be quite 
content to live in a world “comprised of dozens of civilizations…cross-pollinating each other 
without emerging nation-states.” Yet, they argue, this was the circumstance Jews faced before 
the reemergence of Jews in the Land, and nobody else followed the Jews’ model as a civilization 
without the tools of statehood. The result, in their logic, was the destruction of that civilization 
by Hitler. Therefore, they reason, they accept the “rules of the game” (i.e., territorial statehood) 
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because existence without it, without the “tools,” is tantamount to mortal danger.130  In fact, this 
line or reasoning was Steiner’s response to Ezrahi’s heralding of territorylessness in her analysis 
of Jewish literature that posited a desired goal of emplacement. Existence, in this understanding, 
is a luxury others bestow on you, and in that regard the world failed the Jews. For many settlers, 
they see this threat continuing, despite the existence of the State. 
 Other Israelis, as Oz demonstrates, feel quite differently, especially since 1967, which 
saw Israel acquire Judaea and Samaria – the very central hill country of the Israelites from 
Chapter Two (i.e., the West Bank). Before then it was, after the end of the British Mandate, part 
of newly created Jordan. Enactments by the Israeli government, such as the existence of 
settlements in this territory and defensive measures against often wanton violence committed by 
those who identify as Palestinian, even if motivated by security concerns, resulted in what these 
Israelis describe as “moral autism.” In this sense, the status quo demanded that Arabs live within 
conditions that Israelis would not accept for themselves.131  The price of ignoring the Palestinian 
movement, both its nationalistic form and as well as its manifestation oftentimes in security 
threats, creates a situation that cannot last; if one denies the identity of others, however 
conceived, one is doomed to find oneself not unlike those whose identity is denied.132  This 
recognition, however, is two-sided, whose lack of implementation often proves to be an obstacle 
for follow-through of any plan, however well conceived and intentioned. 
 The question that Oz was left asking was whether or not comparison is possible. Can 
one compare the two, or any, national movements? Moreover, can one afford not to compare 
them? Once one begins to question the history, motives, intentions, and policies behind one 
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enactment, regardless of which “side,” similarities and “equivalences” soon fade. The example 
that best illustrates this quandary over how to compare is his reflection on interviewing Ziad 
Abu Ziad, who was at that time editor of the Palestinian newspaper Al-Fajr Al-Arabi (The Arab 
Dawn). Ziad explains that he has detractors both from within his own community, as well as 
from the Israelis. Ziad states, “The censors…plot unceasingly against Al-Fajr, preventing the 
staff from printing even items that have appeared in full in the Hebrew press.” 
Oz asks if this is the equivalent of “turning the phonograph record over,” that if it is not 
just the Israelis detaining him and prohibiting his stories from being published then it is the 
Palestinian leadership issuing the same decrees. Ziad replied: 
There is an Israeli people and there is a Palestinian people and both of them 
must live. In coexistence. As equals…There is justice here, and there is justice 
there, but here or there, over and beyond justice, there is reality…Just when we 
wanted to give coverage to Peace Now and the antiwar movement, they censored 
it.133 
 
Oz relates that in this interview Ziad explained his vision of what would happen, which spurred 
Oz to question the possibility of comparison. Ziad stated, “[…] look, one day the entire world 
will be united. Such is the direction of history…And it can begin between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis…But first of all the Palestinians must be a free people…And we must return to our 
country, we must return to Jerusalem.” 
 Oz explains that: 
In the heart of Jerusalem he says these words to me: “First of all…we must 
return to Jerusalem.” How very strange…in 1868, in Vienna, Peretz Smolenskin 
founded a Zionist Hebrew journal that bore the same name as Abu Ziad’s 
newspaper, The Dawn. On the opening page of the first issue, Smolenskin wrote, 
“Neither in shame nor in disgrace do we believe…that the day will come and the 
kingdom will be restored…when like all peoples we shall not be ashamed of the 
desire to redeem our souls from the hands of strangers”…Aren’t we merely 
flipping the record over…This comparison is…very fashionable…François 
Mitterand and Jimmy Carter make it; the New York Times, Der Spiegel, and Le 
Monde make it, as do men of conscience…Everyone who is enraged because 																																																								
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Israel wishes to deny the Palestinians by force what she herself fought for, over 
three or four generations, makes it…But in spite of this, the comparison 
demands a very cautious and subtle examination. Behind The Dawn of Ziad Abu 
Ziad stands the fortune of the mysterious Paul Ajluni. Behind Ajluni stands, so 
they say, the PLO. And behind the PLO, the mighty resources of Libya and 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the power of the Islamic bloc, the resources of the Soviet 
alliance, the masses of the third world. Behind them stand the phalanxes, the 
mouthpieces of the simplistic new Left and of the reactionary old right…But 
behind The Dawn of Smolenskin stood nothing more than the madness of the 
editor and the zeal of his handful of readers…But, on the other hand, no one 
ever tried to muffle the voice of Smolenskin…Yet, on the third hand, 
Ziad…arrived at the idea of “halfway between a Greater Land of Israel and a 
Greater Palestine” only after decades of savage attempts to throw Israel into the 
sea, in blood and fire. Smolenskin’s Dawn did not seek to hurt even a fly. And 
on the fourth hand, it was not the Arabs who exiled Smolenskin’s forefathers 
from their land, but it is Smolenskin’s grandchildren who…inherited piece after 
piece of Ziad’s legacy. And on the fifth hand…The Arab Dawn sought to shine 
over our dead bodies. It was Israel’s mighty fist, not some sudden moral 
revolution, that finally caused it…to abandon this ambition. And on the sixth 
hand. And on the seventh hand. And on the eighth hand…Is it right to compare 
the two Dawns? Is it possible not to compare?134 
 
Oz states that this continued questioning presents many hindrances to the desire to keep asking 
questions in an attempt at dialogue, but failure to maintain doing so seems the weightier moral 
peril. In the interim, however, there exists an impasse from all sides regarding how to ask 
questions, and whether there is time to do so. Disillusionment continues to build. 
 In 1987, twenty years after Israel acquired the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a result of the 
Six-Day War, the Israeli newspaper Koteret Rashit dispatched David Grossman to the West Bank 
for seven weeks. Grossman, who is fluent in Arabic, visited refugee camps, cities, schools, Israeli 
settlers, and Israeli military personnel in the area. He turned his interviews and reflections of that 
article into his book The Yellow Wind. He notes similarities, as did Oz, in his interviews in outlook 
and tactics between the two “sides.” An example of the similarities between the Israelis and 
Palestinians is demonstrated by David Grossman in his interview with an Arab woman. 
																																																								
134  Ibid., 159-65. 
	 208 
She was from the city of Lod, which in the early 1940s was then an Arab town. She 
spoke of the town’s beauty and relates that since 1948 she has not returned, even to visit. 
“Aren’t you curious to see it now?” he asked, to which she replied, “Only when we return.” 
Grossman states that Palestinians are making use of the ancient Jewish strategy of exile and have 
removed themselves from history. He states, “They close their eyes against harsh reality…they 
fabricate their Promised Land…And here, also, again and again, that absolute demand: 
everything, Nablus and Hebron and Jaffa and Jerusalem. And in the meantime – nothing.”135 Oz 
warns us that such similarities often fall apart upon closer inspection. How people “re-emerge” 
into history, how they fabricate, etc. might reveal the differences in relative positions of power 
between the two groups over their histories, the differences in types of leadership among the 
two, the refusals to accept or reject proposals, etc. What Grossman points to is that the present 
is a place of absence, a void. Everything happens and occurs elsewhere, in different places and at 
different times, save the present. 
 Regarding the entrenched settlers, Grossman reveals that often they retard their own 
development in order to demonstrate how ideological concepts are devoid of meaning. If all 
difficulties and mishaps can be blamed on outside forces, then that precludes self-examination; 
this situation is reflective of not just the settlers, but of all who maintain unwavering positions, 
as Oz pointed out. These enclaves, both physical and intellectual, become their own self-created 
prisons,136 and given enough time, things appear as if nothing has happened at all. At times 
people question how it is that what began for many as a realization of utopian (or perhaps 
quotidian, and normalizing?) endeavors became a prison, both for those who are the “jailers” as 
well as for those who are “jailed,” although given the prescience of self-reflection on the part of 																																																								
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the jailed, the reverse would prove just as correct. Grossman concludes by saying that people can 
continue as they have been, but they must account for the price it takes to do so. 
 As he reflects: 
We have lived for twenty years in a false and artificial situation, based on 
illusions, on a teetering center of gravity between hate and fear, in a desert void 
of emotion and consciousness, and the passing time turns slowly into a separate, 
forbidding entity hanging above us like a suffocating layer of yellow dust. From 
this point of view, nothing matched the occupation as a great personal challenge. 
As a personal crossroads demanding action and thought…Albert Camus said 
that this passage from speech to moral action has a name. “To become human.” 
During the last weeks and seeing what I saw, I wondered more than once how 
many times during the last twenty years I had been worthy of being called 
human, and how many people among the millions participating in this drama are 
worthy of it.137 
 
Even as recently as summer 2014, when “Operation Protective Edge” was in full force, in which 
Israel responded to continued and incessant rocket fire by Hamas from within the Gaza Strip, 
Grossman called for contextualization and for all included to “become human.” 
 In an editorial in the New York Times he states, “Israelis and Palestinians are imprisoned 
in what seems increasingly like a hermetically sealed bubble. Over the years, inside this bubble, 
each side was evolved sophisticated justifications for every act it commits…In this cruel and 
desperate bubble both sides are right.” He recognizes that within Israeli society competing 
factors begin to see how the other views the world and events occurring in it. He says: 
The left is increasingly aware of the potent hatred against Israel – a hatred that 
arises not just from the occupation – and of the Islamic fundamentalist volcano 
that threatens the country…more people on the left understand now that the 
right wing’s fears are not mere paranoia, that they address a real and crucial 
threat. I would hope that on the right, too, there is now greater recognition…of 
the limits of force…There is no military solution to the real anguish of the 
Palestinian people…Israelis have known this for decades, and for decades we 
have refused to truly comprehend it. But perhaps this time we understand a little 
better…Will a similar comprehension emerge on the other side, in Hamas?138 																																																								
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Grossman’s call for contextualization and becoming human in the face of continued war is all 
the more remarkable given that one of his sons was killed in 2006 during the war between Israel 
and Hezbollah. He remains committed to incorporation of all voices and refuses to lapse into 
one entrenched stance or another. In other words, continuing with the status quo is a non-
action, and what is needed, to paraphrase Benjamin and Heschel, is an assessment of 
responsibility while in the limen and threshold regarding decisions to be made. 
Home Improvement: How to Recognize When “Home” Needs Renovation 
 Israeli journalist and pubic intellectual Ari Shavit begins his treatise on his family’s and 
nation’s autobiography by claiming the movement to which they belonged was one of orphans. 
He states, “Now they are fatherless, motherless, and godless…After all, Zionism was an 
orphans’ movement, a desperate crusade of Europe’s orphans. As the unwanted sons and 
daughters of the Christian Continent fled the hatred of their surrogate mother, they discovered 
they were all alone in the world.”139 Much of this account of lost homelands and disillusionment 
with the recreated one echoes the attempts by the scholars in the latter part of this chapter who 
represent Israeli authors grappling not only with how their country came to be, but also with 
what has happened since it became. In this endeavor they add a new voice to the multitude of 
books dealing with this Land that present a sole perspective. In so doing, as well, they do not 
simply replace one myth with that of another; nothing is accepted wholly except the continual 
search for “truth,” in the service of informing ourselves how to emerge ethically, and intact, 
from this liminal situation. In this way, they represent the vanguard of an An-skyian paradigm in 
historiography and auto-ethnography/identity formation. 
 One of Shavit’s most poignant moments of explanation occurs when he is detailing the 
travails of the various Aliyot (waves of immigration to the Land). He lays out the physical, 																																																								
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economic, and social struggles that these immigrants faced, and he also explores the various 
ways in which Jews and Arabs overlooked each other, worked together, and how Jews 
oftentimes exploited Arab workers, often to the detriment of other Jews. It is when he begins to 
discuss the various iterations of Arab incitement against those immigrants that the complexities 
of home, generation, and commitment reach their apogee (or nadir, depending on outlook), 
from which much else seems a simple variation on a theme. As Shavit explains, Arab revolts 
against Jewish immigrants before 1936 were short, sporadic outbursts. On April 15, 1936 an 
Arab gunman shot a Jewish driver and passengers; the next day two Jews killed the gunman and 
his roommate in retaliation. Also, Jewish gangs attacked an Arab cartman and shoeshine man 
who were in town working.  This led to a mass outburst in neighboring Tel Aviv in which 
hundreds of Arabs “thronged the streets.”140  This series of outbursts was not sporadic and 
short, but rather a “collective uprising” that in three days left sixteen dead and eighty wounded. 
On May 16 Arab snipers killed three Jews emerging from a cinema in Jerusalem, and in 
March of 1920 the first Arab-Jewish confrontation occurred up north in the Galilee. After 1937, 
however, with the re-emergence of the Arab revolt, more deaths occurred, and more horrifically. 
In the course of a year more than eighteen hundred people were killed. Shavit states, though, 
that, “while attacks on Jewish civilians were supported by the Arab national leadership and by 
much of the Arab public, the attacks on Arab civilians were denounced by mainstream 
Zionism…On the other hand, some of the Jewish actions were far more lethal than the Arab 
ones.”141 There always is “another hand” in conflicts, historical data, and in recollections. It is in 
this litany of specifics, though, that Shavit approaches the blurring of fiction, autobiography, 
journalism, history, and memory that Oz discussed. 
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 No longer was Zionism a state of utopian bliss, albeit with “usual” social and economic 
grievances; it was transformed into, and continues to be, dystopian conflict. Yet, Shavit offers a 
glimpse into Camus’s call to be human. How, in this scenario, where all actions are justified, all 
voices legitimately needing to be heard and included, and in which the picture is never complete, 
can one accomplish An-sky’s example of being both here and there? Is not ideological 
entrenchment itself inevitable? Shavit offers an example, albeit perhaps unsettling. The 1947 
U.N. Commission concluded, after its visit to Palestine, that chances of peaceful coexistence 
between Jews and Arabs was unlikely and suggested partition. The Arab League and Palestinians 
rejected Resolution 181, and violence erupted throughout the country. The British left, and the 
State of Israel was founded in May 1948, only to be engaged in a full-scale war by five 
neighboring Arab armies. Late that year a Jewish convoy was attacked and thirteen people 
murdered. Months later a plan was presented to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to take 
control of an Arab village, Lydda, in order to secure a region during the war of 1948. In the 
effort to seize the village, Jewish troops massacred its inhabitants. 
How can one be human in this scenario? What choice does one have except to be 
unwavering in support of one side or the other? Shavit states: 
[…] one understands that…the conquest of Lydda…[was] no accident.  They 
were an inevitable phase of the Zionist revolution that laid the foundation for the 
Zionist state…And when I try to be honest about it, I see that the choice is stark: 
either reject Zionism because of Lydda, or accept it along with Lydda.142 
 
As other have articulated in their reflections, too, the same self-acknowledgement and –
reflection must be performed by Palestinians, as well. There is neither a one-way street – in the 
sense of assuming total guilt or innocence (as Benjamin observed and recounted in Chapter 
One) nor a state of being a total victim or aggressor. One rejects hasidism, Judaism, secularity, 
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etc. because of those other movements, or accepts it along with them. We do not occupy the 
imagined shtetl of Zborowski, rather the complex one of An-sky. 
The Arab rejection of the 1937 Peel Commission’s recommendation of partition, 
continued Arab revolts, the Arab (i.e., those who later identified as Palestinian) collaboration 
with Hitler, rejection of the 1947 U.N. Resolution 181, which would have divided up the Land 
into nation-states, etc. all of which were supported, if not carried out by, Arab national 
leadership, must be either rejected or accepted in the same vein as either rejecting or accepting 
the Jews’ 1948 conquering of the city of Lydda, if one is to engage in an An-skyian pursuit of 
identity formation that simply does not replace one myth with another. 
 While this is not a study in the conflicts of the region over time, it is helpful to examine 
what Israeli authors have said about the generation gap in the Land, and the struggles that they 
see over how people identify with, or often fail to identify with, the overarching narratives to 
which they will commit. Cleavages exist on many levels in the Land, and Shavit insists on 
situating each into its larger religio-socio-political context, both intra-Israeli, as well as inter-
regional, with an inclusion of Palestinian experience and voices. He does not, however, deal 
much with the intra-religious cleavages (like Grossman and Oz do) to the same degree in which 
he handles the others. What Shavit succeeds in highlighting throughout his various excursuses is 
the notion of choice and commitment. One cannot focus on any particular topic without 
committing to study of its implications and understanding of how it came to be. 
 To depict this encompassing undertaking he likens any study of a topic to concentric 
circles. The external one is the Islamic circle, into which the Jewish state arouses animosity. The 
intermediate circle is the Arab circle; Israel, he asserts, is a Jewish nation-state founded within an 
Arab world, and the Arab national movement had, and continues to have, as a basic component 
of its motivation, the prevention of Israel’s creation, at which it failed, and its destruction, an 
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endeavor at which it continues to fail in implementing. The third circle is the Palestinian one, in 
which Israel is perceived as being a settler state founded on the “ruins” of “indigenous” 
Palestine. Those three circles are merging, he argues, and any unilateral action, such as Israel’s 
disengagement from Gaza, leads not to recognition of Israel or ceasing of tensions, but quite the 
opposite.143  As well, there are little, if any, reciprocal studies of encompassing self-reflection and 
–critique emerging from within those three regional circles, thus again dooming these few Israeli 
voices to the void of dismissal and irrelevancy. 
 The core of the Zionist “revolution,” Shavit argues, was an identity revolution, and this 
identity has been consistently disintegrating into a multitude of identities, as is the understanding 
of generation. It has gotten to the point, he warns, that we no longer recognize ourselves. With 
that being the case, Israeliness becomes an “iridescent kaleidoscope” of “broken identities,” 
which forms a phenomenon that bears study. What this situation has to offer, and which fits in 
perfectly with an An-skyian understanding of identity-formation, is an example of “life on the 
edge.”144  In other words, the Land itself has regained its status, which we saw it acquire in 
Chapter Three, as a limen and threshold, in which decisions about commitment and return are 
made. Those within Israel, then, because of and despite physical emplacement, are beckoned to 
imagine themselves as being re-diasporized. Only if this becomes the new status quo, and not re-
entrenchment within fixed, dogmatic boundaries, regardless of “side,” will ethical action ensue. 
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Chapter Five 
Peopling the Diaspora: 
Jewish Genetic Disease and the Renewal of Mythopoesis 
 
 
 For many observers, twentieth-century modernism could be characterized by influences 
of the West spreading throughout the entire world, in which categories and boundaries (national, 
social, etc.) were clearly demarcated. This gave way to postmodernism, in which, as Angelika 
Bammer notes, the “post” defines what we no longer are: we are both here and there, neither 
here nor there, at one and the same time.1 As a result of this movement and concomitant 
weakening of previously reified boundaries, which had provided a sense of security through 
which one envisioned identity, we are all marginal characters, an Other (i.e., displaced).2 The 
problem with this state of affairs, Bammer states, is that differences become universalized and 
disappear, and the contexts that contributed to their development (i.e., historical experiences of 
difference based on “socially constructed categories of discrimination as race, class, gender, 
sexuality, religious, ethnic, and cultural affiliation”) become taken over, appropriated, by 
everyone else in an effort to create a “new, postmodernistically hip” universal subject.3 The 
supposedly unique, identifiable, and discrete entities of modernity have given way to the 
quotidian, ordinary, and universalized muddle of postmodernity – the grid of identity 
construction, as discussed in Chapter Two. 
 Yet, Bammer also reminds us that the past is not entirely forgotten; as she notes, what 
has been displaced, similar to how Freud understood what has been repressed, is still there. It 
(i.e., the past) is deferred, displaced, but not replaced. In this way, it “remains a source of 
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trouble, the shifting ground of signification that makes meanings tremble.” What is at issue, for 
Bammer, then, is how to articulate one’s presence, one’s subjectivity and identity, while noting 
the continuing, and increasing, lack of stable markers of identity in a shifting world. As she 
states, there is a tension between marking and recording absence and loss, while inscribing 
presence. One needs to be able to step outside of the system while remaining within it.4 In her 
understanding, “home” is inherently about separation and commitment, and identity is “about 
what we are not but also not free to dispense with.” The politics of identity, for Bammer, 
constitute a constant process of negotiation.5 
 The notion of the inescapability of the past, in both material and socially constructed 
remnants, while trying to make sense of the present, likewise can be figured into discussions of 
genetics research on identity. We cannot ignore biology, and we cannot overlook the many ways 
in which people have constructed their identities and imposed identities onto others. In this 
chapter we explore the ways in which Jewish genetic diseases are understood within Jewish 
communities and what genetics research offers in terms of complements to foundational myths 
of Judaism. Through the continuing use of Benjamin’s call for contextualization across space 
and through time, I echo those who advocate for incorporating both the biological and socially 
constructed aspects of identity. This more comprehensive outlook allows for a better 
understanding of migration, and acknowledges that genetic markers help place into question 
notions as kinship (to whom one feels connected), from what one feels displaced, etc., thus 
offering a multi-perspectival view to constructed identity. As well, these considerations are 
reflected in the Jewish concept of brit (covenant), which includes both biology and social 
construction; only through the use of both aspects does a more comprehensive appreciation of 																																																								
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“home,” “origins,” belonging, separation, and community/commitment emerge. I conclude that 
we already always are displaced, have multiple homes, and struggle to articulate this complexity 
using only one paradigm. 
 Bammer’s insight regarding the necessity of both marking loss and inscribing presence, 
of needing to become cognizant of remaining within the system, for it is the ground from which 
one was displaced, into which one exists, and in which one imagines a future, while 
simultaneously being able to step outside it and recognize it for what it is, echoes Pierre Teilhard 
de Chardin’s endeavor to explore both the interior and exterior of things. He states, “The time 
has come to realise that an interpretation of the universe…remains unsatisfying unless it covers 
the interior as well as the exterior of things; mind as well as matter. The true physics is that 
which will, one day, achieve the inclusion of man in his wholeness in a coherent picture of the 
world.” 6  Both Bammer and Teilhard de Chardin can be seen as belonging to the same 
intellectual (and existential) tradition as Smith, Benjamin, Taussig, members of the Annales 
School, Heschel, et al. who desire to establish contextualization. One’s existence remains with 
that individual. Regardless of one’s outlook and perspective, components of an individual’s life 
do not disappear. They may be overlooked, or dismissed, or unknown (as in the case of an 
individual’s biological ancestry), but the pieces remain to be discovered. 
 Teilhard de Chardin states that, “I am convinced that the two points of view require to 
be brought into union, and that they soon will unite in a kind of phenomenology or generalised 
physic in which the internal aspect of things as well as the external aspect of the world will be 
taken into account.”7 He explains that humanity and existence as a whole are fractured, in much 
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the same way that Bammer understands postmodernity. Yet, in Teilhard de Chardin’s outlook, 
humanity remains entrenched within a bifurcated existence, the poles of which remain stable and 
strong; materialists (scientists) explain external reality, while “spiritual” interpretations focus on 
introspection. What he sees as the goal of life, however, and the direction in which humanity and 
the world are progressing in his opinion, is toward wholeness and recognition of how parts, both 
external and internal, fit together. He outlines his understanding of an integrated reality. As he 
explains, “I repeat that my only aim, and my only vantage ground in these pages, is to try to see; 
that is to say, to try to develop a homogeneous and coherent perspective of our general extended 
experience of man. A whole which unfolds.”8 What Teilhard de Chardin adds to Bammer’s 
reflections, as well as to those of others, is his incorporation of humanity’s enmeshment within 
the natural world. 
 As he states, “Another circle on the trunk of the tree means another interval of time in 
the life of the universe. The discovery of viruses and other similar elements not only adds 
another and important term to our series of states and forms of matter; it obliges us to 
interpolate a hitherto forgotten era (an era of sub-life) in the series of ages that measure the past 
of our planet.”9 In this way, he adds yet another dimension to Bammer’s recognition that the 
past remains with an individual, and within an individual. Humans are part of the universe, are 
part of the same materials as planets, etc., and thus are part of each other’s pasts in ways that 
most people do not realize in their everyday lives, let alone in studies of “origins,” displacement, 
home, and return more generally. He continues: 
There are many forces in nature that we have supposed exhausted only to find, 
on closer analysis, that they are still flourishing. The earth’s crust has not yet 
stopped heaving and plunging under our feet. Mountain ranges are still being 																																																								
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thrust up on the horizon…Nor has the organic world ceased to produce new 
buds at the tips of its countless branches…For the earth is after all something 
more than a sort of huge breathing body. Admittedly it rises and falls, but more 
important is the fact that it must have begun at a certain moment…and that in all 
probability it is tending towards some final state…Thus all around us, deeper 
than any pulsation that could be expressed in geological eras, we must suppose 
there to be a total process which is not of a periodic character defining the total 
evolution of the planet; something more complicated chemically and deeper 
within matter than the “cooling” of which we used to hear so much; yet 
something both continuous and irreversible. An ever-ascending curve, the points 
of transformation of which are never repeated…it is on this essential curve, it is 
in relation to this advancing level of the waters, that the phenomenon of life, as I 
see things, must be situated.10 
 
In any attempt at contextualization, then, we must include the longue durée. After all, as even 
Durkheim noted, within an individual are both a biological entity and a socially constructed 
being, who is representative of a collective. History, and memory (psychological, collective, and 
biological) include unforeseen pasts, and remnants of those associations remain to be uncovered. 
How we gain access to those pasts, then, depends on the stories we well ourselves about 
ourselves. 
The Myth of Bios : Constructing Life in an Age of Deconstruction 
 In The Myth of the Eternal Return, Mircea Eliade states that, “[…] an object or an act 
becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an archetype. Thus, reality is acquired solely 
through repetition or participation; everything which lacks an exemplary model is ‘meaningless,’ 
i.e., it lacks reality.”11 In this way, that which is “real” is that which engages with a previous 
action as established by an ancestor or a divinity and in that way becomes and partakes of the 
sacred. All else is meaningless (i.e., profane). As J. Z. Smith points out in his introduction to that 
book, “[Eliade] has persuasively documented in a number of ancient civilizations the presence of 
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one sort of ‘archaic ontology’…[which] values human creativity to the degree that it is imitative, 
rather than freely original.”12 Profane existence lacks archetypes, thus participation in the sacred 
and real. 
 Such an understanding, then, acknowledges Bammer’s premise that we cannot entirely 
get rid of the past. In fact, for Eliade, it is precisely through the engagement in that past, which 
through ritual becomes the persistent present, is the only way to live a meaningful life. One 
needs community, however conceived, in order to live a sacred life (i.e., real and meaningful). 
Yet, Eliade, as did so many others (e.g., Heschel, Teilhard de Chardin, et al.), recognized as well 
that humanity in modernity is increasingly unable to live such a real life. As he states: 
The chief difference between the man of the archaic and traditional societies and 
the man of the modern societies with their strong imprint of Judaeo-Christianity 
lies in the fact that the former feels himself indissolubly connected with the 
Cosmos and the cosmic rhythms, whereas the latter insists that he is connected 
only with History. Of course, for the man of the archaic societies, the Cosmos 
too has a “history,” if only because it is the creation of the gods and is held to 
have been organized by supernatural beings or mythical heroes. But this 
“history” of the Cosmos and of human society is a “sacred history,” preserved 
and transmitted through myths. More than that, it is a “history” that can be 
repeated indefinitely, in the sense that the myths serve as models for ceremonies 
that periodically reactualize the tremendous events that occurred at the beginning 
of time. The myths preserve and transmit the paradigms, the exemplary models, 
for all the responsible activities in which men engage. By virtue of these 
paradigmatic models revealed to men in mythical times, the Cosmos and society 
are periodically regenerated.13 
 
It is through myths, and their use in society, that humanity gains appreciation of its existence, its 
origins, and its connection to ancestors. Modern humans are losing the ability to connect. 
 Even Benjamin articulates this view of modern humanity. In his “One-Way Street” 
Benjamin ends the journey at the Planetarium, a place that brings together the themes of our 
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chapter. As he states, “If one had to expound the teachings of antiquity with utmost brevity 
while standing on one leg, as did Hillel that of the Jews, it could only be in this sentence: ‘They 
alone shall possess the earth who live from the powers of the cosmos.’ Nothing distinguishes the 
ancient from the modern man so much as the former’s absorption in a cosmic experience 
scarcely known to later periods.” 14  While he acknowledges the divide in how previous 
generations understood reality with how contemporary generations undertake reality, he 
proceeds to offer his own explanation of what is occurring. Later generations (i.e., 
contemporaneity) focused on mastering technologies that would allow humans to control, view, 
and physically manipulate, whereas earlier peoples engaged with the cosmos in a wholly different 
way. He states: 
[…] the exclusive emphasis on an optical connection to the universe, to which 
astronomy very quickly led, contained a portent of what was to come. The 
ancients’ intercourse with the cosmos had been different: the ecstatic trance 
[Rausch]. For it is in this experience along that we gain certain knowledge of 
what is nearest to us and what is remotest from us, and never of one without the 
other. This means, however, that man can be in ecstatic contact with the cosmos 
only communally. It is the dangerous error of modern men to regard this 
experience as unimportant and avoidable, and to consign it to the individual as 
the poetic rapture of starry nights.15 
 
In this way, Benjamin alludes to the fact that to live an integrated (i.e., real, sacred, and 
meaningful) existence necessitates community and recognition of connection – to others, to that 
community, and to one’s context as part of the cosmos. 
 Humanity’s quest for mastery obscures those types of connections. As he relates, “[…] 
technology is the mastery of not nature but of the relation between nature and man. Men as a 
species completed their development thousands of years ago; but mankind as a species is just 
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beginning his. In technology, a physis is being organized through which mankind’s contact with 
the cosmos takes a new and different form from that which it had in nations and families.”16 It is 
up to humans to regain this way of connecting, which is not a solidary endeavor; as well, its 
success depends on more than simple technological expertise. It requires a deeper appreciation 
of existence, which is found in myth. Yet, are myths of the interior and exterior, to use Teilhard 
de Chardin’s terminology, simply different ways to the same knowledge? 
 With regard to a more contextually Jewish approach to connection and the persistence of 
the past that needs to be resuscitated, it is helpful to turn to Yeshayahu Leibowitz and Daniel 
Elazar. In his essay where he explains the relationship between religion and science, Leibowitz 
repeats a common refrain that previous societies understood existence differently than we do 
now. He states, “The conception of nature and the world in terms of meanings made the ancient 
researcher look at natural data as indicating and expressing something, and if this meaning was 
not obvious and clear at first sight, science was expected to reveal it…Since nature itself was 
understood as expressing something – a purpose, meaning, or value embodied in the 
phenomena – natural sciences were conceived in the ways we nowadays conceive the humanities 
and the social sciences.”17 He notes that in the seventeenth century a change occurred, and 
scientists introduced the concept of “functional relations” into their investigations into 
phenomena. 
Since then science has proceeded to look solely for functional relations between factual 
data, and these investigations, then, “do not harbor meaning.”18 Our lives are governed by the 
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knowledge gained by science, and it could be no other way. Religion does not provide 
knowledge, he claims. Rather, it makes demands of an individual in relation to what she 
considers to be ultimate; for Jews, it is God. Science provides information concerning nature, 
and this makes no difference to faith and values. For Leibowitz, an integrated existence requires 
both. 
As we will come to see later on when we discuss the idea of covenant and its relationship 
to the myths we use to structure our lives, Elazar takes issue with Eliade’s claim that Judaism 
(and the Judeo-Christian heritage more generally) helped to do away with the cyclical approach 
to reality, positing in its stead History – God’s involvement in human affairs, which thus 
prohibits connection with archetypes. For Elazar, humans, and Jews in particular, must 
participate in archetypes; the archetype par excellence is that of the covenant, which exists for 
humanity writ large, as well as for Jews. What is more, and as we have seen before in other 
chapters, is that this connection requires renewal; it necessitates constant engagement with that 
originary moment. The remnant of the past, which serves to transform the present into reality, 
remains with us, but we need to be aware of this pressing demand. As he states: 
Derekh (way)…precedes brit [covenant]…which complements it. Every creature 
has his own derekh that either represents his biological heritage or, in the case of 
humans, the synthesis between their biological and cultural heritage…Way or 
path denotes movement that, although to some extent fixed, also provides for 
change or development…God promises to establish his covenant with Noah and 
his descendants. The term brit is introduced…where it complements derekh. If 
the latter is built into humans, the former represents man’s ability to freely make 
choices and commitments…Humans are engaged in a constant effort to relate 
brit and derekh in the building of civilization, its peoples and polities.19 
 
Elazar, like Teilhard de Chardin and others, points out that even the Bible acknowledges 
humans’ connection to both natural forces and socially created ones. Part of living a covenanted 																																																								
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(i.e., meaningful, real, and sacred) life is integrating these dimensions repeatedly. Nothing is 
taken-for-granted, let alone overcome. After all, we still are, according to Benjamin, in our 
infancy as a species regarding collective recognition of this demand. 
Myths, narratives that help to define groups, entities, people, and which affirm continuity 
and give importance to otherwise random collections of stories and anecdotes, continue to help 
orient individuals in this changing and shifting environment. Through these narratives an 
individual connects to aspects of her past that she values. Narratives provide order, and the 
retelling of them in a group gives its members a sense of their collective past.20 While many 
believe that mythological thinking, which provided people a way of understanding their lives, 
existed only in the past and in preliterate groups who relied on stories to guide their behavior, 
Claude Lévi-Strauss points out that this hodge-podge of traditions and beliefs continues to 
operate in our lives. As he states, “I am not far from believing that, in our own societies, history 
has replaced mythology and fulfills the same function.”21 We are in the same situation in relation 
to the variety of historical accounts of our past, written by various historians. 
 According to Lévi-Strauss, both history and mythology attempt to explain; in this way, 
both share an underlying structure, but differ in content. The issue remains one of translation, of 
expressing in one language or code the phenomenon under investigation to another. Even 
history, and the entire enterprise of structuralism, mirrors what the “hard sciences” have been 
doing as well. He relates, “Science has only two ways of proceeding: it is either reductionist or 
structuralist…very complex phenomena on one level can be reduced to simple phenomena on 
other levels…phenomena too complex to be reduced to phenomena of a lower order…[can be 																																																								
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approached] by looking to their relationships…what kind of original system they make up.”22 In 
short, both history and science, broadly speaking, offer myths by which to live, through which to 
understand our past, in which we operate in the present, and from which to prepare for the 
future. 
 For many people, though, science is perceived as offering more authoritative 
information regarding our reality; biological relatedness (read as “natural” kinship) seems more 
real to many people, and DNA is understood as the “real substance” of kinship, thus 
essentializing our genealogical ties.23 Tensions often emerge between biological realities and the 
ways in which this reality is socially marked. Eviatar Zerubavel emphasizes that we must 
understand that (biological, genetic) genealogies are “narratives of social descent rather than 
accurate chronicles or maps of genetic relatedness.”24 Relatedness is both a biological and social 
construct, and when confronting a narrative of genealogy, for instance, one must be cognizant 
of the fact that issues of translation are at play; we all operate simultaneously within multiple 
mythologies, and we must be wary of how our translations of each manifest themselves in 
respective behaviors and outlooks. Zerubavel is quick to point out that the actual amount of 
genetic material that we share (with “relatives”) is not always in direct proportion to our 
presumed genealogical proximity to those ancestors,25 and the further we are in time from 
ancestors, the less genetic material we share with them. Our concept of relatedness to them, 
however, may not reflect that historical distance. 
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 In the ambiguous quality of our competing myths, around which we orient and 
understand our lives and identities, we vacillate between content that is taken on faith and that 
which is “factual” (i.e., historical and/or biological). Furthermore, even this factual content has 
gradations. Ninian Smart says that we are “moving out of the age of what may be called ‘fanciful’ 
myth into that of ‘factual’ myth…on the one hand myth becomes history; on the other hand 
myth is being slit between history and doctrine.” 26  The content that is mythical (i.e., 
authoritative) seems to be increasing, and much of this mythical content combines material 
accessed through faith, history, and biology. What emerges, while perhaps less discrete than 
previous modernist conceptions of origins and identities, is nonetheless rooted in a desire for 
connection and closeness. We conceive of ourselves in relation to an Other, and much of the 
content of the various myths operating in our lives are ways in which we connect with others, 
usually conceived of dichotomously: as either kin or not. As Smart attests, “[…] space enters 
into our symbolism of friendship – being close…Distance is implied in the symbolism of the 
Other, and dualism…between God and humanity is an important theme in all theistic 
religions.”27 In fact, attempts at overcoming those distances through various means (meditation, 
“outreach,” genetic testing, comparative mythology, space probes and accelerators to 
approximate the “Big Bang,” etc.) proliferate in postmodernity as a means to temper any unease 
with distance and demonstrate our interconnections. How these connections are symbolically 
and socially expressed, however, relies on metaphors to which many critics deny any credence: 
biological connection. 
 Two important qualities to notice about our translation of the various myths constituting 
our lives are that, as Smart states, they are retrospective, and given the tested methods through 																																																								
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which they are achieved (the scientific and historical methods), they are believed and thus 
accepted. We accept the “backward” conceptuality, and we look upon history, and biology, as 
real, thus as authoritatively true. 28  Yet, because these narratives necessitate corresponding 
behavior and outlook, they are implicitly a call to ethical action. As Laurie Zoloth observes, 
kinship implies duty, and due to the fact that these narratives (authoritatively) outline who is 
related to whom, the stories present opportunities for people to ask what is their responsibility 
to their kin. As she relates, kinship narratives, however constructed, depict a shared family 
history, shared ancestors, and a shared set of values. Jewish communities, then, are linked as kin 
across all lines (ethnic, linguistic, geographical, etc.).29 Myth, then, defines one’s “community of 
concern.” 
 As we will see, however, people tend to privilege one myth over the other; they accept as 
true either the socially constructed nature of reality or the biological underpinning of existence. 
For many people the notion that kinship, genealogy, and even race are socially constructed 
precludes its material or somatic reality. To claim that race is social rather than biological is 
interpreted as a statement that race is somehow not real or that it is just a (temporary) social 
fiction that needs to be overcome.30 While genetic findings have disproven race as “discrete 
kinds,” and thus indicate that social life is simply a social creation, there do exist “real” biological 
determinants to and indicators in life, which cannot be deconstructed. To argue otherwise is to 
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deny difference (and risk physical detriment), or at least to mistranslate one expression of a 
phenomenon into another language. 
 What this discussion helps to highlight are the multiple ways in which people self-
identify, a process that is pure social construction. Are Jews a race, or a nation, or a people? We 
will see that these groups of people are too physically heterogeneous to be considered a 
biological race. The term nation “is too non-discriminating when referring to genetic diseases” 
and thus lacking in sufficient inclusivity, and thus if one wishes to speak of “Jews,” the term 
“people” is most appropriate. A “people” is comprised of various groups, but groups that, in 
this case, share common religion, culture, historic experience, and language.31 Part of that shared 
historic experience, however, is the biological myth of genes and certain diseases. 
 Marianne Hirsch explains that in her experience, displacement and bilingualism, for 
instance, preceded her physical emigration; they were conditions into which she was born. 
Therefore, if displacement is equated to exile from “older certitudes of meaning,” then she was 
always already born into the wilderness.32 In other words, one always is already in a state of 
diaspora. In fact, one’s history is a narrative of multiple displacements: linguistic, religious, 
relational, and genetic. Her strategy for dealing with these displacements, which as indicated are 
always in a potential state of recurring and returning to an individual, was to make displacement 
(and relocation) a strategy of survival.33 She identified groups that encompassed different ways of 
belonging, often transcending limitations of space (e.g., feminist conscious-raising groups), and 
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these groups helped her to deal with the fact that identity is fractured, self-contradictory, and 
“inflected by nationality, ethnicity, class, race, and history.” 
Displacement was removal from a “mythic place of origin and plenitude” to a space of 
exile. She embraced these multiple displacements as both “assimilation and resistance,” because 
her identities did not shift at the same time or in the same ways. As she states, rather than 
struggling to reconcile her outer, physical emplacements with her internal groundings, she 
“invest[ed] psychic energies in a series of (dis) and (re) locations that allow one to live in 
permanent sojourn in wilderness.” 34  Nevertheless, even Hirsch’s permanent migration 
presupposes a ground from which to gain perspective and stability, however fleeting. Hirsch, 
though, did not shy away from integrating an acknowledgment of the various ways in which 
displacement operated in her life; she welcomed them, which helped ground her. Each myth and 
group to which she became attached allowed her to answer questions about origins, belonging, 
and return in new ways. 
Genetics as the New Myth of Jewish Diaspora 
 We have seen that, broadly speaking, there are two genres of myth that prove as 
authoritative for our lives: the social and the biological. Each attempts explanation, striving to 
provide answers regarding questions around origins and what coheres various groups into a 
people. Yet, we also have seen that people tend to give higher priority to one myth over the 
other. Generally speaking, the humanities and social sciences understand race, for example, as 
reflective of social hierarchies rather than of biological or genetic difference. For researchers 
investigating human genetic variation, the starting premise is different.35 The ways in which 
people articulate their narratives, however, particularly of descent and kinship, are largely 																																																								
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biological. Jonathan Marks states that procreation is biological, while descent is not. What may 
begin with facts of nature is quickly overtaken by facts of culture. Kinship is “a symbolic system 
of classification that adopts some aspects of natural relationships and suffuses them with 
arbitrary cultural distinctions.”36 Yet, when we think about our kinship, we mentally construct 
this lineage with an implicit understanding that our progenitors are prenatal pre-configurations 
of ourselves (i.e., biological forerunners).37 
 Yet, many examples of historical connectedness exist that are not described in biological 
terms. Rabbinic understandings of succession and descent did not privilege hereditary lines, and 
occupancy of an office, for example, proceeds by means other than heredity. Nevertheless, 
images of “spiritual pedigree” and “chains” of succession often carry and are modeled after 
bloodlines.38 In highlighting the extremes of social constructivism, Zerubavel states that, “with 
the possible exception of the Big Bang…it is not self-evident at what point any other given 
stretch of history actually begins.”39 
 Zerubavel notes that, “we regard as closer to us relatives whose distance from a shared 
ancestor is shorter than others.”40 Origins, often commencing at arbitrary points, are presented 
in narratives and myths of both social and biological provenance. From these sources we gain a 
mental construction of social communities that can range from “families to humanity at large.” 
Membership by this way of connection includes one in a family, compresses the time through 
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which one envisions distance to be measured, and in fact may implicate a descendant to family 
genetic disease. Implicit in any construction of family, given our genetic identities, is the 
possibility of both social and biological connection, of various degrees. Ignoring these various 
means of connection risks denying one meaning to what one considers family, but also access to 
potentially life-saving treatments and inclusion. 
Biological Premises 
 The discovery of chromosomes led to a recognition of two types of cell division: mitosis 
and meiosis. Each time a cell divides, the DNA is faithfully copied, and billions of base pairs 
organize into chromosomes that are divided equally between child cells in the process of mitosis. 
This process results in two cells with the same number of chromosomes as the original parent. 
When passing on genes to offspring, the DNA in specialized cells (gametes) is faithfully copied 
again, but the cells divide twice during meiosis. Each gamete contains only one copy of each 
chromosome. In the process of making a new individual, one copy of the chromosomes from 
the mother and one copy of the chromosomes from the father are joined to form chromosome 
pairs in the new individual.41 Genes reside on chromosomes, and the genome is the sum total of 
all genes present in an organism. 
 The appearance of a trait in an organism, such as eye color, is called a phenotype; if there 
is at least one dominant gene, it predominates and determines the organism’s phenotype for that 
trait. If both copies of the gene are recessive, then that trait is determined by the recessive gene. 
A recessive phenotype is observed only if both copies of the gene are recessive. For example, if 
an individual carries two identical genes, such that both are dominant as in HH or recessive as in 
hh, that individual is considered to be homozygous. Those individuals carrying a dominant and a 																																																								
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recessive gene, such as Hh, are heterozygous.42 To gain a sense of the miniscule portion of the 
genetic sequence that varies from person to person, and which is associated with ancestry, it is 
worth noting that human genetic sequences are 99.9% identical. Of the .1% of the genome that 
is different, only 3-10% of it is associated with geographic ancestry.43 
 With regard to the sex chromosomes (the X and Y chromosomes), the X chromosome is 
always transmitted from mothers to sons, and the Y chromosome is transmitted from fathers to 
sons. A daughter receives an X chromosome from both parents. The X and Y chromosomes do 
not carry the same genes, so if a gene on the X chromosome is dominant or recessive it cannot 
be masked by another copy of a gene on the Y chromosome; in males, any gene that is present 
on the X chromosome, therefore, is always expressed.44 If the mother is a carrier for a disease 
that is transmitted on the sex chromosomes, then the son automatically will be a carrier, whereas 
that is not necessarily true for a daughter. 
 Unlike the Y chromosome, the X chromosome is not sex specific. Females have two X 
chromosomes and transmit one to both sons and daughters. The father passes on his only X 
chromosome to a daughter and his only Y chromosome to a son. Unlike most of the Y 
chromosomes, the X chromosomes undergo genetic reshuffling after every conception, and thus 
they are more dynamic and difficult to trace backwards. Y chromosomes are less prone to 
mutations, so scientists can trace unchanged Y chromosomes back to founders thousands of 
years ago. To assess female history, in much the same way that the Y chromosome can be traced 
backwards, scientists turn to mitochondria. These are discrete packages, organelles, which are 
found outside the nucleus of the cell. The mitochondria retain a small segment of the DNA, and 
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it is inherited strictly through the female line. Sons cannot pass on their mitochondrial DNA; it 
is passed from mother to daughter, and like the Y chromosome, it shares “a single evolutionary 
history.”45 
 Both the Y chromosome and mitochondrial DNA are less prone to random mutations 
after each conception than other cells, but mitochondrial DNA does have a higher mutation rate 
than the Y chromosome DNA sequence. Those portions of chromosomes that do not code for 
protein are freer to evolve and acquire changes (mutations), which lead to polymorphisms 
during the replication process. These changes are passed on to succeeding generations. A group 
of polymorphisms is known as a haplotype, and scientists can make assumptions from that data 
regarding rates at which different types of mutations occur. Examining the number of 
recombinations and changes is how scientists measure the number of generations from the 
founder until the mutation.46 Thus it is possible to estimate the date for the most recent 
common ancestor of any number of Y chromosomes.47 
 For example, if many people who have the same mutation share a large block of DNA 
on that gene, then it is clear that the mutation arose in a recent founder. If the block of shared 
DNA is short, on the other hand, the founder lived many years ago; each succeeding generation 
would have lost part of the block through genetic recombination and mutation. As Harry Ostrer 
states, “By incorporating coalescence analysis along with the population range of a disease,” for 
example, “genetic conditions can be identified that were present in the ancient Mediterranean 
basin, including Palestine, in pre-Jewish times,”48 and out of which Jews emerged carrying these 																																																								
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particular genes. This allows for a glimpse into their subsequent movements, admixtures (i.e., 
rates of new mutations and recombinations), etc. What is useful about examining the Y 
chromosome and mitochondrial DNA is that variations are known to occur at fixed rates, thus 
providing a biological clock for timing events. Ostrer states that for people whose Y 
chromosome is identical at thirty-seven different sites, the time to a common ancestor is five 
generations. If there is a mismatch at one of those sites, the time to a common ancestor is twelve 
generations, and if there are two mismatches, the time to a common ancestor is nineteen 
generations. According to this clock, then, “molecular Adam” lived in Africa around 125,000 
years ago and transmitted his Y chromosome, which has continued to this day.49 
Biology’s Historical Web of Social Significations 
 Before the advent of genetic testing, the history of humans’ understanding of speciation, 
the process of genealogical divergence into new species, proceeded along the basis of 
morphological evidence. In the early 1800s Jean-Baptiste Lamarck noted humans’ affinity to 
other animals, and he recognized that species were mutable and postulated that they could 
transmute into other species.50 This speculation gained further support when in the 1960s 
scientists discovered that human blood closely resembles that of chimpanzees and gorillas. The 
study of protein structures, which reflects genetic structures, allowed scientists to confirm 
Thomas Huxley’s claim in 1863 that African apes are closer biologically to humans than they are 
to the Asian orangutan and gibbon, and that chimpanzees are “closer” genetically to humans 
than to gorillas.51 In fact, humans share 98.4 percent of their DNA with chimpanzees. This close 
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biological affinity, now buttressed by genetic testing as opposed to simple morphology, is the 
result of humans splitting off from the common ancestor of the two (humans and chimpanzees) 
relatively recently; thus the genetic differentiation is not significant. The more similar molecular 
makeup animals have with one another, the more recently they split off from each other.52 
 Charles Darwin claimed that all forms of life share a common ancestor; life is 
monophyletic. In this scheme, all life represents various degrees of siblinghood and is thus 
genealogical. Since his time, biologists cease to measure biological affinity through structural, 
homoplastic resemblance (morphology) and instead focus on homologous resemblance. The 
former involves superficial features that are observable (phenotypes), which evolve 
independently of each other. The latter involves studying analogous, parallel patterns of 
adaptation to similar environmental conditions. Homologous features resemble each other due 
to inheritance from a common ancestor (i.e., genetics), not simply the presumption of such 
based off of appearance.53 
 The fact that genetic testing can reveal something about descent places into question 
other ways through which people have gauged kinship. Yet, genetic testing measures only lineal 
descent; it is clinal (i.e., based on a continuum with gradations in characteristics from one 
extreme to another, especially between populations). Human behavior, by contrast, is a product 
of historically and socially produced differences. Both, though, figure in to the myths we tell 
ourselves about ourselves. In this way, we can study social units as well as health differences 
between groups based on biological ancestry. Each myth, however, ought not to be reified. The 
appropriate model is not racial, but biosocial,54 and we cannot jettison one for the other, lest we 
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risk prolonging our stagnation of having humanists and scientists talk past one another in trying 
to understand humanity and existence. 
 While genetic testing may be able to speak to human origins and migrations dating back 
thousands of years, in this way providing scientific “proof” that may corroborate a socially 
instructive, historical myth of group activity, it still does not establish certainty. Genetic testing is 
available for only a small proportion of an individual’s genome (the sum of an individual’s 
genes), and it tests only one part of one person’s genome, from either the male or female sex 
chromosomes. This results in a rather imprecise pedigree, but people continue to utilize this 
testing for ancestry purposes. In fact, as Alondra Nelson demonstrates, people use terms like 
“DNA cousins” and “genetic kin” to denote the information they gain from ancestral genetic 
testing, however scant the results may be. They use these terms to “rhetorically set apart” those 
newly discovered ancestors from those of “natural kinship.”55 Genetic testing speaks to people’s 
desire to close the distance between themselves and whatever progenitors they may have, which 
science can help find, and the created kinship it creates testifies to the culture of relatedness that 
this connection provides. It creates an expanded community of concern. In other words, science 
can aid in expanding both an individual’s conceptualized community (i.e., those for whom one 
feels concern). 
 The resulting behavior afforded to these “root seekers” is an opportunity to accept or 
reject their genetic genealogy results, thus making more explicit the ways through which they can 
choose to identify with any diasporic connection. Nelson dubs this “affiliative self-fashioning,” 
speaking to the ways in which subjectivity can be (re) fashioned based off of given genetic 
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facts.56 Race is only one aspect of complex identity formation, and as Marks states, identity is a 
negotiation among many statuses rooted in genetics, biology, behavior, and sociopolitical 
categories. These statuses provide myths through which one orients oneself, gives meaning to 
one’s life, and regulates behavior regarding who one is, what one is, and to whom one is 
related.57 
 It is possible to measure genealogical distances between individuals and between 
populations based off of the amount of genetic change undergone since the point of divergence 
from each other. One can reconstruct human history by pinpointing the historical junctures at 
which genetically recognizable ancestral populations (haplogroups) shared clusters of genetic 
markers (haplotypes) and then split from one another.58 Yet as stated, focusing on only one line 
of descent, “celebrates some ancestors while forgetting others.” Affiliative self-fashioning is also 
an exercise in genealogical memory. Zerubavel states that genetic testing, which usually tests the 
Y chromosome and mitochondrial DNA, provides information for only one ancestor per 
generation; the others are “relegated to oblivion.”59 Yet, a tension remains. Categories such as 
race, family, kinship, ancestry, etc. “come from the human capacity to create and assign 
meanings.”60 But behind many of these social constructions are real, and often fatal, realities. 
Jews and Disease: the Beginning of Biomedical Difference 
 During the early 1700s writings emerged in Europe in which people spoke of Jewish 
communities (in this case Ashkenazi communities – Jews in Central Europe) exhibiting certain 																																																								
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illnesses more frequently than the surrounding non-Jewish populations. By the end of the 1800s 
two diseases in particular, Tay-Sachs and Gaucher disease, were recognized as occurring more 
frequently in Ashkenazi Jewish communities, and by the 1900s medical literature demonstrated 
that this group of Jews was afflicted with those and other illnesses more commonly than were 
others.61 
 Sander Gilman notes that by the late 1800s Western European Jews (mostly Ashkenazi) 
had become, for all intents and purposes, assimilated to their surroundings in terms of dress, 
occupation, location of dwelling, and hairstyle. Yet, their compatriots assumed them to be a 
distinct racial category, which manifested itself in both ascribed external and internal 
differentiations.62 Some considered Jews a “mongrel” race that interbred with Africans during 
periods of earlier Israelite exile from the land of Israel; this occurrence, as Gilman demonstrates, 
was what accounted for Jews’ “muzzle-shaped mouth and face,” among other physical 
characteristics associated with racial hybridity.63 Jews were considered to have melancholic 
temperaments and to have a complexion darker than other Western Europeans. Yet for others, 
especially scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this “blackness” of Jews marked 
not only their racial inferiority, but also signaled their diseased nature. In this understanding, 
external conditions such as plica polonica (sometimes dubbed plica judiaica or just “plica”), in which 
the hair becomes matted, often infested with lice due to the impoverished conditions in which 
an individual lives for extended periods, was interpreted as an external manifestation of Jews’ 
unhygienic nature and even as illness leaving the body.64 																																																								
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 By the late 1880s, however, more nuanced understandings of medical conditions had 
emerged, and both a British ophthalmologist, Warren Tay, and an American physician, Bernard 
Sachs, noticed that similar symptoms affected predominantly Jewish children. A newborn, 
apparently normal at birth and in the first few months, quickly deteriorated into retardation, 
early blindness, developed epileptic seizures, paralysis, and then died from pneumonia by the age 
of three or four years.65 It was not until the 1930s-1950s, however, that scientists were able to 
provide a more complex picture of what was occurring. By mid-century doctors understood that 
these cases involved an accumulation of specific types of lipids (fats) in particular brain cells. 
This development allowed scientists to reclassify the disease from a case of supposed “idiocy” to 
a generalized brain disorder, opening up new ways of thinking about medical interventions. Tay-
Sachs disease (TSD) no longer was viewed as a (Jewish) pathological illness, dubbed “Jewish 
amaurotic [blindness] idiocy,” but rather as a class of lipid storage disorders, which then could be 
distributed across any number of populations.66 
 In the 1970s scientists had developed methods to test individuals who were understood 
to be at particular risk for carrying the genes responsible for producing a child with TSD, and 
scientists also started inquiring into the social and historical mechanisms that could account for 
Ashkenazi Jews’ higher frequency of possessing the TSD-causing gene. Due to limited 
knowledge of the complexity of the human genome at the time, theories emerged that claimed 
TSD was caused by a “bad gene,” which spread through intermarriage, migration, and patterns 
of reproduction common to isolated Eastern European Jewish communities.67 TSD became 
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synonymous with Ashkenazi Jewish communities and part of the “mythos” of American 
Judaism, many of whom had families originating from those regions. 
 TSD, along with other genetic diseases found in other populations, are related in that 
they are hereditary and thus are propagated in similar ways. But they differ from one another in 
that they manifest themselves in dramatically different ways and are linked to social and cultural 
contexts that differ for each group and “its” respective disease (e.g., Jews and TSD, African 
Americans and sickle-cell disease, northern Europeans and cystic fibrosis, etc.).68 As genetic 
medicine was developing apace during the latter part of the twentieth century, so too were 
Jewish communities in the United States. They were assimilating, moving to the suburbs, but still 
trying to maintain a semblance of religious and cultural distinction. As they tried to negotiate this 
Jewish American identity, they likewise had to confront lingering notions of Jewish genetic 
difference, a “symbolic ethnicity,”69 which carried with it vestiges of racial hierarchies and social 
inferiorities. In calls for genetic testing, once it became available, Jewish communities also strove 
to distance themselves from the memories and experiences of the more recent Nazi eugenicist 
past.70 
 The characteristics of TSD, such as elements of physical deterioration and early 
childhood death and later calls for testing to “eradicate” it, “became linked to the story of Jewish 
life and culture.” In this light, medical knowledge and practice, as well as Jewish communal 
responses, became even more intimately interconnected to cultural, religious, and ethical 
concerns. Keith Wailoo and Stephen Pemberton state that the “politics of identity collide with 
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biological theory, and the promise of genetic innovation is entangled with problems of justice, 
marketing, and hype.”71 Other populations with diseases associated with them dealt with similar 
issues. Genetic diseases became signifiers of troubled ethnic pasts and took on the status of 
defining characteristics of that particular group. One could mention TSD, for instance, and the 
“(Ashkenazi) Jewish experience” was implied. Jewish communities rallied around the prospect of 
confronting this disease, especially within the ultra-Orthodox communities of Ashkenazi Jews 
within which it was most prevalent. The organization Dor Yeshorim (Generation of the 
Righteous, or Upright Generation) allowed rabbis, families, and doctors to work together to find 
the best way to engage community members in helping to lessen potential stigmatization of 
carriers of the gene, the social standing of families of carriers, etc., and to do so in accordance 
with Jewish law. 
 The organization was successful in educating and testing individuals before marriage, 
working with both families and religious leaders, and significantly reduced the percentage of 
carriers who procreated with one another. Once Dor Yeshorim sought to test for other diseases 
that were not as severe as TSD, however, questions emerged about the role of genetic testing, 
the limits of “acceptable” diseases for which to test, and the limits on genetic matchmaking in an 
effort to curtail the proportion of carriers in the population.72 While it was one thing to prevent 
the birth of babies with TSD, it was another, as critics argued, to prevent (thus stigmatize and 
discriminate against) diseases that were not fatal and were more manageable.73 Advances in 
genetic testing and knowledge, which once paved the way for communities to attempt to take 
control of their “destinies” by controlling the extent of lethal diseases, were now being curtailed 																																																								
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for fear of genetic manipulation and possible coercion of “at-risk” individuals to follow a 
prescribed way of life. The completion of sequencing the entire human genome in 2001 shifted 
research from searching for those few “bad genes” to whole-genome analysis. 
Researchers were able to identify particular genetic markers for disease, many of which 
were associated with certain populations. This is useful for diagnosing and understanding the 
origins and possible migration of these genes over time, but many feared that if this technology 
were used uncritically that it could lead to reification of genetic differences, in much the same 
way that assumed “racial” differences were once seen as inherent and immutable. Critics were 
cautious of the emerging pharmaceutical competition to create the next best drug to deal with an 
identified malady. Now that genes could be attached to ancestral origin, and diseases carried by 
certain genes could be located in individuals, many people warned that “genetic research on race 
would take place in a medical context.”74 Drug companies, it was feared, would emphasize 
testing in particular “racial” (i.e., ancestral?) subgroups, but this may overlook individuals who 
may not identify as part of the targeted population, thus missing out on potential life-saving 
medications. 
Genetic Relationships: Where Do They End? 
Overtime the identification of certain populations with specific qualities becomes, as 
Gilman states, “part of the mythopoesis [myth making] of Western culture.”75 He cites as his 
example the “reality” of the (male) Jewish body and circumcision, which has become part of the 
construction of the “Jew’s” body within Western culture. In much the same way, the 
characteristics of TSD were for many centuries also part of the construction of the Jew’s body, 
even after its predominance in Jewish communities declined due to the implementation of 																																																								
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testing and appropriate action. The reason why such constructions become constitutive of 
societal myths is that, as Zerubavel points out, “being social presupposes an ability to experience 
things that happened to groups to which we belong before we joined them, as if they were part 
of own personal past.”76 Thus, acquiring a group’s memories and ways of identifying are part of 
the process of gaining a social identity. 
It is also in this way that genetic testing opens up the possibility of exposing new ways in 
which difference can be marked, thus creating divisions within an otherwise homogenous group 
memory of belonging. Inhabiting these myths of cohesion are those currently remembering 
together, but also, as Zerubavel notes, the group’s predecessors. The ability to claim someone as 
a grandparent allows one to transcend the strictly dyadic form of ancestry (parent-child) and thus 
lengthen the span of time between ancestors. Through the concept of a “grand” relative an 
individual envisions a seemingly direct ancestral tie “among members of non-successive 
generations.”77 
With the advent of genetic testing, however, this connectivity through time gains the 
dimension of familial connectivity across space. The aspect of deepening one’s ancestral 
connection back in time, for example through the use of the “grand” mechanism, is paralleled by 
the use of genetics in deepening one’s connection spatially. There exist both vertical and 
horizontal, diachronic and synchronic, relationships. Regarding the aspect of time, Zerubavel 
notes that we need a paradigm shift to realize that we are genealogically connected to thousands 
of earlier generations of humans, but also to millions of generations of earlier nonhuman 
organisms.78 Likewise, we need a paradigm shift to realize that we are connected (genetically) to 
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many others, in what are thought to be different ancestral families, depending on the genetic 
marker under investigation, across space. The metaphor of the tree, with its multilinear 
genealogical narratives of connection based on descent in time, needs to explicitly address spatial 
kinship as well.79 
Race: Socially Constructed Quagmire regarding (Genetic) Difference 
 The fact that scientists can identify genetic markers indicative of ancestry, region of likely 
origin, even possible migration routes of population groups with those markers, and also the 
likelihood of certain diseases to occur in a given population, leads some people to question the 
premise of social constructions of race. Historically, race was conceived as being based on 
typological traits, an essentialist notion that they are visible, can be hierarchically arranged, are 
static, and thus are natural groupings of individuals.80 Such a concept arose at the time when 
scientists privileged the study of nature and its classification and when nation-states began 
establishing exploitative economic relations with “unfamiliar” political and social entities (i.e., 
engaged in colonialism and imperialism). As Marks states, while individuals had always engaged 
in practices of distinguishing one from the other, one group from another, and even operated as 
if geographically separated groups were distinct from each other, rarely were these divisions 
considered natural, immutable, and global. This changed during the confluence of classifying 
nature during the period of imperialism.81 
 Typological classification of individuals was popular until the 1800s and early 1900s. 
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manifestations of intrinsic properties. It was thought that these features, constituting race, were 
packaged as bundles and transmitted to offspring, which faithfully reproduced the features of 
the previous generations.82 With Gregor Mendel’s research into the genetics of pea plants in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, scientists now operated under the assumption that, as with the 
features of a plant, so too would human genes recombine not in neatly packaged bundles, but 
rather randomly. This helped to support Charles Darwin’s theories about how change occurs 
and in so doing explain how static traits were not passed on as evenly and regularly as 
imagined.83 Scientists were beginning to understand how to scientifically explain change and 
transformation over time. 
 According to Ostrer, the concept of race during the nineteenth century was a technical 
term used by biologists to describe groups of organisms, what we would now call species. When 
this term was applied to humans, however, it denoted characteristics of physical appearance, for 
example skin color, hair and eye color, facial form, limb length, etc. (i.e., the typological forms, 
phenotypes, mentioned earlier). 84  At the extreme end of the definition, a race in this 
understanding was an organism, a species, a human group that did not reproduce with others, 
due to choice or geographic isolation.85 
 In today’s understanding of genetics, non-Africans are a subset of Africans, with the 
exception of small pockets in regions where other humanoids developed. Yet, all are able to 
procreate with one another; thus, they are not separate races/species. There are no discrete 
boundaries within humans that separate them into genetically distinct groups, and members of 																																																								
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each group are highly variable.86 Scientists today, argues David Goldstein, agree that “most 
variation is due to differences between individuals, but this still leaves room for genetic 
differences that inform us about the histories of groups of people.”87 In other words, the 
category of race may be genetically meaningless when applied to humans (i.e., it is socially 
constructed), but humans still cannot escape their biological underpinnings, which are not social 
constructions. What is more, these biological underpinnings reveal much about a population’s 
past and ways in which difference operates genetically. 
 Natural selection and mutations occurred, and as a result, human populations began to 
differ from one another. Groups that traveled far from others, which meant that members had 
less contact with each other, were less likely to share the mutations present in other groups.88 
Given thousands of years, these genetic differences took the form of geographic patterns. 
Hence, today’s peoples whose ancestors came from a particular location (continent, region, etc.) 
often share a set of distinctive differences (alleles). At the aggregate level, not necessarily the 
individual, these manifest themselves as discernible population-level frequencies, which can be 
identified.89 
 Yet, there is a fine degree of tension between the idea that race is a social construction 
and the need to maintain that genetic differences are important. While there are millions of sites 
on the human genome that show differences among individuals, Goldstein notes, if only a small 
portion of those sites were indicative of ancestry (i.e., region of origin), then that still would 
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include thousands of genetic differences among populations.90 The 3-10% of that .1% variation 
in the human genome offers the possibility of much difference, disease, and paths of 
origin/migration. Gilman summarizes this tension when he says, “There are ‘real’ shared genetic 
distinctions within and between groups…but the rhetoric of what this shared distinction comes 
to mean for general culture and for groups so defined becomes central to any understanding of 
the implications of race.”91 There continue to be many meanings and understandings of race in 
biology, the social sciences, the humanities, and in popular discourse. Yet, any concept must take 
into account that terms and categories identify groups and individuals. In this way, race is both 
“real” and social. It is “somatic phenotype reflecting non-discrete, broad-stroke continental 
ancestries,” and its meaning continues to be constituted by social and linguistic contexts.92 While 
Dor Yeshorim, for example, understood that there were genetic maladies affecting groups of 
individuals and knew that technology existed to test for genes that cause such maladies, the 
context in which the proscribed testing occurred was such that overtones of hierarchy, 
discrimination, and racism seeped in to otherwise mundane medical procedures. 
The line dividing ethics and social considerations from medical research and genetic 
attestations of difference exists, but also it must be maintained that at times there is overreach in 
the opposite direction. It is true that medical genetics has moved toward a concern with 
“predisposing genes,” alleles that increase the likelihood of an individual developing a particular 
pathology.93 It also is true that population groups exist. Yet these groups do not have limits and 
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are not immutable. All that can be said is that there are quantitative differences in gene 
frequencies. 
Nevertheless, we still are operating under a restrictive binary of race being either socially 
constructed or typologically real, and both are not entirely accurate. As Pamela Sankar states, “It 
is ‘statistical race’ because of the reliance on numerical data to represent population differences. 
The differences it identifies and represents as racial derive from the fact that people of common 
ancestry are more likely to share certain genes or alleles than those who do not share ancestry. 
To some extent ancestry and genetic variation are geographically distributed.” 94  In this 
understanding, (statistical) race, according to Marks, is a theory of kinship that tells us who and 
what we are, and it takes into account both vectors, the vertical (temporal) and horizontal 
(spatial). As he states, “Kinship is a system of classification, in which complex relationships to 
biology (procreation) and law (marriage) are organized into a coherent framework.”95 
The importance of statistical race (i.e., ancestry and kinship) is that it helps researchers 
gauge the incidence of genetic disease, thus tracking migrations, and thus helping individuals 
have the option of expanding their conceptualizations of connectedness. For example, sickle cell 
disease is not a marker of skin color or race, historically understood, even though it 
predominates in African American communities. Rather, it more properly is a marker of 
ancestry, locating an individual as a member of a group whose geographic location in the past 
originated in an area where malaria was prevalent. A carrier of the sickle cell gene is protected 
against malaria, but an individual with two carrier parents, thus increasing the likelihood of both 
passing on the gene, could develop sickle cell anemia. Not all Africans, or Sardinians, carry that 
gene. Classical race is not diagnostic of ancestry, and disease is not diagnostic of race, but 																																																								
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knowing ancestry and genetic difference can help save lives, and expand the concepts of family, 
distance, and home.96 
The Genetics of Coming Home 
 Gilman emphatically states that all locations in which Jews have found themselves, 
including the State of Israel, “are places of contention and complexity for Jews.”97 It was while 
being emplaced in these locations, he notes, that “diasporic” Jews shaped the intellectual and 
cultural facets of Judaism; these centers of Jewish life operated as such because socio-political 
circumstances prohibited Jews’ movement otherwise, but also because these locations had 
become the Jews’ developed homes. This places into question the overarching narrative within 
Jewish life, however, which understands Jewish history as operating between center/core and 
periphery. These dynamic Jewish locations conceived of themselves as existing on the 
periphery.98 
 Gilman advocates for a new model: the frontier. This space is imagined, but it exists 
alongside of and in tension with the core-periphery model.99 Within an understanding of core-
periphery, there exists an unequal power dynamic between the two; the center possesses a 
“hegemonic orientation” to the periphery/margin, and in this paradigm, Gilman argues, it is easy 
to posit as the center of Jewish history, certain paradigmatic experiences. The Shoah, for 
example, prefigures all other experiences, and therefore, the center of Jewish life is the 
“ingathering” of the community to the Land of Israel. In this way, the marginal areas are 																																																								
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understood as being alienated from the center of Jewish life, the places where Jewish “radicals” 
operate, and at worst the places where the center of catastrophe occurs.100 In Gilman’s frontier 
model, there is no privileging of the center or devaluation of areas that are not the center; rather, 
one focuses only on the frontier, and all locations are the frontier. Now that which was the 
center is placed on par with what was considered marginal. 
 Included in Gilman’s formulation of the frontier are elements that dovetail nicely with 
how Benjamin, Heschel, and Tweed understood emplacement. As Gilman articulates the 
frontier, it is a place defined not by rigid boundaries demarcating center and not center (i.e., 
periphery), but by a “constant sense of confrontation.” This particular space provides 
opportunity for confrontation with, but also accommodation to, ways in which to imagine 
oneself in the world.101 This is a space of rupture; it is liminal space where all individuals and 
groups understand and define themselves in light of the experience of others, confronted 
there.102 Gilman even suggests that Israel ought to be re-conceptualized as a frontier state. 
 Bammer understood diaspora as an experience of mobility, plurality, and inherent 
alterity; one is always in movement from an origin, a place of plenitude and being “at home,” 
whether imagined or “real,” both individual and communal, both spatially and temporally. Yet, 
eventually one needs a place in which to settle upon certain symbols and understandings,103 to 
become emplaced. What the model of the frontier helps to frame is the question of kinship, 
relationship, and even notions of home/return. Even the unsettled qualities associated with the 
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frontier suggest something beyond, in any direction, from which, or to which, or within which 
an eventuality will occur or has occurred. 
 Jews, Gilman states, are to be understood as multiple entities within a singularity. They 
are multiple because of the many cultures manifested under such a label. They are unitary 
because of a common archaeology and/or culture “they believe they share – even those never 
self-consciously part” of the group.104 Inherent in the concept of frontier, according to Gilman, 
is the action of violation. However, this is conceived as “a narrative tradition that is 
superimposed on the landscape.” 105  In this way, then, the frontier is always already an 
encapsulation of the past, present, and future, but with a decidedly motion-orientated impulse. 
The new frontier in medicine, he states, is that of genetic knowledge.106 These narratives, 
religious, historical, and biological, contain multiplicity but are unified in their attempt at 
explanation. They all are predicated on origins, occurrence, and ways of conceiving of 
connection. 
 The space of the frontier includes acknowledgement of differences, those of both the 
individual and the group. As a point of comparison, Gilman juxtaposes hybridity to 
multiculturalism. The former, he asserts, is a result of mixture, which may contain a plethora of 
sources rich in diversity, but ends up with an unstable, malleable product. The latter is the 
antithesis to hybridity. Yet a tension still exists. Multiculturalism may result in a reification of 
ethnic identities, but it also allows for the possibility of celebrating a merging of cultures, in 
which all can be explored in their details. Hybridity, he argues, leads to assimilation and a loss of 
individual identity, paradoxically at the creation of a “new” one, while multiculturalism, being 																																																								
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wary of reifying locations and cultures from which one comes, allows for belonging, 
engagement, and recognition of difference on many levels.107 Diaspora, then, the process of 
origination, separation, and attempted return, is always multiple and is always a part of an 
individual’s (and group’s) identity. These processes contain myths’ multivalence, operating 
simultaneously. 
You Can Take the Human out of the Middle East, but not the Middle East out of the Human 
 We have seen that when considered as a race, Jews are physically quite heterogeneous 
and possess no distinguishing features. If considered a nation, it must be acknowledged that this 
designation refers to the early origin of Jews but is insufficient to account for the proliferation of 
developed genetic diseases within various Jewish populations through time. Richard Goodman 
states, therefore, that it is more acceptable to speak of Jews as a people. This understanding 
takes adequate account of its composition by various groups, but groups that share common 
religion, culture, and historical experiences;108 the constituent groups share certain myths, which 
happen to include a biological substrate for many individuals. He continues further by stating 
that genetically Jews constitute a heterogeneous population, but there are markers suggesting an 
early Middle Eastern origin, and these groups carried their genes with them. To understand 
genetic disorders, therefore, physicians must understand one’s distant past.109 In this way, genes 
are a chronotope par excellence, as well as the prime example of a longue durée investigation into a 
population’s history. They always remain with an individual and provide a constant supplement 
to one’s constructed identity. 
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 If we pick up where Chapter Two left off historically, the Jews are a Middle Eastern 
people, comprised of various groups and united by a shared outlook and consequent historical 
experiences. Component groups that coalesced into what became known as the Hebrews were 
nomadic, while others were breakoff segments of what became known as the Canaanites (i.e., 
developed “indigenous” populations). Historical speculation based on probability, as well as 
textual evidence, recognizes intermarriage among these peoples. Over time this people would 
become the Ashkenazi, Sephardi, and Mizrahi Jewish communities worldwide.110 With the 
destruction of the First Temple in 586 BCE, the Israelite population that was moved eastward 
founded Babylonian Jewry. Some later left that community and traveled to other parts of Asia 
and the Middle East and mixed with populations there, forming the Mizrahi (Eastern) Jewish 
populations. 111  With the rise of the Greco-Roman empires, some Jews who remained in 
Palestine migrated westward, going as far as Spain. These groups developed into what became 
known as Sephardic Jewry, eventually covering the Mediterranean basin.112 Ashkenazi Jewry 
developed out of the Jews from Palestine who made their way to Europe mostly during the 
Middle Ages and established themselves in France and the German lands. Over time they settled 
in Eastern Europe and made their way to the United States. 
 Speaking in broad terms, Gregory Livshits says that by the time of the beginning of the 
Jewish diaspora (i.e., migration out of Palestine) in the sixth century BCE, the Jewish people had 
spent a few hundred years developing into a people, which later were subdivided into numerous 
populations that dispersed to various parts of the world. In the subsequent locations into which 
Jews found themselves, they tended to remain a non-intermarrying subpopulation. As a result, 																																																								
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random genetic mutations, as well as a not insignificant amount of interbreeding, were expected. 
Numerous dispersions and physical catastrophes, such as rapid and severe decreases in 
population due to assaults and further subsequent migrations elsewhere, led to the effectively 
small population size of each Jewish subpopulation. This in turn led to a rapid increase in genetic 
distances between them and whichever surrounding populations they encountered.113 
 He notes that during processes of formation and settlement in any given territory, 
human populations are subjected to various influences, such as migration, admixture with people 
from other populations, random differentiation, and even selective processes. These effects may 
be demonstrated genetically, and thus geneticists are able to pinpoint areas in which members of 
populations are more similar to each other than to others. Jews, then, spread over all of Europe, 
the Middle East, North Africa (and pockets in other locations), parts of Asia, and eventually to 
North and South America. They did so relatively rapidly, given the time span of human 
development, but until relatively recently had remained rather isolated and small in overall 
population size. 
 When viewing Jewish history in the light of renewed migrations, it is easy to see how 
Laurie Zoloth can characterize a significant component of Jewish life as always being estranged 
and in exile, of not being at home; it is this sense, she argues, that is intrinsic to a particularly 
Jewish notion of otherness and a yearning to go home.114 Yet, when viewed in terms of human 
migratory patterns and development writ large, the concept of Jewish dispersion might have 
been overdramatized, as James Neel argues. Rather, he states, it is helpful to “visualize the roots 
of Ashkenazim in a more or less continuous flow of people to Europe over a period of some 
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800 years, beginning more than 2,000 years ago.”115 Jewish history, even from its scriptural 
beginnings, then, with Abraham traveling from Ur to the Land of Israel and continuing with 
Jewish travel in and out of the land, is always already in a state of physical movement, even if the 
“originary” movement was imagined (i.e., without an historically identifiable “Abraham,” as 
such). With regard to archaeological attestations to such, Jewish history, then, began with a 
coalescence of various migratory groups with indigenous populations. Thus, Jewish history 
always already was located, but imagined itself as migratory. 
 What geneticists can say regarding Jewish travel is that Jewish populations from major 
diaspora groups (e.g., Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Mizrahi) form population clusters that share genetic 
relationships with both Semitic and European populations. Within the larger Jewish cluster, 
then, each Jewish subpopulation, variously conceived and interspersed throughout different 
regions, formed their own subclusters. Each subcluster demonstrated Semitic ancestry and had 
variable degrees of admixture with the respective surrounding populations.116 In this way, 
contemporary Jews betray a decidedly Middle Eastern and Mediterranean identity,117 albeit in the 
same way that a majority of the world’s humans betray an African ancestry simply by being 
human. With the advent of genetic testing, we are entering, quite literally, a revolutionary era; we 
have returned once again to this concept of locating Judaism’s origins, now located through 
genetic glimpses into the past, to a Levantine culture. 
 While it has been argued that no single event or connection unites the Jews, there do 
exist, as Goodman points out, different strands connecting different groups at different times, 																																																								
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which places into question what it is that makes a people a people.118 For example, there are 
some genes that have a higher frequency among populations or continents. The presence of a 
particular hemoglobin gene that causes sickle cell disease and Glucose-6-Phosphate 
Dehydrogenase deficiency (G6PD deficiency, also known as “favism”) increases the likelihood 
that those people had ancestors from geographic regions where malaria was present. In much 
the same way, those individuals with the TSD allele most likely have Ashkenazi Jewish or French 
Canadian ancestry.119 
 There are several ways that geneticists can study human genetic variation. They analyze 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), short tandem repeats (STRs, also known as 
microsatellites), and Alu sequences. Recent analyses of hundreds of microsatellite DNA markers 
and thousands of SNPs from different populations have demonstrated that it is possible to 
assign individuals, with a high degree of accuracy, to major geographical regions of origin by 
using a combination of polymorphic genes.120 The human genome contains patterns of SNPs 
that are inherited in particular ethnic communities (populations) with origins in historically 
continuous geographic regions. This suggests that those individuals possessing such SNPs share 
a common ancestry.121 When many people in a population share these genetic loci, geneticists 
can differentiate between geographical populations, and those markers can be used to form 
affinity clusters based on the number of shared similarities. People possess ancestry from more 
than one cluster, thus demonstrating migratory origins from multiple regions.122 																																																								
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 This clustering of SNPs, for instance, sheds light on the history of human migrations 
that began around 100,000 years ago. With regard to specifically Jewish migration history, a 
common example focuses on tracing the biblical priestly line (cohanim). Goldstein states that with 
genetics it is possible “to evaluate whether groups showing Jewish cultural characteristics or 
claiming Jewish ancestry show genetic affiliation with other Jewish groups”123 based on those 
SNPs. Analyzing genetic variation among Y chromosomes of individuals who do and do not 
claim priestly descent can test the oral tradition of patrilineal inheritance of cohanim. If the oral 
tradition of patrilineal inheritance is accurate, in which case this status was passed on from father 
to son, then it must be recorded in the Y chromosomes.124 
 Based off of the biblical prescriptions of Numbers 3, the priests were male descendants 
of Aaron, and the priestly status, in particular that of high priest, Cohen, was hereditary. The 
cohanim were a subset of the tribe of Levi, and this status, while diminished due to the 
destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE and the end to the functioning of the priests, was 
never abandoned. Priestly status, unlike Jewishness itself, was conferred on males from cohanim 
fathers to their sons.125 As stated, the Y chromosome is a chromosome that a father passes on 
only to sons, and it does not undergo evolutionary shuffling in the same way that paired 
chromosomes do. Therefore, sons inherit from fathers a relatively unchanged chromosome.126 
 To determine whether or not this oral tradition continued, scientists had to determine 
who was a cohen or not. Through the use of symbols on tombstones indicating that the buried 
was a cohen, among other methods, it has been estimated that four to five percent of worldwide 																																																								
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male Jewry consists of those with the cohen priestly status. Roughly estimated, this amounts to 
around 500,000 cohanim in existence today, and that would mean that those individuals are 
derived from a single ancestral chromosome (of Aaron, to be exact), who must have lived, 
according to tradition, some time within the past three thousand years.127 Groups of scientists 
investigated a set of six unique event polymorphisms (specific genetic markers/mutations). If 
multiple Y chromosomes carried those markers it would indicate the likelihood that they shared 
a common ancestor. Scientists were able to identify a set of related chromosomes, called a modal 
cluster, which among those who claimed descent from a cohen, accounted for sixty four percent 
of those observed chromosomes.128 This became known as the Cohen Modal Haplotype, and 
not surprisingly it was shared with both Ashkenazi and Sephardi communities of cohanim. In 
other words, this particular lineage predates the historical separation of those communities. 
 Ostrer states that the rate of admixture is estimated to be around 0.5% per generation. 
When multiplied over the more than eighty generations since the founding of Ashkenazi Jewry, 
it indicates that those groups remained endogamous for much of their history. Around sixty one 
to sixty nine percent of Ashkenazi and Sephardi cohanim share the Cohen Modal Haplotype, and 
when viewed in terms of the rate of decay of those genetic markers, the haplotype is estimated 
to have originated around two to three thousand years ago. This suggests that at least that 
particular subset of Jewish populations remained faithful to the oral tradition over the 
millennia.129 
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You Are Where Your Genes Have Been? 
 The genetic split between what became European Jews from Middle Eastern Jews is 
timed to have taken place about 2,500 years ago.130 When studying Y chromosomal markers 
geneticists are able to better understand the gene flow of Jewish populations from non-Jewish 
males. Ostrer notes that contemporary Jews and Middle Eastern Arabs have thirteen common Y 
chromosomal haplotypes, which indicates that the original Jews (i.e., Jews who later dispersed 
into regions after the Temple destructions, which indicates many years of having been 
indigenous to the region) might have arisen from local peoples and were not the “offspring” of a 
single patriarch.131 The significance of this, and other similar discoveries, is to highlight the fact 
that migration and relatedness are relative. We all identify as belonging to many families, 
contrary, even, to historical myths. 
 Other examples of “Jewish tracking” based on genetic markers exist, for example the 
Lemba, a group from southern Africa who claim Jewishness through genetics, not practice. 
Their group narrative includes traditions of migration from Israel to Yemen and then to 
southern Africa, and based off of genomic tests, they are “authentically” Jewish because many 
male members carry the Cohen Modal Haplotype on the Y chromosome.132 This demonstrates 
that “Jewish people in population studies represent a series of geographical isolates or clusters 
woven together by common genetic threads.”133 What helps in strengthening their identification 
with the decidedly Jewish component of their identifications is that they share more and longer 
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strands with one another than with non-Jewish populations, thus highlighting their commonality 
of Jewish origin, regardless of temporal distance.134 
 While the general picture that emerges from a map of routes taken by modern humans 
during their geographical expansion is that Jews had a Middle Eastern origin, there nonetheless 
are varying degrees of admixture that those Jewish populations had with others. Based off of 
those interactions, which likewise spanned thousands of years, Jewish populations genetically 
mirror local populations of the regions in which subsequent generations arose, but it is difficult 
to explain the prevalence of “Jewish” genetic diseases in these populations.135 Involved in these 
occurrences are elements of chance occurrence (i.e., random mutation) and natural selection. 
 As Melvin Konner attests, almost all of the world’s Jews have a common, substantial 
genetic resemblance to local non-Jews of the Middle East; in this way, Jewish peoplehood is a 
reality, and it traces Jews to roughly the time and place in which Jews had always told themselves 
about their origins. Of course subsequent conversion and admixing occurred, but there is a non-
negligible component of “Jewish” genetic markers still uniting many Jews in Jewish populations. 
He states that Jews, as many liberal Jews attest, are not a racial category, nor is Judaism a 
biological characteristic. Yet, historically the practice of Judaism by individuals has overlapped 
with populations that can, to a significant degree, be genetically defined.136 
Genetics’ Limitations 
 Given the statistically significant fact of admixture and inbreeding with other 
populations, what mechanisms can account for the high prevalence of genes that have come to 																																																								
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be identified as and as causing “Jewish” genetic diseases? Over the years many scientists have 
attempted to answer this question. The answers are less clear-cut, but the inroads that have been 
made have done much to help explain the migrations of populations identifying as Jewish. Some 
suggestions as to how certain diseases predominated in Jewish populations were advanced that 
focused on selective forces operative on Jews and non-Jews in Europe over the last 1,900 years, 
such as susceptibility to tuberculosis (i.e., natural selection). The argument was that heterozygous 
carriers of the TSD gene were more resistant to tuberculosis and that a homozygous individual 
would develop TSD itself. Yet, this line of argument is speculative. In addition, while life in the 
Jewish enclaves in Europe (i.e., the developed ghettos), was miserable, it was no less miserable 
for non-Jews who were city-dwellers. Yet, there is no corresponding prevalence of TSD in 
surrounding non-Jewish populations.137 
 Another hypothesis for the high frequency of TSD is that of genetic drift with a founder 
effect. Some scientists posit that genetic changes occurred in Jewish populations after various 
dispersions, due to random genetic drift, natural selection, and admixture with local populations. 
Defective genes predispose people to many types of diseases. Genetic drift means that a small 
population settled in a new area, which caused the incoming population to genetically differ 
from the surrounding population. Jews from different ethnic communities (i.e., geographic 
regions), it must be noted, suffer from different genetic diseases than Jewish populations from 
other regions. Genetic diseases, in this regard, differ from the sex-linked Y chromosome 
haplotype in that they vary between populations, but this, too, like disease genes, can help to 
track “origins” and migration. 
 Most of the genetic disorders afflicting Jews are autosomal recessive traits, which means 
that the mutant gene may be located on an autosome (a non-sex chromosome) or on either of 																																																								
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the sex chromosomes. A helpful way to think about human dispersion when related to disease 
frequency is, as Ostrer points out, to view gene frequencies in a population as a line or a vector 
in space. Populations with the greatest distances are the most disparate. The distance between 
branching points was the measure of time when one population broke off from another.138 As 
noted, disease mutation can be traced back to a single founder, if a genealogy for the group 
exists. If genealogies are absent or spotty, then founder effects can be inferred when carriers of 
particular genetic disorders seem to cluster or emanate from particular communities.139 
 For Jewish communities, in particular the Ashkenazi populations in Europe, there are 
seven different Y chromosomal lineages in common. Of those seven, five belong to an ancestral 
pool transmitted by individuals migrating from the Middle East, and two are part of populations 
that entered the Ashkenazi communities after dispersal to Europe.140 Of the diseases frequently 
occurring in these populations, some are lysosomal storage diseases, other are glycogen storage 
diseases, some involve clotting factor diseases, and other are disorders of adrenal steroid 
biosynthesis. TSD is an autosomal recessive disease, which means that each parent of an affected 
child carries a single defective copy of the Hexosaminidase A (Hex A) gene. What makes it a 
“Jewish” disease? It was found a hundred times more frequently in individuals of Ashkenazi 
ancestry.141 
 This disease is categorized as a lysosomal storage disorder. In effect, lysosome cells 
contain specific enzymes that digest accumulated cellular waste into molecules that can be 
reutilized. A deficiency in these enzymes leads to an accumulation of those “garbage molecules” 																																																								
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and they cannot be broken down. Ordinarily Hex A breaks down the fatty substance, a toxin 
known as GM2 ganglioside. Without this break down, the substance accumulates on nerve cells, 
causing them to increase in diameter. Over time the nerve cells die, which results in neurological 
deterioration.142 
As stated, some scientists posit genetic drift as the mechanism for Ashkenazi Jewish 
populations’ high frequency of TSD. Drift implies random fluctuations in the gene frequency 
from one generation to the next based on a finite size of an effective breeding population. The 
founder effect, a special feature of drift, occurs when some genes are carried by founders of a 
new community, whose genes tend to differ in frequency and occurrence from those in the 
original, parent population.143 What this means regarding Jewish migration is that segments of 
the Middle Eastern Jewish population who later would emerge as founders of Ashkenazi Jewry 
possessed genes that differed from the parent population from which they emerged, and they 
likewise differed from the populations into which they settled. Repeated bottlenecks in the 
population (sudden and rapid decreases in population size followed by dramatic increases in 
population size) continued the mutated gene in succeeding generations at a much higher rate 
than in the surrounding populations. The issue that scientists continue to grapple with is that 
given the unusual predominance that TSD had in Ashkenazi populations suggests that the 
groups comprising those populations carried the gene with them from the Middle East hundreds 
of years ago. The chances of a subset of a Middle East population having this gene, then going 
to Europe over many years, continuing to carry it in such high frequencies despite admixing is 
extremely unlikely. 
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 Another explanation is natural selection, as stated. This occurs when individual traits that 
are better adapted to an environment (i.e., involve a greater chance of survival) continue to be 
propagated throughout a population. This proposition requires that the affected individuals (i.e., 
those who are carriers of the altered gene) would have a reproductive fitness and thus have 
offspring more suitable to live successfully within a certain environment. In this reasoning, the 
Hex A deficiency in TSD disease supposedly increased resistance to tuberculosis, but there is no 
strong evidence to support this claim,144 especially given the historically similar environments of 
Jewish and non-Jewish life in Europe of the preceding centuries and the lack of prevalence of 
TSD in those other populations. 
 We have seen that Jewish populations tended toward endogamy and thus were likely to 
pass on disease-causing genes. They also underwent many bottlenecks, for example in the 9th, 
14th, 16th, and 17th centuries in Europe, when their effective population sizes became as small as a 
few thousand individuals.145 As the groups eventually grew in size, they supposedly maintained 
the presence of those altered genes while still undergoing admixture (i.e., influxes of new genes 
due to incorporating those of other populations), but apparently Jewish populations were never 
as diluted to such an extent to approach gene frequencies of certain disease-causing genes as 
were those of surrounding non-Jewish populations. In other words, Jewish populations 
maintained a high prevalence of the TSD gene. 
 Scientists also note, however, that some disease mutations are unique to specific Jewish 
groups and thus likely arose while in diasporic conditions. They have determined, based on 
particular genetic markers, that the coalescence time of these mutations is dated to around fifty 
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generations ago, which places the influx (migration) of these populations at the time when Jews 
were said to have arrived to the Rhineland; other diseases correspond to periods when Jews were 
granted charters to reside in Poland and Lithuania.146 In other words, genetics allows us to gauge 
not only how disease operates, but also to link onsets of such disease-causing genes to flows of 
people into particular regions where such diseases are reported to occur. Much of this genetic 
evidence corresponds to previous accounts of Jewish residential history in Europe. 
 Given that Jews “began” genetically as a conglomeration of various peoples in the 
Middle East, slowly but steadily fanned outward from there, admixed with every population they 
encountered, and carried some altered genes with them but also developed some along the way 
in various locations, it is easy to see how Ostrer could describe Jewishness at the genetic level as 
a tapestry with threads representing shared segments of DNA, no one single thread being 
required for its composition, and no thread replacing the religious definitions of what is a Jew.147 
The main area of dispute, among geneticists, is how to incorporate those portions of genetic 
variability within Jewish populations that do correlate with geography and to assess how 
important those portions are to medical treatment and testing.148 Scientists note that there is no 
consensus as to who should be counted as belonging to the Jewish community for purposes of 
screening, and in fact genetic testing is aimed not at Jews as members of a religious group, per 
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se, but rather at people of Ashkenazi or Mizrahi ancestry, a large proportion of whom are 
Jews.149 
Genetics as a Multicolored (and Necessary) Thread in Identity 
 Even in the Jewish scriptural imagination the Jewish people never claims to be a race, a 
distinct, discrete, somehow “pure” genetic group. We read in Ezekiel 16:3, for instance, that in 
recounting Judaism’s origins the male and female progenitors were Amorite and Hittite, 
respectively; both were from the lands of Canaan, however. Also, the Bible is replete with 
examples of mixed groups producing offspring that were considered fully part of the Jewish 
faith community. For example, at the beginning of the book of Ruth we read how the later King 
David had ancestors who included the Moabite Ruth. Many years later Jesus, who is claimed to 
be included in David’s lineage, issues from this mixed ancestral heritage. At times women 
converted to Judaism, as in the case of Ruth, but that is not always the case – see Moses’s wife, 
the Midianite Zipporah. In this way, Judaism is presented as a population bound together by 
common historical experience and an awareness of belonging, which often was “derived from 
personal participation.”150 Yet, there still existed the explicitly hereditary priestly line. It was only 
in the post-Second Temple period that rabbis made a Jewish mother the sine qua non of 
Jewishness.151 
 Jewish scriptures speak of people being named after male founders and being included in 
the father’s ethnic group, but it was after the Babylonian exile that Jewish identity placed a 
stronger emphasis on the mother’s status. Shaye Cohen explains that the introduction of 																																																								
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matrilineal descent occurred during the time when similar Roman laws governing intermarriage 
were prevalent, and the Jewish community needed to maintain its population. As well, he states 
that matrilineal descent might have taken priority over that of patrilineality when rabbis ruled 
that it was more effective to gauge what happens to offspring as the result of reproductive 
mixtures of different types; the female gains primacy in determining the status of the child.152 
 With regard to genetic histories of human migration, however, we gain a somewhat 
different picture. In most patrilocal societies, which it could be argued the early Israelites were, 
the man remains in one location while the woman travels from her birth place to that of the 
man’s to start a family. Over time this relocation transfers the mitochondrial DNA over long 
distances. For the bulk of Jewish history, though, it was men, not women, who were mobile. 
Geneticists have identified four founder events occurring two to three thousand years ago, 
which accounts for forty percent of the mitochondrial DNA lineages in Ashkenazi communities 
today. We can infer from this that, “Jewish women had different paths than men.”153 It seems as 
though Jewish men would settle in new locations, if unmarried they would take local women for 
wives, and then once a community had been established would erect barriers against further 
admixing. This is consistent, Goldstein argues, with the idea of Jewish isolation and endogamy.154 
 According to what has become standard halakhah (rabbinic Jewish law), a Jew is someone 
who has a Jewish mother or who is a convert according to halakhah. For Conservative Jews, the 
conversion does not need to be performed under Orthodox auspices, and for Reform Jews, an 
individual having a non-Jewish mother but a Jewish father is considered legally Jewish.155 
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Throughout time there have been varied definitions about what is a Jew, and the decisions about 
this question have implications for questions about genes. Judaism has many cultural definitions 
of Jewishness, but the halakhic one is largely genetic. For our purposes we can follow Konner’s 
logic of treating Judaism according to his understanding of peoplehood. 
 Konner states that regardless of their name (Israelites, Hebrews, etc.), the groups of 
people who comprised this designation existed well before the Temple was erected and before 
the laws of the Temple were enumerated. These peoples continuously occupied places that are 
now considered to be part of the land during the periods their foundational scriptures said they 
were sojourning in Egypt (which many of them might have been, as well). He notes that 
archaeologists have found elements of continuity between Israelite culture in the land and the 
later development of an Israelite kingdom, as depicted in those scriptures. The culture that 
developed into Jewish culture was formed and nurtured while in that land, and “Jews” existed as 
a people before there would be considered a Jewish religion; this, then, is what Konner 
understands as peoplehood, which has priority to all other forms of identification.156 It is fitting, 
then, to consider this land of meeting, point of departure, and area of development as a frontier. 
It is where people encountered each other, determined symbols and narratives, and considered 
“home,” of both their imaginations and historically – as part of their narratives. The land was 
directed to motion and encounter, and it was hardly achieved. Even the myths detailing its 
location – in memory and in archaeology, are unreconciled with one another. The frontier of 
genetics bespeaks this array of complex mythology and adds another dimension of movement 
and relatedness. 
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 A more thorough investigation into the scriptures, however, reveals elements that also 
speak to the component parts of peoplehood that Konner raises. The notion of “election” 
contains many of the elements of the halakhic definition: biological transmission and religious 
transmission.157 One can trace a fictive biology to Abraham, which maintains a semblance to 
genetic ties, although as noted there were a few genetic founders as opposed to a lone male and 
female pair, but through time scholars have added conflicting opinions on what other sorts of 
election constitute Jewish identity. Some have rejected election based on lineage, such as 
Spinoza, and others suggested that election was rather a notion of national morality.158 What no 
scholar can do away with, however, is that there necessarily has to be a combination of biology, 
culture, and religion in any understanding of inclusion to the Jewish community. 
 The traditional model of covenant is that between God and Abraham, Jews’ common 
ancestor, as found in Genesis 15 and 17. We find promises of land and continuity of 
descendants. Later, however, in Exodus 3, when at the burning bush God announces the lineage 
which brought Moses to this time and place, God is more than just the god of ancestors; God is 
one of belief and faith in what God will do and to which people will assent and follow.159 Elazar 
situates the covenant between God and the Israelites within the context of covenants between 
God and humanity more broadly. He explains that while the Bible recognizes humankind’s 
common ancestry, it also acknowledges intermixtures of nations and peoples as a concomitant 
part of human existence. What results, though, is that while all humans “are descended from 
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Noah and human history continues to flow in a generational rhythm, after the Flood that history 
will be one of separate nations on a divided earth.”160 
In his analysis of the Bible’s covenants, he notes four major attempts. As he relates: 
God’s first effort, with Adam, was to create a creature with sufficient intelligence 
to manage His garden but naturally innocent and thus uninterested in challenging 
Heaven…Humans lose their innocence by gaining knowledge of good and evil, 
thereby arousing God’s fear that they will indeed challenge Him. God tries to 
remedy this by requiring humans to work hard and make their way in the world 
only with pain; this is His second effort. But humans show their mettle, are 
inventive…So God wipes them out by flood…God makes a third try with Noah 
and his sons…Not only does Noah disappoint Him, but worse, humanity as a 
whole challenges Heaven at Babel…God tells Abraham to go forth from his 
land, his kith and kinship network, and his father’s household…to a new 
Divinely indicated land…Founding a new society requires detachment from all 
of these factors, which are the principal sources of cultural ties and 
transmission…they must be replaced in the new society by new attachments of 
equal weight…Every new society or nation must have a purpose that motivates 
its founding and informs its existence…Such transformations only come when 
migration is part of the process…it makes possible the reintegration of those 
elements around a new set of beliefs and principles and a new way of life…there 
is an existential connection between migration and the founding of new societies 
by covenant.161 
 
In this way, Elazar incorporates into the presentation of covenant the major themes of our 
chapter, and even of this dissertation: myths of origin/beginnings, ancestry (both biological and 
consensual), the co-implication of biology and culture (thus laying the foundations for a 
biosocial framework through which to study humanity), migration/movement, generation, 
continuity, and commitment. What allows the developed groups to claim descent and inclusion 
to these covenants, as Elazar reminds us, is the act of remembering.162 
This twofold aspect of biology and culture continues further when in Exodus 32-34, 
after the incident of the Golden Calf, the assembly under the direction of Moses, was issued a 																																																								
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new covenant – likewise based on lineage, to a degree, but mostly on assent. This serves to 
demonstrate that covenants are revocable, and it also places into question when “Judaism” 
begins: before birth (in genes, tracing back to Abraham), at birth with circumcision, at Sinai, 
upon entering the Promised Land, at the moment of converting to the community (in which 
case one gains a fictive biology, assuming the name “Son/Daughter of Abraham/Sarah”), etc. 
 What also is important to note is that the Jewish idea of election, of identifying with its 
history as if it were one’s own, never connoted “racial” superiority or even purity, as 
demonstrated. Rather, the notion carried with it self-impositions and a supposed on going self-
policing and drive to live out those injunctions to which they assented.163 What, then, is the 
meaning of the TSD gene on Jewish identity, for instance? There is none, apart from the cultural 
and religious significance attached to genetic testing and any community reactions to that 
process.164 As Zoloth explains, the new “frontier” of genetic medicine presents to us another 
opportunity to find a coherent balance between freedom and responsibility, between “the 
American [and postmodern] idea that we can be anything we want if we try and the constraints 
of biology.”165 Slowly the medical establishment must shy away from depersonalized medicine, 
which, paradoxically suffers from the same predicament of postmodernism, in which all 
differences blend away. Research about physical (including genetic) difference is different, 
Zoloth states, in that it exists in tension with the universalizability of the body. She notes that we 
still lack a vocabulary to discuss difference.166 
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 Regardless of attempts to do away with boundaries, differences exist, and humans are 
meaning-making creatures. In this way we reapproach the concept of diaspora. Nelson reminds 
us that efforts to refine the concept persist, and scholars seem to agree that its “hallmarks” 
include dispersal away from a long held geographical home, the constitution of a collective 
identity/consciousness in response to the experience of dispersal, connection to that place of 
origin through cultural practices, and the circulation of collective memories about the homeland. 
How does imagining the homeland include genetic information? She joins Gilroy in being wary 
of attempts to essentialize and homogenize origins by trying to find a DNA link to a “there,” 
which would situate an individual into an imagined, glorified past.167 
 The more that genetics offers us in terms of actually finding those links, as well as 
informing us of how genes can inform us about ancestral movement and rates of disease 
occurrence, etc., we find that there really is no unified past, let alone a glorified one. Our 
developed myths posited these homelands and associated ways of belonging with those of our 
kin. Yet, Nelson points out that kinship has many bases, and genetic testing offers possibilities 
to “scale up diaspora without scaling it down to human biological essences.”168 As Elazar states, 
“The biblical accounts of the origins of the Jewish people reflects a blend of kinship and consent 
that generates a special political culture and a variety of institutions at home in it. A family of 
tribes becomes a nation by consenting to a common covenant with God and with each other, 
out of which flow the principles and practices of religious life and political organization that 
have animated the Jews as a corporate entity ever since.”169 One is not reducible to the other, 
and one cannot supersede the other. Both biology and culture are needed for some semblance of 
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an integrated existence. If one myth remains dismissed, then that corresponding aspect of being 
in diaspora remains unrecognized. 
 We have seen that Teilhard de Chardin, Bammer, Benjamin, and others have presented 
numerous ways in which we are always already born into states of displacement; we also have 
seen that the proliferation of narratives/myths that attempt to explain origins continues to 
obfuscate matters for many reasons. Some myths lack historical depth, others encompassing 
breadth, and some focus on only the cultural or biological component to the neglect of others. 
Bammer insists that in order to navigate this array of ways of being displaced she uses the 
knowledge of life as itself comprised of displacement as a tool to survive. If we all are displaced 
many times over, then what is left to do is to understand ways in which we connect and provide 
meaning to our lives. We have seen many people proclaim humanity’s inability to overcome 
these multiple displacement; others have claimed the opposite as true. Yet, we know all too well 
that we are unable to take into account all ways in which we are displaced/diasporized. 
Therefore, we are still incomplete. As Benjamin states, “The chronicler who narrates events 
without distinguishing between major and minor ones acts in accord with the following truth: 
nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost to history. Of course only a redeemed 
mankind is granted the fullness of its past – which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its 
past become citable in all its moments.”170 Nevertheless, gaining contextualization allows for 
more recovering of the past and necessitates less of inventing it. 
In other words, we may integrate this new genetic information into our existing 
conceptions of identity and ancestry, but even this occurs in environments loaded with symbolic 
significations, histories, and languages that often disallow its expression in certain ways. As well, 																																																								
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the genetic information often fails to provide the certainty that many individuals desire.171 We 
can trace our common evolutionary history, our genetic relatedness, and the many ways that 
different groups conceive of kinship and ancestry. In following Bammer’s discussion about 
displacement, where are any of our points of origin? But more importantly, how we conceive of 
our pasts helps in determining how we live presently, what connections and relationships we 
form, and ultimately helps determine how and to what, if anything, we wish to return.
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 
 
Studies of diaspora have ranged from exploring various socio-historical causes of “exile,” 
to subjective literary analyses locating “home” in an imagined, extraterritorial text. Many of these 
earlier studies also proposed definitions, each with various configurations of sets of 
characteristics, which constituted the diaspora phenomenon. Over time tensions emerged 
among many foci in these characteristics of diaspora, such as between locality and mobility; 
between radical particularisms (i.e., more subjective, individualized, and free- floating signifiers 
expressing alienation) and the need for definitional anchoring; and between individual memory 
and history. The resulting breakdown of these imposed definitions opened up the phenomenon 
to include more groups as being in diaspora and also placed into question other narratives that 
previously seemed stable and fixed, such as the concept of boundaries, the nation-state, group 
identity, irredentism, issues of power, as well as the scope of investigation itself – what are the 
parameters in studying any phenomenon? How much of the past needs to be included in any 
study of diaspora, or of any particular groups that self-identify as diasporic? 
Self-Appraisal and Remedy 
Even the enterprise of History of Religions underwent a similar period of self-
assessment due to proliferating calls regarding “identity politics.” Early studies, such as those by 
Eliade, presented an impressive array of archetypes in a morphological system. Yet, they offered 
no explanation, just description of seemingly static and unchanging phenomena. Gradually these 
gave way to studies, such as those by J. Z. Smith, which were attuned to changes within a given 
system, explored causes and implications of such transformations, and thoroughly investigated 
and contextualized the exemplum. Smith even recognized that the exemplum is not an 
ontological status in itself, but rather is the creation of the scholar; he acknowledged the fact that 
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any starting point is somewhat arbitrary and provided ways to address that critical insight. 
In this regard, Religious Studies demonstrated that it could respond to, but also 
contribute to understanding, current events and even to enduring issues of politics. Yet, it still 
lacked a prolonged engagement with diaspora. Some scholars within the field, such as Smart, had 
written about religion’s explicit treatment of group formation, location/space, travel/migration, 
and enactment of identity in changing contexts. But it was not until Tweed’s study of diasporic 
religion, however, that Religious Studies became firmly entrenched within the postmodern 
debates regarding identity, relation to space and time, and adequately addressed the tensions 
created in earlier definitional studies, especially regarding boundaries, power, and movement. 
Tweed noted that diaspora is a condition of movement from a center, real or imagined, 
and the dispersed members share a common culture, language, and symbols that help to bridge 
the homeland and the new land. This new land, he insists, is a symbolic place that targets 
practices and beliefs that overcome oppositions. In this way, diaspora religion, and religion more 
generally, can be considered a tirtha, a crossing place; it highlights difference (among beliefs, 
practices, ways of belonging within a community – even providing ways in which the community 
defines itself), but also unites. People rally around the religion proper, despite, or perhaps 
because of, the aforementioned differences. This new place, this diasporic religion, is a space of 
dispersal and is a site of confrontation/negotiation over symbols, images, and relations to them 
through which groups make sense of themselves and of being dispersed. Religion is a spatialized 
and spatializing cultural form, and it incorporates symbols that speak to its qualities of being 
both transtemporal and translocative. 
Tweed’s presentation of religion accommodated the aspect of movement while 
acknowledging the importance of location. He allowed for tensions to erupt between the 
individual and the group, between the group and the surrounding environment, between 
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tensions inherent in travel and settlement elsewhere, and between continuity and inevitable 
newness. Unlike Gilroy, Bhabha, and Clifford, who were attuned to movement and the 
development of new creations, of hybridity, Tweed, though permitted continuity and attachment 
by focusing on religion and the ways in which people construct meaning in relation to those 
pasts (which they access through religion). As a result of these limited, often historically 
superficial approaches, with notable exceptions (including Tweed), many other ways in which 
diaspora exists have been overlooked, particularly the work that memory performs in opening 
up diaspora’s multivalence. 
Memory, both individual and collective, helps to provide context. Subjective reflections 
provide access to voices otherwise absent in other accounts of life lived away from “home.” In 
this way, the individual inserts her own understanding of what caused diaspora, how she and the 
group to which she belongs relate to the lost home, etc. Yet without the inclusion of institutional 
memory and any other assessment of other pasts, accounts of and by diaspora groups remain de-
contextualized. Significant elements remain forgotten or otherwise omitted. A recognition of the 
many levels on which experience exists, both temporally and spatially, necessitates memory and 
enactment and thus fosters contextualization and understanding. 
Toward this goal of contextualization, I examine four case-studies in order to better 
understand how diaspora functions through time and across space. Underlying each subset is a 
concern with the mutually reinforcing realms of collective memory and commemoration. The 
result is to view diaspora as an experience in which diaspora itself is a commemoration that 
needs to be remembered and enacted. The focus on memory and its relation to place (i.e., 
commemoration) emerges out of the work by Benjamin and Taussig. They saw in their 
respective studies on the act of being reminded (i.e., remembering and recollecting, both 
activities that are intimately connected to re-presenting, making present again) that individuals 
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and groups have lost the ability to adequately present narratives to others (without imposing and 
interjecting biases), have lost the ability to listen to those attempts at stories, and have lost the 
ability to engage with context. Everything is presented in its mediated immediacy as a taken-for-
granted state of affairs. As a result, people do not know how things came to be as they are, or 
seem, and thus they are distanced from their own pasts, from themselves, their origins, and 
communities. Inherent in the phenomenon of diaspora are these very themes: myths, rituals 
(commemorations, enactments), distance, (lack of) context, and issues of community 
(relatedness), and return (i.e., regaining context for ethical decision-making). 
Genealogical Precursors 
To gain a better sense of how studies of memory and commemoration contribute to 
studies on communal life and institutions (i.e., what bonds individuals together and thus from 
what people feel alienated and distanced), I examine Durkheim’s recognition that within an 
individual is both a biological entity and a social being; thus, an individual is a representative of a 
collective already on many levels. Mauss extended further this socially constitutive aspect of 
humanity by focusing on ways in which structures are socially constructed, deeply entrenched in 
society, and also determinative, to a large degree, of an individual’s psyche (mentality). 
Halbwachs took Durkheim’s focus on social gatherings to mean that memory and history are 
socially constructed as well. History is not an abstract continuum interrupted by ruptures, but 
rather tied to perceptions that various groups have of themselves and of their relation to society, 
variously conceived. Connerton, also influenced by the Durkheimian tradition, understood 
rituals as being not just inscribed (written, taught, learned), but also as being incorporated 
(performed, encoded in gesture, posture, movement). Nora, similar to Mauss, focused on 
Fernand Braudel’s longue durée (i.e., fragments, “building blocks,” which combine over time to 
form a symbolic whole). Such a study takes otherwise stable constructs, like the nation and 
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concepts like the generation, disassembles them into their own constituent parts, and sees how 
they come together in “sites of memory” to form the constructs that we know and within which 
we operate. Through such an engagement with phenomena, those in the Durkheimian tradition 
note that times change, as well as how people approach, relate, and respond to symbols over 
time. 
Assmann, writing out of a Halbwachian, and thus Durkheimian, understanding of 
memory as being socially formed, differentiates between communicative memory and cultural 
memory. The former is what we perceive of as regular communication. The latter entails 
culturally instituted forms of enactment and content. Quotidian time, in which communicative 
memory occurs, is interrupted by events, rites, and other social activities that serve to introduce 
different temporal dimensions into the present. Assmann, like Nora, recognized that times and 
contexts change, but he pointed out that some elements of cultural life, like religion, maintain 
memories despite changes in the surrounding environment. These aspects of life bring to 
contemporaneity components that are out of time and place. Rituals, for Assmann, become 
bonding memories; they unite meanings from disparate times and places with people enacting 
them now. In a similar vein, Confino showcases how people become national, or part of a 
group, through identifying with the local. Through identification with the local environment in 
which they were raised, for instance, an individual becomes part of the whole but seemingly 
independent of it. Through this way of identifying, one sees how, despite changes and variations 
within the local itself, one becomes subsumed within the whole while retaining identification 
with what he perceives as simply the local. In this way, locals become nationals, despite never 
having been to the capital city, not speaking the same dialect, etc. Space, while in abstract is 
repetitive, for specific individuals at particular times, is a world unto itself; thus, it is irreducible, 
different, but unified with the whole. 
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With regard to Judaism proper, Eisen demonstrates how located within Jewish biblical 
texts, paradigms are present that speak to both humanity’s and Judaism’s relation to space, time, 
and notions of displacement. As a whole, humanity is displaced and longs to return to its Eden, 
a Paradise. Israel is displaced from and longs to return to the Promised Land; in the process 
Israel sojourns away from and toward that place. Also, Israel sojourns theologically and 
politically, and understands that what God gives to it is dependent on its behavior. In Israel’s 
developed self-understanding, it is itself the midpoint between origin and destination. Israel is a 
threshold, a limen, a tirtha, and a frontier. To do its appointed work, it needs space. Israel also is 
a people that is itself a meeting point between bonding memory (uniting disparate times and 
places in its ritual), and thus is a chronotope. Due to the recognition that the people must be 
cognizant of its past, know its future, and act accordingly to reach it in that place, it embodies 
the multivocality of diaspora – displacement politically, socially and culturally, geographically, 
temporally, and metaphysically, thus imaginatively. 
Archaeology and Cultural Memory 
Historians, political scientists, and even some literary theorists gravitate toward a broad 
understanding that something external causes a group to precipitate into a diaspora. This is not 
always the case. Incorporating memory into an analysis of diaspora uncovers further ways in 
which a group may enter a state of diaspora. Within each case-study, I incorporate key theorists 
who provide insight into the overarching theme of the respective chapters. In the first subset I 
use biblical archaeology alongside cultural memory studies, notably literary criticism, to get a 
better appreciation of what constitutes diaspora. I juxtapose cultural/literary theorist Jan 
Assmann’s examination of early Israel’s formation of cultural memory through his analysis of the 
book of Deuteronomy and biblical archaeologist William Dever’s acknowledgment of early 
Israel’s fragmentary nature, partial indigineity, and use of biblical texts as a way to target 
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“convergence” with the material record. The period under consideration is the Deuteronomistic 
History; its authorship and redaction are dated to the period of the Babylonian exile (sixth 
century BCE), but parts of it reflect, if are not dated to, earlier periods. This material was 
incorporated into biblical texts so as to fit the later theological interpretation of its authors and 
imposed teleology, but it still hints at earlier Israelite history. 
We get a sense from these textual glimpses into the past, as well as from archaeological 
evidence that overlap with events described in those texts, of a past that calls into question any 
understanding of early Israel based solely on scripture. After detailing and explaining away three 
previously held models used to make sense of Israelite origins (conquest, peaceful infiltration, 
and peasant revolt), Dever explains how the symbiosis model is most appropriate. According to 
physical remains, early Israel lived alongside Canaanites and set up new settlements in the central 
hills after leaving the lowland coastal centers. This process of resedentarization was part of a 
trend that had been occurring for centuries, in which the entire Levant was undergoing socio-
political upheaval. Israel, then, contained partly displaced Canaanites, displaced both 
geographically and ideologically. 
Some factions of this people may have also been part of earlier migrations in and out of 
Egypt, while others were breakoff groups from different nomadic peoples, and still others were 
the products of admixture among the Canaanites (including the displaced Israelite sections) and 
these various other groups. Over time they developed overarching narratives and later attributed 
theological understanding of these variegated pasts and subsumed different accounts into a 
single myth of origins for this people. Assmann explained that the biographical memory of the 
eyewitnesses (of the Exodus, of the wandering, etc.) gave way to the bonding memory spelled 
out in Deuteronomy. The prescribed rites tell the story and instruct these peoples in how to 
remember the narrative appropriately. 
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Yet, Deuteronomy is a counter memory; it introduces something alien into this 
community. It articulates a myth of who the community believes itself to be, presents 
enactments to perform in order to inculcate correct ritual behavior, admonishes people to forget 
their polytheistic pasts, and in effect, instructs the community to adopt behaviors that will entail 
their becoming strangers even in their renewed home. In other words, Israel is instructed to 
alienate itself from local traditions, even from its own indigenous past, in order to belong. This 
text, written hundreds of years after the events it describes occurred, is a cultural production of a 
projection into that past. 
Deuteronomy describes a community re-entering a land from which it had been exiled 
and into which it will now establish a covenanted life, after becoming a people. It also was 
redacted by members of that community who had again become exiled from that same land. 
Diaspora already exists on many levels. The developed Judaic tradition, though, lost Israelite 
presence in the land; Judaism had forsaken Israel’s partial indigeneity for a theological 
understanding of itself as a stranger coming from elsewhere. Diaspora, when seen in this light, is 
not necessarily precipitated by physical departure, as uncovered by archaeological evidence. It 
originates in part as an ever-present condition that begins as an act of remembrance. 
In order to press further, I include Lewis’s tripartite division of history as remembered, 
recovered, or invented. Through inclusion of personal recollections, history can be remembered. 
By uncovering instances of the past that had been forgotten or rejected, history can be 
recovered. And by interpreting history for particular purposes from material that has been 
remembered, recovered, or fabricated to fit those purposes, history can be invented. Yet, the 
present constructions of the past (as in the case of Deuteronomy) often find their foil, especially 
when confronting actual presence of groups that in the reconstructed history had been erased. 
Jewish traditions invented a particular version of the past as presented in scriptures. The 
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remembering of this past recovered actual Israelite presence, and this complicates that to which 
people feel distanced and alienated. 
To make better sense of this development, I turn to Masuzawa’s studies of Benjamin, 
especially his study of art. She noted that the study of origins, in religion for instance, is similar 
to the invention of photography for art; both shorten the distance between the original and 
subsequent viewers and practitioners. Technology diminished “aura,” the distance around an 
object; it diminished the object’s autonomy and independence. Now all reproductions, such as 
photographs, contain aura, but in less substantial form than in the original. Behind all 
reproductions, though, there was thought to be a primordium; this changed with the idea of the 
grid. No longer did artists see their work in light of prior creations. Each moment was its own 
creation, in the here and now. Thus, the grid had no precedent, no tradition, and nothing from 
the past was brought to bear on it. In this way, what was created never existed before, but then it 
always had existed. Each immediate creation, not being tied to anything prior, is a perpetual self-
created repetition. 
When applied to religion, Masuzawa was struck by Eliade’s notion of the eternal return. 
Ritual, which through repeated enactment continually hearkens back to a supposed time of 
origination, refers to beginnings, to a primordial event. Through enactment of this time, people 
are interpreted as suffering from “cosmic nostalgia.” Yet, she argued, if it is just archaic 
individuals who engage in this behavior (seeing as how “modern” individuals have overcome the 
need to do this), then they are the double of the modern scholars. Archaic individuals, in this 
scheme, are said to be obsessed with the time of ancestry, with origins, and we are obsessed, 
then, with archetypes and cosmogony (the beginning of the cosmos). Modern scholarship, she 
claims, is marked as dealing with displacement and repression, but on a different order. In using 
Masuzawa’s insights in trying to understand scholars who denounce Israel’s origins in a specific 
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location but ignore physical presence, we are left asking what these scholars mean by origins. 
Why should origins be limited to a literary tradition that denies physical presence and difference? 
Ancient Israel exists in many locations: literary, physical, ideological, etc. 
Space is important. Diaspora is an ever-present, never realized/actualized, let alone 
overcome, phenomenon, and its ground of origination is constantly shifting. If we take 
Masuzawa’s analysis to be true, that our obsession with those who are obsessed with origins is 
the other of us, and we have overcome our own obsession with origins, but still are obsessed 
with creation itself, then to what do we hope to return? If origin never existed as such, how 
could we overcome it in the first place? Arrival, then, is impossible. We are left with a view of 
Israel existing within multiple diaspora narratives, each a constant negotiation with memories 
and developed representations of such. In the traditions around these origins, especially literary 
traditions, the community in question was not given all the facts regarding physical migration, 
but were given all the facts regarding spiritual/metaphysical movement. They were told that they 
were strangers in the land, but were themselves of that land. Being a stranger, then, is an 
imagined condition as well. 
Fiction, Ethnography, and Reflection 
In subsets two and three I examine how diaspora operates in literature, ethnography, and 
personal reflections in order to better answer a simple question: Once one has physically 
returned, how does one write about travel, home, and homeland? To help answer this question I 
look at representative examples of Hebrew literature by S.Y. Agnon, in particular his novels In 
the Heart of the Seas, To This Day, and Only Yesterday. As well, I examine two ethnographic works: 
Mark Zborowski’s and Elizabeth Herzog’s Life is with People and S. An-sky’s work and 
questionnaire from his Jewish Ethnographic Expedition, alongside Israeli texts about 
intergenerational identity and forms of belonging, including Eliezer Schweid’s The Land of Israel, 
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Amos Oz’s In the Land of Israel, David Grossman’s The Yellow Wind, and Ari Shavit’s My Promised 
Land. 
Ezrahi examines authors who present an image of the land as pristine and those who 
present it as in ruins. The idealized place of yore serves as a foil, for these authors, to the current 
unredeemed lives out of which they wrote. They posited a home of the past in contradistinction 
to their homelessness of the present. In this scheme, Ezrahi argues, a telos is given; the goal is 
rigid (to travel from here to home – the land – and in this way redeem their lives and fulfill 
Judaism’s destiny), but the journey is open-ended and creative. The ensuing deferment of 
achieving this goal, which would bring their wandering and openness to a close, in fact maintains 
creativity. Closure (i.e., redemption found through emplacement in the land), the end of the 
journey, and rootedness in the land prohibit creativity. Here the land is understood as signaling 
exclusivity and a rejection of openness (to Others, to living a purely spiritualized existence, etc.). 
Therefore, Ezrahi issues a challenge to writers after political re-territorialization of the twentieth 
century: to become re-diasporized. 
The texts in these chapters deal with the themes of group formation, travel, separation, 
(physical) return, and struggle with how to include different and conflicting voices and 
incorporate self-reflective change. Many scholars studying the Jewish diaspora continue to 
understand physical homecoming to the Land as a fait accompli; which, according to some 
interpretations, prohibits creativity and presupposes an already achieved redemption, as Ezrahi 
warned. Scholarship following this analysis, however, misunderstands the calls for continued 
alienation and separation, regardless of location, and leaves unexamined many components of 
diaspora. 
The aforementioned texts provide examples through which I consider the theoretical 
frameworks of Walter Benjamin’s explanation of the threshold, Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the 
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“chronotope,” Thomas Tweed’s theory of religion as necessitating acknowledgement of both its 
transtemporal and translocative elements, and Abraham Joshua Heschel’s claim that the Land 
itself is a chronotope, a threshold, and thus requiring emplacement for ethical decision making. 
Heschel’s pronouncement regarding space, however, is a prolonged caveat to his argument that 
Judaism is a religion of time, not of space; in this caveat, however, he states that in order for 
time to be sanctified, it first needs ground from which to enact this sanctification. Through his 
inclusion of space as a necessary component to the fulfillment of time he allows for one to pause 
and consider what ethical imperatives and possibilities exist for one while in this place of 
potential sanctification. When speaking of how memory operates in relation to space and what 
one encounters in a journey, Benjamin invokes the metaphor of an unfolding fan. Its segments 
never finish unfolding, and this action occurs and is related to a particular place. Bakhtin’s 
chronotope is described as knots of narrative that are tied and untied, also at a particular place. 
Tweed continues his focus on movement, both through time and across space, but he adds that 
for this wandering to be meaningful, it must be purposeful (i.e., self-conscious and –reflective). 
Each theorist here pays attention to what occurs in the space necessary for narrative to 
emerge. Heschel’s echo, sound, and blast represents the rupture of the status quo, much like 
how others understood ritual punctuating communicative memory; these encounters, echoes, 
blasts, rites, etc. interject elements from elsewhere (both temporally and spatially) into the 
present (i.e., into moments of regular communicative time) and awaken and bond people to 
those other moments, times, and places. While undergoing quotidian life, people gain a 
consciousness of and identification with an elsewhere. Yet, Heschel issues another caveat to the 
proposition that humanity, and Judaism for instance, simply needs to heed to these warnings and 
live appropriately: humans have lost their guideposts. While the land of Israel may be a gate (to 
the past and future, from which one encounters the echo of the past alerting one to the 
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potentially ethical future), the key is lost. In this way, humanity has forsaken myth, the 
authoritative narratives that alert, inspire, teach, and guide. Given the state of humanity within 
modernity, especially within postmodernity, Heschel claims that these moments of rupture are 
becoming increasingly less frequent, and even when they occur, people are unable to hear the 
echo in its fullness. He speaks of “spiritual amnesia” and the importance of regaining a 
community of concern through which people act in concert to regain access to context (i.e., 
both collective and personal memories and pasts). 
Agnon complicates Ezrahi’s posited telos that she claims authors demonstrate in their 
writings regarding arrival to the land. His protagonist, Isaac Kumer for example, is always 
focused on the goal of the land, even while there. Despite his dying in the land, which for Ezrahi 
signaled redemption and unification with the goal, his goal was always something still to be 
achieved/reached. In fact, the goal in Agnon’s works is always imagined, projected, and never 
explicitly defined. Once emplaced, the characters still attempt to realize their imaginations in 
various ways. Isaac is the sojourner par excellence, and he is a portable chronotope himself who 
happens to become situated in the place/location that is itself a chronotope and threshold. What 
Agnon’s stories reveal is that the condition of diaspora cannot be overcome, for diaspora’s 
inherent aspect of longing can never be overcome. Even the content of that longing is never 
specified, let alone recounted. It is always in flux, and both object and subject are never stable 
long enough for any meaningful reconciliation to be reached, except to say that 
acknowledgement of diaspora’s ever-present, never-fulfilled, but continually striven for aspects 
help to guide action in one’s life and provide meaning. Perhaps the end of diaspora is the lack of 
challenge, the onset of resignment, and the settling for mediocre, uncritical action. Yet, this 
would be a delusion, for whatever place at which one stops, both physical and mental, is only an 
arbitrary destination. It is only part of the totality. 
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In turning my attention to ethnographies and Israeli reflections, I examine accounts of 
what being physically situated entails. The examples that I use highlight themes of location and 
identity construction therein. These processes of identity construction necessitate inclusion of 
voices and perspectives that often are troubling. Being emplaced allows for issues of generation 
and connection to be addressed. Attachment to what others before you were attached brings to 
the fore powers of coherence. We see that developed identity is always unfulfilled. Spaces of 
emplacement are locations of liminality from which one enacts a diasporic identity. Detailing the 
importance of place, and particular places at that, places into question calls for dismissing that 
particular place. Such calls overlook the ground for identity construction and its involvement in 
realpolitik. 
The first ethnography I examine is heavily mediated and was influenced by Zborowski’s 
imagination and biases. The latter delved into minutiae of everyday life in an attempt to capture 
as much as possible without imposing any external biases. Both types of studies may or may not 
have overlap with scholarly, historical accounts of shtetl life, however. What these studies help to 
highlight, though, is what results from crossing boundaries and developing an identity in a 
situated context. I juxtapose the two ethnographies with Gilroy’s Black Atlantic. He emphasizes 
the forged compound culture that results from the amalgamation of disparate sources into a new 
identity. His analysis of intermixture is not reduced to national or even ethnic terms; the culture 
that develops transcends both the nation-state and the constraints of ethnicity, and he explains 
how the developed black identity releases itself from reliance on the linearity of “grand” Africa 
of the past, slavery, and projected return to that glorious past. 
What Gilroy argued against is what Zborowski presented in his ethnography of Jewish 
life in the shtetl. This image is of a culture frozen in time and place, operating within a linear 
idealization of existence. Yet, even An-sky’s program was not what Gilroy envisioned. Gilroy 
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understood that something new emerged out of travel, while An-sky reveled in the messy 
complexity of being in the world. An-sky was comfortable with being in multiple positions and 
locations and did not transcend the constraints of the imagined poles of an imposed telos. Rather, 
he immersed himself within the contradictions of the factness of displacement, to use Bammer’s 
and Nelson’s terminology, knowing that a displaced life is itself a survival strategy. He utilized 
memory as a way to navigate the shifting realities in which he found himself. Emplaced 
identities, in all their engagements with the past and projected futures, customs, traditions, and 
newness, highlight continuity, reciprocity, and attachment without reifying such concepts. The 
Oral Torah is not to be transcended, but rather incorporated, lived. One can be both Jewish and 
fully embedded in the surrounding environment. In other words, commitment constitutes a 
generation, and this is an ethical concern that necessitates space, but conscientious living within 
it. 
Margaret Mead spoke of this new way of being as the life of a pioneer. People learn from 
youth and each other, but they still maintain collective reflections on the past while addressing 
different locations and contexts. In this way, many scholars have understood An-sky as serving 
in the role of a meshulach, a messenger, who comes from another world and beckons us to a 
different world, both of which may be in the same location. He is a go-between, an intermediary, 
transmitting both worlds into each other; he does not transcend either, so he is not quite a 
hybrid. Rather, he is a liminal figure, neither of here nor there, but is of and in both. While 
aspects of the journey can be accomplished, such as physical return, too much has happened 
since one’s “origins,” and thus unification and fulfillment of “home” remain impossible. Yet, 
this journey and goal are full of potential. Heschel and others have argued that one reason why 
return is frustrated is because modern humanity has lost the keys and myths to home, and even 
have confused one myth as being the only myth. An-sky and his organization of cultural life, in 
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Vilna, was conscientiously situated. His creativity as a way to live in worlds apart needed 
grounding, however. Nobody lives as herself a free-floating signifier. 
In their calls for contextualization, Israeli authors lamented the current state of affairs 
regarding intergenerational gaps in Israel. Schweid situated his concern in both theological and 
practical terms. There must be a return, he stressed, or an attempt to return, which will include 
in its purview more aspects of Jewish traditions than previous generations had. Israel is not just 
the land of destiny and not just the political entity. It is necessarily both. He understood the 
biblical view that established this paradigm as a series of covenants that must be ever renewed. 
The covenants are ritual (priestly) and moral (prophetic) life; emphasizing one at the expense of 
the other is a sure way to live an unfulfilled existence. Elon also pursued Schweid’s call for 
renewing covenants but focused on the political and personal. He lamented the fact that he saw 
in Israel no shared social purpose. To paraphrase Heschel, Israeli society lacks meaningful 
communities of concern. People are entrenched within the poles of a telos: tradition, origin, and 
future. Yet, their conceptions of these poles and what constitutes living life guided by such are 
poorly understood. The result is a middle, liminal period, which is full of potential, but which in 
his view is slipping away at a frightening speed. People are forgetting and/or dismissing myth, 
are ignorant of events and context, and there is little to sustain the few communities of concern 
that he believes share his concern. 
Elon warned that people are developing moral vertigo; in this scheme, hybridity is 
impossible. He advocated the need to live in the past, present, and future. If one develops 
something new, at the expense of being in this messy complexity, then one leads a superficial 
and inadequate life. Grossman and Oz likewise spoke of a moral autism. They believed that a 
concomitant part of contextualization is comparison, but this implies reciprocity among 
comparing partners, and this does not exist either. In short, the most difficult process is to enact 
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Camus’s “becoming human.” Shavit summed up Israeli society, and many other diasporic 
identities, as being an iridescent kaleidoscope of broken identities. Life there is on the edge, full 
of potential for it is the threshold and limen, and individuals need to realize that their lives are 
not yet realized. The goal remains. 
The data used in these two chapters emphasize moments of encounter and the 
possibilities these have for uncovering recollections and making present unforeseen and 
unanticipated memories. Such confrontation destabilizes that which has become taken-for-
granted and thus renews creativity, even, and especially, while being physically emplaced. The 
resulting intentional separation produced by confrontation, which we see operating in the 
representative Hebrew literature, ethnographies, and journalistic reflections, makes the quotidian 
extraordinary and the already achieved something to be anticipated. This counters previous 
understandings of the Jewish diaspora and “homecoming.” The Land remains contingent, never 
accomplished, and always in a state of “permanent revolution.” Even while being emplaced, 
possibilities exist for re-diasporization. One needs to feel distanced from the Land considered 
“home” in order to return to the condition prior to homecoming. This threshold that re-
presents unforeseen memories is a call for ethical action now, and in the future, of the yet 
unredeemed, of being in imagined diaspora. 
Genetic Testing, Relatedness, and Connection 
In the fourth subset we learn from Bammer that the past is still with us; it is never 
entirely forgotten. She states that when life is viewed as already always in a state of being 
displaced, then home is about separation and commitment; identity is about what we are not, but 
still not able to dispense with; and the politics of identity is an ongoing process of negotiation. In 
other words, diaspora is an ever-present condition that cannot be overcome because one cannot 
overcome longing. Yet, so often people privilege one account of what it is for which they long 
	 292 
to the exclusion of other ways in which they are displaced. In other words, individuals remain 
fragmented, incomplete, and alienated even from their own pasts. Teilhard de Chardin stated 
that humanity exists in a bifurcated condition; materialists tend to emphasize external conditions 
as encompassing reality, while “spiritualists” focus on individual, subjective interior sentiments 
and motivations to the expense of material considerations. Humanity lacks unity, and until one 
recognizes humanity’s wholeness with all of creation, it will continue along this fragmented path. 
Benjamin and Yeshayahu echoed this call to wholeness (i.e., redemption, the messianic 
period) and offered their own versions as to how humanity has become displaced from previous 
wholeness and understanding. Individuals lack contextualization. In their attempt to gain what 
they believe to be a semblance to unity and fuller knowledge, they rely on authoritative narratives 
to explain how things came to be, but unbeknownst to them these explanations are themselves 
solely partial truths. Science offers knowledge that is of no use to religion, and vice versa. A 
reliance on one over the other ignores, forgets, dismisses, etc. significant aspects of one’s past, 
one’s connection to ancestry, to genealogy, and even to one’s well-being. To help us navigate 
this “process of negotiation,” and that which helps to gain contextualization, are myths. They 
help to define and orient people. As Lévi-Strauss, among many others, pointed out, myths have 
continued into postmodernity. History has replaced mythology as the way we gain access to the 
stories and accounts of the pasts. What is needed, however, in his view is explanation and 
translation. 
As he understands it, mythology, history, and even science, share an underlying structure: 
they explain, they demonstrate how constituent parts relate. In fact relatedness is the myth that 
underlies this entire project. It is both a biological and social construct, and in this way it is the 
framework for context and diaspora. Regardless of what myth we utilize (history, theology, 
science, etc.), the uniting factor is one of connection and a related closing of the gap between 
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us/here and them/then. Relatedness urges people to be aware of different registers through 
which one narrates that connection. 
Often when expressing connection, many people downplay the biological aspect, but 
there is a counter tendency. Many people also understand biology as offering a more 
authoritative way to connect, thus they couch social constructions in biological terminology. In 
constructing the past, for example, people conceive of ancestors as biologically prefiguring the 
present generations. Yet examples exist of connectedness that is not biological. Darwin 
understood humanity and evolution as genealogy, and in fact biological connection is another 
way to gauge kinship, which helps to provide a more holistic appreciation of context. Human 
behavior, however, is a product of history and socially produced differences. Genetic testing 
helps to open up varieties of difference and connection. Thus, the appropriate model through 
which to approach human existence is biosocial; you cannot privilege one at the expense of the 
other without risking creating severe gaps in knowledge and analysis. 
Identity is negotiation among many statuses rooted in genetics, biology, behavior, and 
sociopolitical categories. Durkheim even recognized as much. This chapter returns again to 
“origins” of sorts, but focuses on the developed myths that people use to understand what they 
are and how they connect to those origins. This study of mythology, then, is similar to what the 
Annales School and the Durkheimian tradition envisioned. Genetic testing expands the breadth 
and depth of familial connectivity. People construct backwards through time (e.g., using the 
construct of the “grand” relative – grandparent, etc.) and now genetically across space. Genetics 
allows us to understand the meaninglessness of stating that groups of people are races, for there 
exist no discrete groups. Yet, genetics also helps us to locate places in ourselves where biological 
difference does exist and cannot be ignored/dismissed. Thus while the redactors of 
Deuteronomy may have dismissed early Israel’s presence in the land, genetics necessarily cannot, 
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because elements gained there persist in people who migrated out of there; these elements often 
impinge on their well-being. In this way there operates a “statistical race,” which uses numerical 
data to represent population differences, histories, and health – all traceable within the human 
body, the embodiment of difference and unity. 
We construct narratives about ourselves that take the form of kinship; through its system 
of classification we know who and what we are. Biological, legal, social, religious, etc. 
relationships are organized into a coherent framework. With the addition of statistical race, 
which alerts us to underlying realities within us about our distant pasts, we have the opportunity 
to gain new dimensions in our self-perceptions, even if disease is not a physical manifestation of 
such difference. Classical race is not diagnostic of ancestry, and diseases are not diagnostic of 
race. But knowing our ancestry and genetic difference saves lives and expands our myths of 
kinship, distance, connection, and understandings of home. In this way, each life is lived on the 
frontier. There exist increasingly fewer rigid boundaries, and as a result we are bombarded by 
constant confrontation and accommodation. The fan of memory in fact never ceases to unfold. 
These spaces of rupture, liminality, violation, and thresholds are motion-oriented. In addressing 
them, the myths are multiple but unitary in their attempt at explanation. 
We can speak of Jews, for instance, not as a race or nation, but as a people who share 
myths, culture, historical experience, and for some individuals, biological substrate – real or 
imagined. Depending on when and how one views migration, different pictures emerge. If one 
sees renewed migrations, then it is easy to characterize Jews as always being estranged, in exile, 
and “homeless.” Yet, when viewed as part of human migratory patterns, then one sees continual 
processes of movement over many millennia. Jews, then, are always migratory, even if the 
originary movement (as depicted in scripture) was imaginary. The people included elements 
from settled populations, but built an identity as one of migration. In light of archaeology, one 
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sees settlements in Canaan and then migration. The people Israel was located but imagined itself 
as migratory. Genetics offers another myth. Jews share elements with both Semitic and 
European populations. Belonging, then, is a relative term. It is psychological, historical, and 
biological. We all belong to multiple families, and it behooves us to question just who comprises 
“we,” when “we” began, from what and where we feel displaced and separated, and what feeling 
“at home” entails. 
 And what might be next in the study of diasporas? Studies in Zionism and the 
relationship between American Jewish communities and Israel, for instance, have historically 
separated into two streams of thought: one focusing on the historical and sociological aspects of 
lived reality, the other on theoretical engagement. While there are moments of confluence 
between the two streams (e.g., Zionist congresses proceeding from ideological debate to physical 
and political enactments), most studies have continued to privilege one stream to the exclusion 
of the other. 
“Post-Zionism” is perhaps the most notable example of this trend. What began with 
questioning accepted, dominant societal narratives and the state of Israeli historiography quickly 
turned to questioning the state of Israel’s very existence. As a result of the turn to a 
preoccupation with the ideational, such studies have produced a skewed, divisive outlook lacking 
in historical depth and tangency to daily life. Eran Kaplan postulated that post-Zionism has 
proven unable to respond to persistent modernist tendencies, such as continued calls by 
nationalist groups for territorial states. He relates that the postmodern quest for unbounded 
openness rejecting any “grand” narratives or imposed (societal) order manifests itself, when 
applied to Jews, Judaism, and Zionism, as a resuscitation of the idea of the wandering, diasporic 
Jew. This “new” universalism denies Israel and Jews (political) borders and territorialism due to 
their supposed concomitant marginalization of others. Yet, the “modern” insistence on 
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“possessing” a territorial state is unabating among other groups worldwide. 
Theodore Sasson proffers that many scholars have misunderstood the historical and 
sociological trends of American Jewish relations with Israel. While some see a distancing by 
American Jews from Israel, attributed to political alienation toward Israeli policies, Sasson 
suggests that evidence instead points to increased engagement with Israel but in different forms 
than in the past. American Jews no longer rely on hegemonic institutions for information and 
guidance regarding Israel and Israeli policies. Rather, Sasson argues, American Jews have entered 
a period of “direct engagement” with Israel: seeking out information about Israel directly and 
donating to independent advocacy groups. Yet, even Sasson’s nuanced understanding of 
American Jewish groups’ relationships to Israel relies exclusively on survey and interview data, 
much to the exclusion of their intersection with theoretical issues that others have critiqued. 
Future work might attempt to bridge the divide between these two oftentimes 
competing streams by bringing to bear on American Jewish-Israel relations an overlooked aspect 
of Israeli and Jewish identity: its situation into the interconnected Mediterranean milieu, as 
opposed to emphasis as refuge. One way to approach this change in perspective is to utilize the 
work of collective memory studies, especially as it relates to investigating the idea of “diaspora.” 
As I explored in this dissertation, it is not always the case that something external precipitates a 
group into a diaspora. As a result of the limited, often historically superficial approaches, many 
other ways in which diaspora exists have been overlooked, particularly the work that memory 
performs in opening up diaspora’s multivalence. Therefore, as I argued, it is necessary to view 
diaspora as an experience that is itself a commemoration needing to be remembered and 
enacted. Incorporating memory into an analysis of diaspora uncovers further ways in which a 
group may enter a state of diaspora. 
By continuing to utilize Benjamin’s insight into the relationship between place and 
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memory, Bakhtin’s chronotope, and Heschel’s understanding of the land itself being a threshold 
that is never accomplished, this places into question post-Zionist sentiments, according to 
which, the State of Israel is the realization of Zionist ideology, signaling diaspora’s end. The 
conclusion I reach, that processes of re-diasporization need physical emplacement (in the Land 
considered “home”) as the means to achieve unanticipated separation and distance, which entails 
an ethical decision on how to respond accordingly, echoes Eran Kaplan’s concept of being 
“beyond post-Zionism.” Yet, this entrenchment within the ideational needs grounding in the 
historical and experiential. As David Ohana reminds us, however, alternative perspectives on 
Jewish history and identity have precedents in lived reality. Options of remaining within the 
system of territorial states, but with constructed identities encompassing more inclusive 
horizons, exist in those visionaries who understood Israeli and Jewish identity as Mediterranean, 
not solely the refuge of persecuted Ashkenazim. This system maintained discrete boundaries, but 
opened up paths to more inclusive identities and interconnections. 
This Levantine memory, however, is overlooked, or ignored, or simply unknown in 
Jewish sources about Judaism and Israel. I propose to examine how American Jewish schools 
(day schools and supplemental Hebrew and Sunday schools) discuss Israel in educational 
materials, how Israel is portrayed in American Jewish communal organizations (e.g., AIPAC and 
J Street), and how journalists understand Israel in magazines and newspapers (e.g., The Forward, 
Commentary Magazine, and Tablet). Such an understanding of Israel and Jewish identity, which 
opens up Israeli and Jewish history to their rich situation in the Near East, expands Sephardic 
and Mizrahi perspectives (religious, social, political, cultural) that are not necessarily haredi. This 
inclusivity and openness, while maintaining the integrity of the state, may be more appealing to 
American Jews and broaden their appreciation of the necessity of a state and of the development 
of their socio-religio-political traditions in relation to Israel. 
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